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Nowadays, the G77 is a key factor in North-South negotiations at the UN to 
achieve global commitments.  On the understanding that neoliberalism is an economic 
rationale that strongly influences the relationship between North and South, this research 
explores the influence of a primordial neoliberalism in Latin American interest in taking 
part in the G77 at the First United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).   
Utilising the ideas of Michel Foucault to analyse discourses of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) since its incorporation into the G77 
establishment, this work claims that the neoliberal rationale in part lies behind the 
mechanism that leads Latin American countries to take part in the G77 at the UNCTAD 
I. This mechanism is the need for development and the consequent concept of 
“developing country” reinforced by the G77 at the UN negotiations.  
In particular, the lack of natural resources in international markets due to the 
world wars produced the need for surveillance of non-industrialised countries. This 
surveillance, called here “Police of Development”, was supported by knowledge of 
natural resources provided by the ECLA, and reinforced the differentiation of countries. 
This differentiation promoted the need for industrialisation and the need for development. 
Thus, in a context of lack of financing and deterioration of the international terms of trade 
of natural resources, Latin Americans seeking development present themselves as 
“developing” countries in their international negotiations through the G77.  
The idea of development encourages the production and export of natural 
resources, which is necessary for a continuous availability of raw materials in 
international trade to maintain the expansion of markets, a basic precept of neoliberalism.
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Neoliberalism that has been deployed in relation to the South in the last decades 
has involved the change of several governmental policies.1 In Latin America, neoliberal 
strategies that started with the coup against the Chilean government in 19732 meant the 
restructuration of laws and regulations related to economic processes, and implied a re-
institutionalisation of state in areas related to capital accumulation.3 In a positive way, 
neoliberal financial cooperation programs in the 1990s helped to overcome the structural 
deficit of domestic savings in Latin America. For example, the countercyclical behaviour 
promoted by the World Bank allowed cushioning of the impact of the slowdown in private 
flows in the region when economic performance was highly dependent on capital 
inflows.4 
Likewise, neoliberal implementation meant the transformation of foreign policies 
and, consequently, a change of the Latin American paradigm of international integration. 
According to Cervo, due to a change in international trade rules foreign policies adopted 
an economic perspective more than a political one. The implementation of neoliberal 
strategy in Latin American foreign policies triggered the following: 
The foreign ministries were largely silenced, as they were guardians of the political 
heritage of developmental philosophy. Their sphere of action was confined to ornamental 
diplomacy that included the new themes of fashion, such as global governance, the 
environment, human rights and humanitarian interventions. The substantial international 
politics, such as trade, finance, business linkages or transfers of privatized assets moved to 
the command of the economic ministries, occupied by young people who mostly had done 
graduate in the US Universities or they had served in technical agencies such as the IMF 
and the World Bank.5 
                                                          
1 Peck, 2004; Harvey, 2005; Castree, 2009; Tickell & Peck, 2003 
2 Ffrench-Davis, 2003:81 
3 Harvey, 2005; Tickell & Peck, 2003; Peck, 2004; Perreault and Martin, 2003; Castree, 2009 
4 Tietelman, 2002 
5 Cervo, 2000: 8 
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The change of foreign policies due to neoliberalism has also influenced Latin 
American multilateral objectives. For example, in the 90s the cooperation among Latin 
American countries and their multilateral interests moved to industrialised states in search 
of new markets6. The principal focus for cooperation was the United States.  
Interestingly, despite the impact of neoliberalism in foreign ministries of Latin 
American countries, at the international level the commitment to neoliberalism and its 
economical precepts has not been clear. For example, from the beginning of 
neoliberalism, some governments in the region have been part of groups internationally 
recognised as neoliberals, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OCDE), and the G20.  
For example, Chile and Mexico are part of the OCDE, while Brazil and Argentina 
are part of the G20. At the same time, these very countries have been part of the G77, the 
negotiation group formed by developing countries in 1964 to improve, among other 
issues, the terms of trade of natural resources at the UN;7 it has a recognised discourse 
against the North and its international neoliberal economic system.8 The North-South 
divide has been influenced by neoliberal ideas.9  
The G7710  is according to itself: 
[…] the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries in the United 
Nations which provides the means for the countries of the south to articulate and promote 
their collective economic interest and enhance their joint negotiating capacity in all major 
international economic issues within the united nations system, and promote South-South 
cooperation for development.11 
The G77 represents the South in its claims for solutions to the unfairness that its 
members face in the international arena.12 This negotiation group emerged in the 1960s, 
in the middle of the Cold War and before the neoliberal deployment in Latin America, 
specifically to address common problems about development whose resolution would 
                                                          
6 Viola, 2004; Legler & Santa Cruz, 2011 
7 Fogarty, 2013:131; Krasner, 1985 
8 Yamin and Depledge, 2004:35; Dosman, 2008; Kasa, Gullberg & Heggelund, 2008 
9 Arrighi, Silver and Brewe, 2003 
10 About the G77. In: www.g77.org/doc/ 
11 About the G77. In: www.g77.org/doc/ 
12 Krasner, 1985 
 
 
require the consolidation of international institutions to replace the global economic 
system and implement a New International Economic Order (NIEO)13. Broadly, the 
NIEO meant a common interest in the achievement of comprehensive economic 
arrangements in favour of all developing countries that suffer inequity and economic 
marginalisation, and which need more opportunities in the international economic 
system.14 The group has maintained its aims up to the present day.  
In general terms, the South’s position through the G77 has been built around the 
conditions of commodity trade.15 Thus, in the North-South relationship the North claims 
the desirability of free trade without any recognition of the costs of adjustment inflicted 
by sharp increases in imports, while the South takes the northern rhetoric at face value 
and believes that political pressures which impede southern exports are simple evidence 
of northern greed and intransigence.16  
Common elements in the demands of developing countries through the G77 at 
the UN, such as its rejection of the neoliberal economic system, reinforce the idea of a 
joint South despite this group having always been composed of heterogeneous countries.17 
Indeed, the belongingness of developing countries to the South is still in debate. 
According to Williams: 
While Third World countries may share similar characteristics, the idea of a Third World 
is essentially a term referring to identity rather than an objective fact. In taking an identity 
or psychological approach to the concept of the Third World, I do not intend to imply that 
this “imagined community” is divorced from material reality. Indeed, the continued 
reference to a Third World, and a persistence in constructing a coalition (of sorts) in 
environmental negotiations is the result of a mix of factors.18 
At this point it is important to note that despite it being possible to use the term 
Third World as a synonym of  the South and “developing country” each of  these terms 
refers to a specific period of  time and context. Most specifically, the term Third World 
                                                          
13 Chasek and Rajamani, 2003; Patel, 2007 
14 Rodrigues, 2010; Costa, 2012 
15 Rothstein, 1979:51 
16 Gray, 1985:325 
17 Williams, 2005; Najam, 2005; Narlikar, 2006 
18 Williams 2005:52 
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responds to the historical context of  the Cold War in which the First World was the 
Capitalist NATO bloc, the Second World was the Socialist economies of  Europe and the 
Third world was the unaligned countries.19 The dualism of  North-South represents the 
differentiation of  parts within an international structural system.20 In this context, Smith21 
claims that the dualism North-South is: 
[…] based in the assumption that the under-development of  one region was structurally 
necessary for the development of  the other. […] The argument recognized that the social 
and economic changes of  the South – with particular emphasis given the state intervention 
– were not aimed at developing the region by actually were intended to avoid conflicts 
which might hamper growth in the North.22 
In spite of  this, the North-South model seems to be more representative of  current 
international politics; in this research the dualism of  developed/developing country and 
industrialised and no-industrialised economy is meant. This is because this differentiation 
represents more clearly the historical period that the study explores. 
Thus, despite the G77 always being composed of  economically heterogeneous 
countries, at the UN it defends a host of  common elements,23 such as economic growth, 
international political equality, influence in international decision-making arenas, 
autonomy and independence, the preservation of  territorial integrity from external 
invasion or internal fragmentation, the dissemination of  new world views at the global 
level, and the maintenance of  domestic regime stability.24 
Hansen25 claims that many items on the agendas of  Global North-South 
negotiations have been about rules for industrial and raw-material trade, international 
finance, foreign aid, and multinational corporations, the use of  the “global commons”, 
and control and reform of  international institutions. Prashad26 for his part states that the 
Global South has defended three main elements: peace, bread and justice. Specifically:  
                                                          
19 Escobar, 2011 
20 Smith, 1992 
21 Smith, 1992:187 
22 Smith, 1992:187 
23 Williams, 2005; Najam, 2005; Narlikar, 2006 
24 Krasner, 1985:13. Also see: Wriggins,1978; Rothstein, 1979:3 
25 Hansen, 1979 
26 Prashad, 2013:45-47  
 
 
Peace: The Third World Project kept faith with the Bandung communiqué, which called 
for “the regulation, limitation, control and reduction of all armed forces and armaments, 
including the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of all weapons of 
mass destruction, and to establish effective international controls to this end.” The 
International Atomic Energy Agency of 1957 was a child of Bandung, and a cornerstone 
of the Third World Project. 
Bread: The new nations of Africa and Asia and the renewed national agendas of Latin 
America explicitly recognized that the countries they had seized were impoverished. Any 
direction forward would have to confront the legacy of colonial economy, with the 
advantages seized by the Atlantic powers and the trade rules drawn up to benefit those 
historical, not comparative, advantages. 
Justice: The UN had been hijacked by the five permanent members of the Security 
Council. The IMF and the World Bank had been captured by the Atlantic powers, and 
the GATT was designed to undermine any attempt by the new nations to revise the 
international economic order. It was hoped that NAM, and the G77, would put pressure 
on the West and the East to afford political space to the new nations.27 
Thus the North-South divide has become a way to describe international 
structural inequalities at international level that separate rich and poor states.28 The 
request of the South for special treatment in international trade is a fundamental part of 
the North-South division. 
In the inception of the G77 and the definition of its demands, Latin America 
played a relevant role.29 This region defined mainstream thinking that identified the 
South’s need to improve the terms of trade of natural resources and consequently 
determined differences between the South and the North. Historically, Latin American 
and Yugoslav initiatives led the way for what became the G77 at the UNCTAD I in 
1964,30 while the rise of new states in Asia and Africa helped to increase the need to solve 
global inequality in the international arena. The deep theorisation of Latin America on 
                                                          
27 Prashad, 2013: 45-47 
28 Kegley, 2009:101-102;  
Love, 2010  
30 Geldart and Lyon, 1980 
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international trade matters and their relation to inequality suffered by countries in the 
region put the Southern perspective in a relevant place at international level.31  
The greatest Latin American contribution to the G77’s perspective was the 
knowledge that gave support to several theories about underdevelopment. These emerged 
in the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) under the leadership of  Raul 
Prebisch. Despite these theories arising in the 60s, in the 50s Prebisch had already started 
this stream with the identification of  a world economy structure organised into centre-
periphery. This structure was an optional vision to classical economic understanding 
about the development of  under-developing countries. In fact, in its theories of  
modernisation, classical economics argued that major barriers to development were posed 
by the Global South countries’ own internal characteristics. This classical economic vision 
was represented in Walt Rostow’s theory, formalised in his book The Stages of  Economic 
Growth: a Non-Communist Manifesto.32 
The work of  Prebisch was oriented to questioning some important ideas in 
classical and neoclassical economy, mainly those that talk about the international trade 
of  raw materials.33 In his vision, the international structure that sustained comparatives 
advantages for some nations under some conditions, could not foster development and 
equality among other nations, mainly the peripheral ones.34 He wanted to understand 
causes and dynamics in the inequalities between producers and exporters of  industrialised 
products and producers of  raw materials. He concluded that the international structure 
promotes detrimental terms of  trade that could be solved by different economic measures, 
but mainly by the promotion of  industrialisation. 
In different scholarly traditions, these theories are sustained in the concept of 
dependence, which refers to aspects of relational asymmetry in international and 
transnational trade relations.35 According to Dos Santos36: 
                                                          
31 Love, 2010 
32 Rostow, 1960 
33 Valdés, 2009 
34 UNCTAD, 1964b:773 
35 Duvall, 1978 
36 Dos Santos, 1968:6.  
 
 
By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is 
conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former 
is subjected. The relation of inter-dependence between two or more economies, and 
between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries 
(the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the 
dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either 
a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development.37 
In other words, underdevelopment is not some passive lack of activity by states, 
it is an active, intended condition imposed on those economies as part of their place in 
the international economic structure. The beginning of theories about underdevelopment 
attempted to explain the international limits of the development of Latin American 
countries as an unequal relation of trade in an historical period after the world wars. In 
the 1970s literature about the dependence theory started the debate about this issue from 
a global perspective. Cai38  stated that dependence theory established four central diverse 
aspects: 
[…] (1) underdevelopment is closely connected with the expansion of the industrialized 
capitalist countries (2) development and underdevelopment are diverse aspect of the same 
universal process (3) underdevelopment cannot be considered as the original condition in 
an evolutionary process (4) dependency is not only an external phenomenon but is also 
manifested in different ways in the internal (social, ideological and political) structure.39  
This Latin American knowledge about dependence in trade matters was deployed 
toward developing countries from Asia and Africa and it contributed to reinforcing the 
Southern perspective through the G77 about the inequality of the international system.40 
Indeed, the original UNCTAD I program was the ECLA’s one, extended to the global 
level.41  
Returning to neoliberalism, Michel Foucault proposes that government has a 
mentality that can be expressed as governmental rationality (or political rationality) that 
                                                          
37 Dos Santos, 1968:6 
38 Cai, 2010:23 
39 Cai, 2010:23 
40 Prashad, 2013 
41 Love, 2010 
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guides the objectives of  its power.42 This rationality, which started to be developed at the 
end of  the Second World War,43 can be instrumentalised by ‘governmental technologies’,44 
which are heterogeneous mechanisms that use and create knowledge45. According to 
Rose46, a technology of  government is an 
[…] assemblage of  forms of  practical knowledge, with modes of  perception, practices of  
calculation, vocabularies, types of  authority, forms of  judgement, architectural forms, 
human capacities, non-human objects and devices, inscription techniques and so forth, 
these are heterogeneous, made up of  a diversity of  objects and relations linked up through 
connections and relays of  different types.47 
 Likewise, according to Foucault48 the forms of governmental rationality called 
liberalism and neoliberalism have the political economy as their principal form of 
knowledge. Dean49 states that: 
[…] technologies include mechanisms by which specific aspects of  governed reality are 
rendered both knowable and amenable to governing. Thus the broad distinction between 
rationality and technology may be one between the representation of  and intervention 
into specific governmental domains, but this distinction is also present within the 
technologies themselves. Political rationality may generally codify and assemble particular 
technologies within various programmes, but the technologies themselves are a condition 
for that rationality and have forms of  rationality inscribed within them.50 
Historically, the deployment of neoliberalism can be organised into three stages 
outlined by Harvey and by Tickell & Peck. Nowadays, neoliberalism consolidates itself 
into its third stage as a political theory.51 In the previous stage, neoliberalism was in 
transition and accordingly in experimentation. In the first stage neoliberalism was created 
as a political idea and it was in this period that the ECLA knowledge was produced, and 
the G77 was established.  
                                                          
42 Miller and Rose, 1990  
43 Foucault, 2008; Polanyi, 1944; Ruggie, 1982; Mirowski & Plehwe, 2015 
44 Rose and Miller, 1992:176  
45 Miller and Rose, 1990 
46 Rose, 1999:52 
47 Rose,1999: 52 
48 Foucault, 2008:20 
49 Dean, 1994:188 
50 Dean 1994:188 
51 Harvey, 2005; Tickell & Peck, 2003; Craig & Porter, 2006 
 
 
The current, third phase began in the 1990s, and it is called ‘Roll-out 
neoliberalism’ by Tickell & Peck.52 In this period, neoliberalism acquires a ‘diffuse but 
consolidated form’, becoming a global and institutional hegemonic ideology.53 The 
international neoliberal thinking produces a shift of focus regarding multilateral 
institutions due to variations of mainstream political discourses. Neoliberalism sequesters 
the ‘key economic policy issues beyond the reach of explicit politicisation’, and most 
importantly, it can ‘become more deeply embedded in international law’.54  
Craig & Porter55 see from the early 1990s a birth of ‘neoliberal institutionalised 
development’ which they identify as a historical moment of neoliberal dominance over 
development. This perspective has played a key role in the construction of the neoliberal 
paradigm in developing countries, summarised in the term ‘good governance’. This 
concept has allowed international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, o 
reinvent their work, image and developmental thinking as a whole.   
The second stage, called ‘Roll-back neoliberalism’ by Tickell & Peck,56 occurred 
in the 1980s. To Harvey57 this is a neoliberal stage of transition and experimentation in 
which neoliberalism turns into a dominant state strategy. Neoliberal discourse, as a result 
of strategies of inflation and stabilisation in the UK and the US, becomes focused on the 
promotion of individual freedoms and the implementation of new monetary policies. The 
global political arena was based on the fundamentalist idea of the “free market” and neo-
liberal policies, with their philosophical underpinnings disseminated and supported by the 
media.58 The second stage finished when the Washington Consensus was established in 
the early 90s.59 The end of this period was marked by an economic recession in the USA 
and the UK; however, the neoliberal project did not succumb, and on the contrary, this 
just implied a normalisation of neoliberal modes of regulation.60 
                                                          
52 Tickell & Peck, 2003:168 
53 Tickell & Peck, 2003:168 
54 Peck & Tickell, 2002; Tickell & Peck 2003; Routledge, 2003 
55 Craig & Porter, 2006:15 
56 Tickell & Peck, 2003:168 
57 Harvey, 2005 
58 Boutros-Ghali & Gosovic, 2011.  
59 Harvey, 2005 
60 Tickell & Peck, 2003 
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In the ‘Roll-back neoliberalism’ at international level, Breton Wood institutions 
become counterparts in the South-North division; they do so by suggesting neoliberal 
reforms to the South and guaranteed capital placement to the North.61 For example, the 
G7, a northern group mostly intent on re­establishings the North’s neoliberal dominance, 
moved to use the debt crisis of the 1980s to its advantage, and to push through a new 
intellectual property and trade regime to consolidate the gains of the North against the 
South.62   
In this period the North sought to neutralise any possible dissent or challenge to 
the supremacy of the resurgent system in the UN arena - this means to neutralize the 
collective South via the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).63 They did 
this mainly because these groups promoted systemic demand for equity for developing 
countries in the international economy. Indeed, in the work and outputs of the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development, they seek the implementation of an international 
development agenda. Also, in the Declaration and Program of Action on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), they demand the 
democratisation of world politics and institutions.64  
The beginning stage of neoliberalism and the one of interest for this research is 
called ‘Proto-neoliberalism’ by Tickell & Peck65 and ‘embedded liberalism’ by Harvey.66 
Proto–neoliberalism ranges from 1950 to 1980 whiles ‘embedded liberalism’67 ranges from 
the end of the World War I up to 1970. Its characteristics at national level were the 
intensification of economy regulation, changing industrial policies and change in the 
system of social protection. These shifts, generated in a polarised debate between social 
democracy and central planning, were developed in a regulated environment. In this 
period the neoliberal common sense nourished by corporations and the consumption 
desire was created, championed as the economic and industrial strategy to follow.68 
                                                          
61 Murray, 2011 
62 Boutros-Ghali & Gosovic, 2011 
63 Prashad, 2013 
64 Boutros-Ghali & Gosovic, 2011 
65 Tickell & Peck, 2003:168 
66 Harvey, 2005:11 
67 As described in Ruggie, 1982 
68 Harvey, 2005 
 
 
This stage of neoliberalism was originally perceived as an experimental treatment 
for developing economies such as the Latin American ones. Its “treatment” were 
supported by an influential intellectual movement from the University of Chicago which 
focused on embedding the world with market relations based in Think Tanks and other 
neoliberal networks.69 It was a period of ideas, in Britain associated with the 
predominance of financial markets, and in Chile with the liberalisation of the economy 
within  a dictatorial regime.70 The G77 was established in this period. 
Globally, the period was characterised by the construction of new institutions to 
keep economic stability and to assist international relations to ensure peace and to 
improve international affairs.71 Here is when Southern criticism of equity in international 
trade starts. During the 1960s and 70s, as a way to address the inequalities in the 
international trade, the ECLA set out a coherent alternative of political economy to this 
dominant liberal order. The alternative was intended to allow developing countries, 
through the G77, to challenge the existing international order thanks to its increasing 
assertiveness and growing bargaining power.72 In the early 1970s during the Cold War 
initiatives and agenda of the South began to take form after the OPEC oil price rise and 
the 1974 Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly. This assembly adopted the 
Declaration and the Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO, part of the Seoul Declaration, was the first 
manifestation of the newfound power of the G7773. Meanwhile, the UNCTAD played a 
vital role in energising the developing countries’ group position and thrust.74  
Given that neoliberal ideas had an early emergence in the international arena, and 
given that these coincided with the emergence of multilateral institutions75, neoliberal 
purposes could be related to Latin American knowledge that underlay the foundation of 
the G77. Moreover, the interest in terms of trade of natural resources in Latin America 
had something to say in the complete context in which neoliberalism was structured. 
                                                          
69 Van Horn, 2009. 
70 Tickell & Peck, 2003 
71 Harvey, 2005 
72 Prashad, 2012 
73 Lipschutz & Rowe, 2005 
74 Boutros-Ghali & Gosovic, 2011 
75 Polanyi, 1944; Ruggie, 1982; Mirowski & Plehwe, 2015 
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Therefore, the identification of technologies related to the knowledge produced by the 
ECLA could show how neoliberalism was related to the participation of Latin American 
countries in the G77 at the first UNCTAD. 
Regarding that knowledge, Ong76 states that neoliberalism has the aim of 
‘reconfiguring relationships between governing and the governed, power and knowledge, 
and sovereignty and territoriality’, which tells us that neoliberalism can be conceptualised 
as a new relationship between government and knowledge. Therefore, the knowledge 
produced by the ECLA could be related to neoliberalism, even when neoliberalism was 
at an incipient stage. Indeed, in the Foucauldian perspective, neoliberalism as a rationality 
of government produces knowledge that can guide/transform governmental practices and 
make them useful for their intentions. Political rationality assembles particular 
technologies and knowledge in its service. 
The ECLA’s knowledge that produced the discourses against mainstream political 
economy could be related to a system of  power that guides governmental practices. 
Indeed, the knowledge established by Latin America through the ECLA to define the 
problems of  the South and those that criticise northern neoliberalism are interlinked and 
mutually reinforced. It is clear that the context in which the South’s discourses against the 
neoliberal economic system has been used to sustain the G77’s existence is not just part 
of  a theoretical analysis, but is also a political one. 
 Thus, given that neoliberalism is the a ‘malleable technology of  government’ that 
produces new forms of  sovereignty,77 and which has influenced, in several ways, the 
developing countries’ practices, such as foreign policies, identifying the role of  
neoliberalism in policies can be straightforward. However, it is not so easy to locate the 
role of  neoliberalism in practices that a priori look like resisting neoliberal precepts and 
that began before the neoliberal deployment, such as Latin American participation in the 
G77 at the UN negotiations. 
 Though it is clear that some neoliberal ideas influenced the process of  the 
institutionalisation of  the international economy and the use of  their resources, it is not 
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evident that the process was related to neoliberalism and the production of  the ECLA’s 
knowledge, employed by Latin America through the G77 and its discourse against the 
neoliberal economic order. 
Some questions therefore arise: 
What is the purpose behind the ECLA declaration about economic unfairness in 
trade? Was the knowledge of development and the terms of trade of natural resources 
produced by Latin America, that triggered the G77, linked to neoliberalism? How is the 
idea of “underdeveloped country” related to neoliberalism? 
Thus, the hypothesis of this research is: 
Early neoliberalism is implicit in the process that led to Latin American countries 
taking part in the G77 at the first UNCTAD. 
The main question of this study is:  
How is early neoliberalism implied in the process that led to Latin American 
countries taking part in the G77 at the first UNCTAD? 
The main aim is: 
To identify the mechanism that links neoliberalism with the participation of Latin 
American countries in the G77 at the first UNCTAD. 
Specific aims: 
- Delineate the case study to explore the historical beginning of Latin American 
involvement in the G77, and its relation with neoliberalism.  
- Identify the power/knowledge system related to the ECLA interest in improving 
the terms of trade and its relation to Latin American in the G77 at the UNCTAD I. 
- Identify the problematisation that led to this power/knowledge system and how 
this is related to neoliberalism. 
- Propose a mechanism that links the Latin American practice of taking part in 
the G77 with neoliberalism.  
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To answer the research question about Latin American interest in the inception 
of the G77 and neoliberalism this study will explore the ECLA’s discourses using 
Foucauldian methods. Latin America has been chosen because this region was the most 
active in the inception of the G77; the ELCA archive has been selected because it brings 
together knowledge about this process. In order to achieve the methodological purposes, 
this research also uses other UN archives, mainly those from the UNGA resolutions and 
the UNCTAD I process. The scope for analysis is found in the UNGA archive from its 
beginning to the present, while the UNCTAD I and ECLA archives are checked 
exhaustively from their beginning to the inception of the G77. Also used in support are 
the archives of the ITO conference and the archives from the Bretton Woods institution’s 

















2. 1.2 General Background 
                                        
1.2.1 The complexity of  neoliberalism  
Neoliberalism has emerged as one of the key concepts for studies of cultural and 
political-economic change on a global scale. However, there is a challenge in discerning 
its limits.78 By and large, neoliberalism is a concept that significantly varies according to 
the context prevailing in each field; hence, it is possible to propose different 
understandings of neoliberalism. For example, Tickell & Peck79 define neoliberalism as 
‘the mobilisation of the state power in the contradictory extension and reproduction of 
market rule’. 
The precise scope of neoliberalism cannot be fully defined in advance because it 
is related to the context in which it is studied. For example, in the paradigm influenced 
by post-structuralism that explores the shift in governmentality, neoliberalism can be 
considered as modern governmentality characterised by having intrinsic limits formulated 
in terms of economic truths, in contrast to the past where limits were formalised by 
jurisdictions.80 Harvey, with a Marxist perspective on neoliberalism, defines it as the 
‘theory of political, economic practices’. Hartwick & Peet81 talk about ‘advanced 
neoliberalism’ characterised by a changing relationship between citizens and the national 
state, and by the changing conceptions of the meaning of society in this connection. As 
an economic discourse, neoliberalism rests on the principle that individual freedom is only 
possible through the markets82 and therefore seeks to insulate itself from Keynesian and 
development economics and politics.83  
Neoliberalism is widely used to explain topics such as market freedom, individual 
liberties and the reduction of state apparatus,84 and has among its aims economic growth 
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and hence the creation of a ‘good business climate’.85 Neoliberalism protects individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms through the development of an efficient institutional 
framework, based on private property rights, free markets and free trade. 
From a sociological point of view, neoliberalism is the element whereby 
commercial transactions are introduced into society, while from a political perspective 
neoliberalism is the scope to intervene in and administrate the state.86 In this context, 
neoliberalism has been oriented to optimise conditions for capital accumulation no matter 
what the consequences for employment or social well-being.87 These drastic changes 
intended to protect freedom have produced, in many governments, a restructuring of the 
laws, policies and regulations that govern the economic process, like intellectual 
protection legislation and the availability of financial resources. The mobilisation of state 
power has implied the development of a new form of statecraft to manage the 
consequences and contradictions of international marketisation.88  
Regarding spatial location, according to Ong,89 neoliberalism evolves in line with 
the places and cultures where it is deployed and with the depth in which it is established. 
Thus, it could be understood as a process that evolves unevenly.90 It has undergone several 
transformations due to the obstacles and opposition in the places in which it has been 
implemented. Accordingly, the concrete shape of the neoliberal project has always been 
variable institutionally, across space as well as through time.91 This variability is the 
reason neoliberalism is often confused with Globalisation; both terms represent the 
relatively uncontrolled advance of market forces at a particular time.92 
Clearly, there is a common sense about neoliberalism that in general leads to it 
being thought a transparent term that defines a political-economic ideology, and that this 
term is easily applicable in a historically isolated way.93 However, the 90s was the period 
that agglomerated the political concepts of neoliberalism and when it became a central 
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element in theoretical reflection. Hence, the analysis of neoliberalism in practice that 
happens before or after that period can see it as an anachronism, mainly because 
neoliberalism is an open historical process that is changing. Therefore, in its use for 
research, the critical and theoretical reflection on the concept have to be done in a 
continuous form. 
It is important to take into account that the understanding of neoliberalism that 
includes policies of free trade, privatisation and stabilisation has a close association with 
multilateralism. For example, according to Gardner94, multilateralism 
[…] means fewer obstacles to the movement of  goods and capital. Trade trend to flow in 
accordance with relative price consideration instead of  being channelled in one direction 
or another by the need to strike bilateral balance. Purchases can be made in the cheapest 
foreign market and sales in the most lucrative. Such system promotes the international 
division of  labour and encourages each country to specialize in the production of  those 
things in which it enjoys the greatest comparative advantage. Two important advantages 
maybe claimed for this regime. First, the most is made at any given time of  the world's 
existing stock of  productive resources. Second, that stock of  resources will be likely to 
increase over time more rapidly than under any alternative system. The latter result will 
occur because capital will be induced to flow to those part of  the world economy where it 
can make the greatest net contribution to productivity. At the same time, productivity will 
be stimulated by competitive forces acting through the operation of  the market 
mechanism. In this way Multilateralism will tend to maximize the real income of  the 
world as a whole.95  
In this context, Cox96 identifies two types of multilateralism, political 
multilateralism, an inter-state cooperation exercised by governments, and the economic 
multilateralism that represent the world economy. In the words of Cox:97 
Economic multilateralism meant the structure of world economy most conductive to 
capital expansion on a world scale; and political multilateralism meant the 
institutionalized arrangements made at that time and in those conditions for inter-state 
cooperation on common problems. There was, for some people, an implicit compatibility, 
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even identity between economic and political aspect of multilateralism: political 
multilateralism had as a primary goal the security and maintenance of economic 
multilateralism, the underpinning of growth in the world order. Other saw contradiction 
between economic and political aspects: political multilateralism for them existed to 
correct the inequities that resulted from the world economy, leading for instance, in the 
1960s, to a demand for the institutionalization of a New International Order.98 
Multilateralism is a highly exigent institutional form.99 In general terms, 
multilateralism provides more democratic means by which global issues should be 
addressed and how states should address them.100 Despite the meaning of multilateralism 
changing little over the years,101 the multilateral process has been adapted to new 
challenges, national interests, actors, norms and political traditions and cultures.102 
Therefore, multilateralism is considered a social construction that is constantly changing 
accordingly to space and time.103  
 For all purposes and despite the term is not a central part of this research, this 
study uses the term multilateralism in the understanding of Ruggie,104 who commonly 
refers to it as ‘an institutional form in international relations that coordinates relations 
among three or more states by generalised principles of conduct – that is, principles which 
specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions without regard to particularistic interest 
of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence’.105 This 
concept of multilateralism was adopted in 1945 when the United States defined it as the 
‘international governance of the many’.106 
Broadly speaking, the neoliberal order is a form of  free trade predicated upon 
domestic interventionism,107 while neoliberalism refers to the application of  the principles 
of  neoclassical economics to economic development and other aspects of  economic 
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affairs.108 This liberalisation of  trade generally rests on the theory of  comparative 
advantage of  David Ricardo, who in his Principles of  Political Economy and Taxation of  1821 
concludes that each state can gain by specialising in the product where it has a 
comparative advantage and the resulting trade of  this product. This theory is based on 
Adam Smith’s seminal work, The Wealth of  Nations. 
 
1.2.1.1 Analytics of  Foucauldian neoliberalism 
 Given that the period covered by this research is one in which neoliberalism, as is 
known, was not deployed in Latin America, and because this study is oriented to 
understand neoliberalism over practices of  government, neoliberalism is not addressed as 
an economic doctrine that explains the world economy and its societal results. Here, 
rather, it is understood as a rationality that influences and produces discourses that change 
concrete projects that account for specific institutions. Neoliberalism is used under the 
ideas set out by Michel Foucault. 
 To comprehend the Foucauldian concept of  neoliberalism it is important to 
understand the concept of  political rationality. Foucault proposes that government has a 
certain mentality that can be expressed as governmental rationality or political rationality 
that guides the objectives of  its power.109 Thus, by his study of  the European state, 
Foucault understood well this political rationality and concluded that political power 
could be modelled and analysed.110 
Specifically, political rationality is the ‘relatively systematic, explicit, discursive 
problematisation and codification of the art or practice of government’.111 According to 
Foucault the governmental rationality is ‘the ensemble formed by the institutions, 
procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise 
of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as 
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its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means 
apparatuses of security’.112 
The idea of political rationality began with oucault’s work at the College de 
France in 1978-79, in which he sought to understand the ‘type of rationality implemented 
in the exercise of state power’.113 In his work, Foucault did not focus on creating a theory 
of the state, but he aimed to ‘analyse the operation of governmental power, the techniques 
and practices by which it works, and rationalities and strategies invested in it’114. 
 The Foucauldian work on governmental practices had a methodological reason. 
It allows him to test his methods on a macro scale, in contrast to previous studies done on 
a micro scale.115 According to Dean116, ‘Foucault’s thought on governmentality can be 
read as an attempt to explain the relative nature of  macro-micro division; thus, questions 
of  the ‘how’ of  power and rule, its mechanisms, its techniques, its strategies, its objectives 
and effects, can be asked on the ‘global’ forms of  power just as they can be asked of  the 
micro-power’. Concretely, Foucault117 stated: 
What I wanted to do -and this was what was at stake in the analysis- was to see the extent 
to which we could accept that the analysis of  micro-powers, or of  procedures of  
governmentality, is not confined by definition to a precise domain determined by a sector 
of  the scale, but should be considered simply as a point of  view, a method of  
decipherment which may be valid for the whole scale, whatever its size. In other words, 
the analysis of  micro-powers is not a question of  scale, and it is not a question of  a sector, 
it is a question of  a point of  view. Good. This, if  you like, was the methodological 
reason.118 
 The Foucauldian analysis of  the political rationality of  government was firmly 
focused on domestic political technologies but also on international aspects.  Indeed, the 
international aspects of  the state were crucial to Foucault’s analysis of  governmentality.119 
According to Jaeger120 ‘the international’ is as constitutively implicated in (German) 
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neoliberalism as in police and liberal governmentalities’. In this context, Foucault claims, 
in Security, Territory, Population that ‘states are situated alongside other states in a space of  
competition’.121 While in The Birth of  Biopolitics, Foucault raises the notion that ‘the state 
exists only for itself  and in relation to itself, whatever obedience it may owe to other 
systems like nature or God. The state only exists through and for itself, and it only exists 
in the plural’122. This approach, in which the scope of  the political rationality can be 
conceptualised both in international and domestic contexts, facilitates the understanding 
of  practices that have international outcomes, such as diplomatic efforts among states 
engaged in UN negotiations. So, Foucault’s perspective of  ‘one’s own state as one of  
many’,123 has an important implication in practices of  governments. 
 The rationality that guides the exercise of  state power is useful to help us 
understand how governments use political actions to elaborate processes of  policy and 
political decision-making.124 Thus, applying these ideas of  Foucault in this regard, it is 
possible to say that relations among states respond to a political rationality that happens 
in a particular historical context. The particular political rationality encourages states to 
choose the use of  certain practices at international level to achieve their goals. So the 
political rationality could be encouraging Latin American participation the G77 at the 
UN. But, what is the goal? 
 To identify the technology that connects the practice of  taking part in groups of  
negotiations at the UN and neoliberal rationality, it is important to unravel how political 
technologies are interconnected with governmental rationalities and how the knowledge 
is implied in this relationship.  
 In particular, Foucault grouped political technologies into two main 
‘assemblages’.  Firstly, domestic political technologies that assemble practices aimed to 
manage the state within the limit of  its sovereignty. And, secondly, those international 
political technologies, of  interest for this research, which bring together practices aimed 
at managing the state in its relation to other states.125 This international assemblage has 
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the aim to ‘empower particular agents and forces to speak and act in the name of  a 
territory’,126 such as governments actually do in international negotiations.  
 The political rationality of  the European state and its technologies has undergone 
variations from its inception. The comprehension of  these variations is important for 
understanding of  how neoliberalism influences governmental practices related to the 
interaction among states. There have been three notable political rationalities from the 
sixteenth century to the present. These are the Raison d’État, liberalism, and 
neoliberalism; with neoliberalism in our age the prevailing rationality.127 
 The initial rationality aimed at building the European state was the Raison d’État. 
According to Foucault,128 the emergence of  the Raison d’État implied that governmental 
practices were focused on the state interest instead of  the interest of  the king. This new 
interest means that states became more conscious of  their need to be sturdy and 
permanent. In this context, the Raison d’État frees governmental activity from divine 
precepts and rules.  
 This new state is a material form that needs to be understood through a specific 
knowledge, and its interventions to reduce the power of  the prince.129 This rationale 
conceives the state as its own end. Therefore, its objectives are the security and prosperity 
of  the state itself, identifying the welfare of  the citizens with the achievement of  these 
ends. Under the ‘umbrella of  this rationale, the domains and objectives of  government 
began to multiply’.130 In this period, starting in the sixteenth century, South American 
territories were mainly colonies of  Spain and Portugal. 
 In the Raison d’État, Foucault identified three major assemblages of  political 
technologies interacting with each other. These are the ‘police state’ as the group of  
internal political technologies, mercantilism in the middle, and the ‘European balance’ as 
the group of  external political technologies.131 This European balance, initiated by the 
treaties arising from the Peace of  Westphalia in 1648, initiated a new order in Central 
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Europe and marked the birth of  the nation-state.132 In this context, the European balance 
is built upon governmental technologies based on military and diplomatic practices, 
which was the principle of  territorial integrity oriented to maintain borders of  the state. 
With the European balance the concept of  national sovereignty began. The emergence of  
liberalism came to modify the Raison d’états.  
 Liberalism is the second political rationality of  government identified by Foucault 
in Europe. He does not speak of  a liberal “period”; he claims that liberalism is a ‘restless 
and dissatisfied ethos of  recurrent critique of  state reason and politics’.133 Liberalism had 
a significant impact on the organisation of  international trade because of  the emergence 
of  the political economy. Hence, understanding its precepts is relevant to address Latin 
American participation in the G77 at the UNCTAD I and its relation with neoliberalism.  
 The liberal rationality was also determinant for colonial territories in their process 
of  gaining independence, such as Latin American ones, because this rationality defined 
its political aims. Indeed, most Latin American governments gained independence during 
the emergence of  political economy in the eighteenth century. Therefore, the emergence 
of  the political economy and its comparative advantages was relevant to the position of  
Latin American countries in the growing international trade. Liberalism facilitated the 
emergence of  stratification through the levels of  industrialisation, which had a significant 
impact on Latin American participation in the G77 at the UNCTAD I.  
 In this context, an important characteristic of  liberalism is the “mutual 
enrichment”.134 Indeed, the overall target of  external political technologies of  European 
states under the liberal rationality was the promotion of  this “mutual enrichment”, 
understood as a great collective effort to ensure economic growth for the world, though a 
world mainly composed of  European states.135  
  The world under the idea of  mutual enrichment was by no means actually global; 
the world was the European region. This definition of  the world underpinned the 
structure of  global trade. Liberalism identified Europe as the centre of  all things human, 
                                                          
132 Foucault, 2008:52 
133 Barry et al., 1996:8 
134 Foucault, 2008:55 
135 Foucault, 2008:56 
25 
 
including the economic centre. In liberalism, ‘there will be Europe on the one side, with 
Europeans as the players and then the world on the other, which will be the stake. The 
game is in Europe, but the stake is the world’.136 Latin American states emerged in the 
middle of  this liberal perspective. The problem? There was no clear role for them in 
international trade. They were states but not states as the European ones; Latin America 
was not industrialised. 
 According to Foucault,137 the mutual enrichment of  the world is an aim necessary 
and possible to achieve by the promotion of  progress through international trade. The 
overall international target of  the European liberal rationality was the promotion of  this 
European progress.138 This idea of  mutual enrichment that was fundamental in liberalism 
was also important in neoliberalism. Thus, neoliberalism understands Europe (or rather 
industrialised states) as the primary economic subject, while the rest of  the world was its 
stable market and its permanent provider of  raw materials. Foucault139 argues: 
In other words, [in (neo)liberalism] we are invited to a globalization of the market when 
it is laid down as a principle, and an objective, that the enrichment of Europe must be 
brought about as a collective and unlimited enrichment, and not through the enrichment 
of some and the impoverishment of others. The unlimited character of the economic 
development of Europe, and the consequent existence of a non-zero sum game, entails, of 
course, that the whole world is summoned around Europe to exchange its own and 
Europe’s products in the European market.140 
 It is important to note that in liberalism treaties that did promote unlimited trade 
between European countries promoted as well appropriate conduct in domestic markets 
to support interaction in international trade. This caused governments to reorganise 
resources at a national level (natural resources and population among these). This 
reorganisation, in the thinking of  Foucault, did not limit only state actions nationwide, 
but also, on the principle of  competitiveness, states had to deal with unlimited 
international expansion.141 In this context, expansion of  markets led to international 
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banking trying to control macroeconomic policy to fulfil the commitments of  peace, 
elevating central banks and their payment balances to high importance. 
 In creating and increasing freedoms, liberalism increased the control of  and 
intervention in markets as well. After the First World War this feature was influential in 
the rise of  neoliberalism because such controls would become institutionalised. 
Foucault142  gives the example of  the New Deal in the US: 
Roosevelt’s welfare policy, for example, starting from 1932, 28 was a way of  guaranteeing 
and producing more freedom in a dangerous situation of  unemployment: freedom to 
work, freedom of  consumption, political freedom, and so on. What was the price of  this? 
The price was precisely a series of  artificial, voluntarist interventions, of  direct economic 
interventions in the market represented by the basic Welfare measures, and which from 
1946, and even from the start moreover, were described as being in themselves threats of  
a new despotism.143  
 The contingency linked to the world wars changed the conditions for mutual 
enrichment. Indeed, the outbreak of  the world wars (and the subsequent Cold War) 
threatened the movement of  raw materials and put at risk their availability to international 
markets. In this global trade insecurity, the role of  natural resource producers such as 
Latin American countries became a decisive factor for the health of  international markets. 
It is in this context of  raw materials’ unavailability that Latin American countries started 
to produce knowledge to improve their conditions of  development. Consequently, it is 
relevant to take this into account to understand why Latin America participated in the 
G77 at the UNCTAD I.   
  Neoliberalism is the third political rationality identified by Foucault. Under this 
rationality the United Nations system emerged, bringing with it the interest of  Latin 
America in taking part in the G77 at the UNCTAD I.  
  Neoliberalism is an economic system. Regarding its technologies, it is built over 
an institutional legal framework that creates conditions for its survival.144 According to 
Foucault,145 this legal-economic system has three parts. The first part is the legal-economic 
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framework that enables governments to intervene in social institutions to re-create 
capitalism. This allows neoliberalism to create/adapt its practices. These practices can 
have a discourse against its precepts, such as the participation in the G77 at the UNCTAD 
I. The second part is the establishment of  a legal interventionism as a consequence of  the 
legal-economic intervention; this means the creation of  a “rule of  game”, such as the 
structure for development. The third part is increasing legal procedures.146 The first two 
edges of  this legal-economic system are necessary to understand the possible actions of  
neoliberalism in the Latin American decision to take part in the G77 at the UN.   
 The legal-economic framework is a set of  economic activities regulated by law and 
established in a particular historical context. This framework is important because it 
enables the manipulation of  the economic order through formal principles. Indeed, the 
legal-economic framework creates a ‘conscious economic system’ that re-integrates the 
concept of  the ’rule of  law’.147 Using the words of  Louis Rougier, a political philosopher 
of  the liberal tradition, Foucault148 explains the need for a legal-economic framework: 
The liberal regime is not just the result of  a spontaneous natural order as the many authors 
of  the Natural codes declared in the eighteenth century; it is also the result of  a legal order 
that presupposes juridical intervention by the state [...] The question of  the legal 
framework best suited to the supplest, most efficient, and fair operation of  the market has 
been neglected  by classical economists and deserves to be the object of  an International 
Center of  Studies for the Renewal of  Liberalism.149 
  At an international level, the application of  the “rule of  law” guides the 
interaction of  states. 
According to Foucault150, neoliberals can build different kinds of  capitalism (such 
as the international capitalism) from theoretical analysis of  the economic-legal systems. 
Given that each of  these new capitalisms is composed of  a particular institutional-
economical set, it is possible to think that an international capitalism has different 
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characteristics than national capitalisms, as well as that capitalism from the North will be 
different to capitalism in the South. Foucault affirms: 
 The other aspect of  the text that I have just read concerns what we could call "legal 
interventionism," which is the consequence of  the first aspect. If  we accept that we are not 
dealing with an essential Capitalism deriving from the logic of  Capital, but rather with a 
singular capitalism formed by an economic-institutional ensemble, then we must be able 
to act on this ensemble and intervene in such a way as to invent a different capitalism. We 
do not have to carry on with capitalism so much as invent a new one151. 
 Likewise, this ‘conscious economic system’ creates by legal interventionism 
implies new capitalisms inside and outside government. 
 Despite, the rule of  law determining the market framework in which economic 
agents can make free decisions, the framework cannot be corrected as a function of  the 
effects that this interaction produces.152 Indeed, governments can only influence the 
elements that affect the market, never those that structure the market itself. This means 
that the political rationality influences governmental practices to achieve neoliberal goals. 
 Neoliberalism, as a liberal regime, allows new capitalisms to be established 
without changing legislation. In the establishment of  a new capitalism it is necessary to 
define a specific historical and institutional framework,153 which only implies a change in 
related institutions, such as ministries of  Economy and Foreign ministries. 
  Neoliberalism has among its aims the expansion of  global enrichment. To achieve 
this aim, an international structure is needed, as well as capital and natural resources 
available in international markets. These resources also have to be in competition. In a 
world in which developing and developed countries are more and more specialised it is 
difficult to conceive of  a group of  them, such as developing countries in the G77, 
deploying a discourse against the purposes of  the international neoliberal rationality. 
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1.2.1.2 Limits of  neoliberalism in its beginning 
This research is framed in the first stage of neoliberalism. Thus, it is relevant to 
introduce the history of the end of liberalism to understand the relevance of international 
trade in the North-South relationship and its importance for developing countries such as 
Latin American ones. 
In a Foucauldian perspective, neoliberalism as the key element of  today’s 
liberalism154 appeared in the twentieth century, albeit that its international characteristics 
can be identified as arising at the end of  the nineteenth century.155 According to Foucault, 
neoliberalism appeared in Germany and the US after the Second World War as a reaction 
of  liberals towards government planning produced by the wars, and against the 
deployment of  communism, socialism, and national-socialism. Polanyi,156 more precisely, 
argues that neoliberalism started after the Great Depression in 1930 triggered by the end 
of  the Concert of  Europe at the end of  the nineteenth century, which set off  an economic 
crisis that produced the collapse of  the international economic system. Ruggie157 states 
that embedded liberalism appeared due to the emergence of  several specific developments 
in transnational economic activities, and can be accounted for at least in part by their 
perceived first-order contribution to the regimes for trade and money.  
Foucauldian neoliberalism emerges as a rationality of  government to face, in 
Germany, state reconstruction after the Second World War. According to Foucault, 
German liberals used the historical context to create a specific capitalism that allowed 
them to reconstruct a legitimate state after the Nazi period. The theory claims that the 
state must create a proper legal environment for the economy and maintain a healthy level 
of  competition (rather than only “exchange”). To do this, historical studies, such as those 
made subsequently in the ECLA period, are vital. The historical reality is the foundation 
that transforms capitalism into a historical institutional capitalism. In this context, 
ordoliberal capitalism, based on an economic theory that is explained though a historical 
reality, can recreate itself, and consequently capitalism could grow after the crisis of  
                                                          
154 Foucault, 2008:78 
155 Polanyi, 1946 
156 Polanyi, 1946:225-26 
157 Ruggie, 1982:383 
 
 
1930.158 Thus, many capitalisms are possible, such as capitalisms for industrialised and for 
non-industrialised countries. Foucaultstates: 
What does this mean, historically? It means that we should guard against thinking that at 
a given moment there was the literal and simple economic reality of  capitalism, or of  
capital and the accumulation of  capital, which with its own necessity would have come up 
against old rules of  right, like the right of  primogeniture, for example, or ancient feudal 
right, etcetera, and then created, in accordance with its own logic and requirements and 
somehow by pressure from below, new and more favorable rules of  right, whether property 
rights, legislation on joint stock companies, patent law, and so on. This is not how we 
should view things in fact. We should keep in mind that historically we are dealing with a 
singular figure in which economic processes and institutional framework call on each 
other, support each other, modify and shape each other in ceaseless reciprocity. Capitalism 
was not a process from below which comes up against the law-of  primogeniture; for 
example. In fact, we can only understand the, historical figure of  capitalism if  we consider 
the role that was actually played by the rule of  primogeniture, for example, in its formation 
and genesis. The history of  capitalism can only be an economic-institutional history159 
The emergence of  the German state implied the beginning of  a new state 
legitimated by economic freedom, an organisation different to the laissez-faire dogma. 
The establishment of  this new German state, that put the economy-planning state of  the 
Nazis as its opposite, also influenced American neoliberalism, whose adversary was the 
New Deal.160  
From this critique of  the state the neo-liberals found another form of  state and 
another principle of  legitimacy that moved the crisis of  free-market capitalism towards 
the state. Then, if  the market economy is not the origin of  the destructive effects assigned 
to it, but its origin lies in the state, it may well be the basis for a reorganisation of  the state 
and society. For ordoliberals, economic development founds sovereignty and produces 
public law.161 This scheme represented a series of  decisive displacements in relation to 
classical liberalism, which sees the market as the place of  exchange between free and 
rational individuals, so that the state should limit itself  to intervening, except as a 
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guarantor of  private property. For neoliberals it is not the place of  exchange and 
equivalence; its essence is competition and inequality.162  
Particularly, liberalism appears in the XVIII century linked to the birth of  Political 
Economy and prevails until the Great War’s outbreak. The most important aspect of  
liberalism is that the market becomes the source of  state legitimacy. In other words, the 
market, besides international trade under the principle of  comparative advantages 
supported by the political economy, guides the state’s actions at internal and international 
level.163 This relevance of  markets is related to the availability of  resources for national 
enrichment.  
 In particular, in Europe before the emergence of  liberalism a form of  international 
trade organisation understood as a zero-sum game prevailed; this means that the state is 
enriched only because of  the impoverishment of  another state.164 This zero-sum game 
occurred because the resources of  gold, the unique source of  wealth, were restricted in 
international markets, and hence, the possibilities of  states to grow are intrinsically 
limited.  
This restriction of  access to gold implied a limitation of  state power in its global 
technologies, hence to compete with other states in the economic arena; the state was 
forced to exercise unlimited power over its populations. In this context, the 
implementation of  the Peace of  Westphalia and the regency of  the zero-sum game 
resulted in an uneven distribution of  wealth of  states, causing extreme differences of  
power among states.165 The emergence of  political economy and the idea of  mutual 
enrichment changed the zero-sum game of  international trade.  
The ideas of  mutual enrichment were born in Europe when through the political 
economy European countries realised they could enrich themselves through unlimited 
trade. The idea of  mutual enrichment was first mentioned in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of  
Nations. Smith stated that ‘If  a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper 
than we can make it, better buy it off  them with some part of  the produce of  our own 
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industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage’.166  
This idea was worked subsequently by Ricardo, who defines the Theory of  
Comparative Advantages in his book On the Principles of  Political Economy and Taxation. 
The conclusion expressed in his work is that each state can gain by specialising in the 
product where it has a comparative advantage and the resulting trade of  this product. 
Empirically, in Europe mutual enrichment was conducted through the industrialisation 
and commerce that was supported by raw materials that were understood as always 
available and provided by colonies and independent regions that produce commodities, 
such as Latin America.  
 The emergence of  political economy raised the idea that the enrichment of  the 
European state does not depend on the accumulation of  gold, but rather on the ability of  
the state to create new markets in peaceful contexts. This context of  perpetual peace was 
enabled by the Concert of  Europe, the international structure that would allow 
continuous trade with the rest of  the world.167 The peace produced by the Concert of  
Europe was no longer oriented to limit the military power of  countries, but rather it 
ensured the continuous exchange of  goods in international trade, goods such as raw 
materials, through perpetual peace.168 The industrialisation of  Europe was dependent on 
raw material availability.  
  The emergence of  liberalism that placed Europe as a region of  unlimited 
economic development in relation to a world market also put Latin America in the 
position of  raw material producer. The emergence of  political economy removed the zero 
sum game and replaced it with the establishment of  market competition to promote 
unlimited and collective enrichment. In this liberal context, European states became rich 
only when they could trade among themselves using the unlimited resources available. 
From this moment, the general target of  the European state would be the promotion of  a 
global collective welfare that ensured the growth of  all states that could take part in the 
free international market.169  
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 This unlimited and collective enrichment occurs only in the long term and in 
conditions of  free trade. That is why free trade is a key determinant in the liberal 
rationality. Particularly, conditions of  free trade were made possible by the peace achieved 
through the Concert of  Europe.170 This, supported by international banking and sustained 
in international law, became the structural guardian of  peace.171  
 The establishment of  the Concert of  Europe implied that peace was no longer 
oriented to limit the forces of  countries, but rather it was the way to ensure the exchange 
of  goods from European states in free international trade. Thus, while nationalism and 
industry allow ferocious wars, adequate safeguards were erected for the continuance of  
peaceful business in wartime.172/173  
In this new structure of  free trade the balance of  payments acquires a vital status, 
and the gold standard becomes the central part of  international trade.174-175 Balance of  
payments became the connector between national and international practices in the state. 
This was because it represented the economic behaviour of  states while the gold standard 
enabled an equivalency between national currencies so they could interact in international 
trade.  
According to Ruggie,176 this relationship between economic regimes and 
international transaction flows is inherently problematic, because the domain of  
international regimes consists of  the behavior of  states, vis-a-vis one another and vis-a-vis 
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the market-place, not the market-place itself. In this relationship between national 
currencies, which is so important for domestic markets, for the commodity money, and 
for international trade, central banks gained relevance in the international economic 
interaction. This regulation of  currencies by central banks that replaced the self-regulation 
of  markets began the union between politics and economy.177 
The banking role is important because it plays a relevant role in agriculture 
protectionism by industrialised countries. Banking fostered the implementation of  
protectionist regulations at national level, because it enabled the protection of  vulnerable 
national sectors regarding international monetary variations. This protectionism in 
industrialised countries would have a wide impact in countries that were producers of  raw 
materials, such as in Latin America, a situation that would become an integral component 
of  the G77 claims in the UN negotiations.  
Protectionism was a practice rooted in European states that liberalism sought to 
eradicate.178 However, an administrative machine allowed protectionism to be maintained. 
This administrative machine, that must be continuously modified, enables the necessary 
domestic changes that can maintain the new imposed laissez-faire. This laissez-faire, 
promoting freedom through national regulation, was the pillar of  neoliberalism.179 
The imposition of  laissez faire at national level involved the growth of  the 
administrative functions of  the European state. This administrative growth was due to the 
state liberal rationality that does not allow the state to do anything directly to the market 
other than just removing restrictions hindering the market. This means that the 
government could act, but only indirectly. Polanyi180 cites Bentham to explain this action 
of  through government.  
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True, legislation could do nothing directly, except by repealing harmful restrictions. But 
that did not mean that government could no nothing, especially indirectly. On the 
contrary, the utilitarian liberal saw in government the great agency for achieving 
happiness.[...] Bentham believed, the influence of  legislation "is as nothing" in comparison 
with the unconscious contribution of  the "minister of  the police." Of  the three things 
needed for economic success—inclination, knowledge, and power— the private person 
possessed only inclination. Knowledge and power, Bentham taught, can be administered 
much cheaper by government than by private persons. [...] Benthamite liberalism meant 
the replacing of  Parliamentary action by action through administrative organs [...] This 
growth of  administration reflected the spirit of  utilitarianism. Bentham's fabulous 
Panopticon, his most personal Utopia, was a star-shaped building from the center of  
which prison wardens could keep the greatest number of  jailbirds under the most effective 
supervision at the smallest cost to the public. Similarly, in the utilitarian state his favorite 
principle of  "inspectability" ensured that the Minister at the top should keep effective 
control over all local administration.181  
 Therefore, international regulations became necessary to guarantee that self-
regulating markets achieved full laissez-faire. This situation caused such contradiction in 
the liberal system that it would become one of  the institutional sources of  rupture. In this 
era of  protectionism, the colonial expansion played its part.182 
The disruption and the consequent historical events meant that trade could not 
fulfill its role, market laws were put in check, liberalism entered crisis and the First World 
War broke out. This global crisis generated a re-evaluation of  liberal reason and 
governmental practice, producing the birth of  a new kind of  liberalism that would be 
called neoliberalism.183 
The outbreak of  the Great War reflected the crisis of  the liberal rationality, 
producing a re-evaluation of  liberal reasons. From this a new governmental rationality 
emerged, called embedded liberalism, which differs from classical liberalism.184 Ruggie185 
explains it: 
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The new international economic order that would emerge from World War II, Polanyi 
concluded, on the one hand would mark the end of  “capitalist internationalism,” as 
governments learned the lesson that international automaticity stands in fundamental and 
potentially explosive contradiction to an active state domestically, and, on the other hand, 
the emergence of  deliberate management of  international economic transactions by 
means of  collaboration among governments.186 
Postwar treaties mitigated the peace crisis but aggravated the economic crisis, 
leading to the second war. The return to the twentieth century system was considered the 
only way out. This meant the establishment of  an international order endowed with power 
capable of  transcending national sovereignty.187 The League of  Nations was intended to 
rebuild the international system of  currencies as the only possible safeguard for peace 
between sovereign states. According to Ruggie188: 
…the task of  postwar institutional reconstruction was to devise a framework which would 
safeguard and even aid the quest for domestic stability without at the same time, triggering 
the mutually destructive external consequences that had plagued the interwar period. This 
was the essence of  the embedded liberalism compromise: unlike the economic nationalism 
of  the thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of  the gold 
standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic 
interventionism.189 
It was believed that only the restoration of  the previous system of  “solid 
foundation” would bring peace and prosperity. The need to restore currencies implied the 
need to control deflation nationwide. This deflationary necessity promoted the creation 
of  a free economy under the stewardship of  a strong government, which is characteristic 
of  neoliberalism. Polanyi190 states:  
In 1932, the Report of  the Gold Delegation of  the League of  Nations declared that with 
the return of  the exchange uncertainty the main monetary achievement of  the last decade 
had been eliminated. What the Report did not say was that in the course of  these vain 
deflationary efforts free markets had not been restored though free governments had been 
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sacrificed. Though opposed in theory to interventionism and inflation alike, economic 
liberals had chosen between the two and set the sound-currency ideal above that of  non-
intervention. In so doing they followed the logic inherent in a self-regulating economy. Yet 
such a course of  action tended to spread the crisis, it burdened finance with the unbearable 
strain of  massive economic dislocations, and it heaped up the deficits of  the various 
national economies to the point where a disruption of  the remnants of  international 
division of  labour became inevitable.191 
Nevertheless, Europe lacked a political system capable of  supporting this new 
model. This instability promoted a global transformation from the thirties, such as the 
abandonment of  the gold standard by the UK, five-year plans in Russia, the launch of  the 
New Deal in the US, the national Socialist revolution of  Germany and the disintegration 
of  the League of  Nations.  
In general terms, the outbreak of  world wars exacerbated the interruption of  free 
trade that was impeding access to unlimited markets, as claimed by the liberal rationality. 
The restrictions on the trade created problems for state enrichment, which produced two 
situations. The first was that states’ fear of  one state becoming an empire to dominate 
trade reappeared; and the second one was that states needed to find ways to solve their 
internal problems related to international free trade.192 This search for freedom in markets 
produced the establishment of  new institutions at international level. According to 
Polanyi193 : 
[...] no less than a complete destruction of  the national institutions of  nineteenth century 
society accompanied the crisis in a great part of  the world, and everywhere these 
institutions were changed and re-formed almost out of  recognition. The liberal state was 
in many countries replaced by totalitarian dictatorships, and the central institution of  the 
century— production based on free markets—was superseded by new forms of  economy. 
While great nations recast the very mold of  their thought and hurled themselves into wars 
to enslave the world in the name of  unheard-of  conceptions of  the nature of  the universe, 
even greater nations rushed to the defense of  freedom which acquired an equally unheard 
of  meaning at their hands.194  
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These institutions were the United Nations system and the consequent GATT to 
regulate trade. 
The inception of  the United Nations and the current economic system have their 
roots in the crisis of  liberalism that created the need to protect free trade and the 
consequent rise of  protectionist measures. The decadence of  liberalism triggered the 
ECLA’s interest in explaining Latin American problems in international trade, and the 
resulting underdevelopment that gave support to the emergence of  the G77. Indeed, the 
structural asymmetry of  the global economic system has its pillars in the emergence of  
political economy. This defines the place of  Europe regarding the rest of  the world195 and, 
consequently, defines the position of  Latin America as a regional producer of  raw 
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1.2.2 The international context of  the G77 inception 
Neoliberalism in Latin America became a relevant issue in the 90s when the WB 
and the IMF started to implement structural economic reforms aligned with the 
Washington Consensus.196 Given that neoliberalism was dominated by the IMF and the 
WB,197 these reforms entailed a far-reaching imposition of neoliberal policies on 
developing countries.198 Indeed, financing for development has relied on countries joining 
the neoliberal mainstream, and their adhesion to the IMF and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) has become an essential pre-requisite to participate in global 
negotiations.199 
Those reforms that sought to solve the external debt crisis200 also placed the market 
at the centre of developmental strategies.201 Strategies that affected the international 
economic integration of Latin American countries generated a transformation in the 
paradigm of its foreign policies.202 Indeed, some Latin American presidents were strong 
advocates of neoliberal politics in international affairs. For example in Brazil, presidents 
Collor de Mello (1990-1992) and Cardoso (1992-2001) broke with past political trends 
and paradigms203 to restore international economic affairs concerned with improving 
external perceptions of Brazil. 
By the end of the 1990s, neoliberal changes produced in Latin America 
widespread dissatisfaction. For instance, changes promoted by the multilateral system did 
not contribute significantly to boosting productivity and economic growth; on the 
contrary, they increased poverty, deepened inequality and worsened environmental 
conditions.204 The effects of neoliberalism on foreign policy were several, such as a further 
external indebtedness to sustain monetary stability in the middle of speculative capital 
flows; sale of governmental firms to pay out financial commitments; change from a 
productive multilateralism to a commercial one; trade conflicts among members of 
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economic blocs such as MERCOSUR and Pacto Andino; and the transfer of technological 
research to multinational companies.205 
Dissatisfaction that arose due to implementation of Washington Consensus 
guidelines and the emergence of the Asian financial crisis in 1997206 put into question the 
neoliberal process. Econ Poyry207 states: 
The multilateral institutions "failure" to fully understand and respond properly creating a 
legitimacy issue for the developed countries and their institutions; developing economies 
became more sceptical about the leadership of the West, the “Western model” of 
democracy and free markets, and the capacity of the G7-led multilateral financial 
institutions to serve their needs. As a global recovery began in the first years of the 21st 
century, developing countries began to look for their own models for growth. The 
countries taking the lead were Brazil, Russia, India and China.208 
In Latin America, this questioning process of neoliberalism and the events of 11 
September 2001, which changed the US’s multilateral focus toward the “war on terror”, 
also triggered a shift in approach to the multilateral process in Latin America.209 Indeed, 
some Latin American countries changed from basing their multilateral interests on 
economic issues toward multilateral interests based on political issues, focusing on 
alliances with other developing countries.210 In this context, neoliberal changes entailed 
altered Latin American multilateral objectives, such as the promotion of regional blocs 
and the cooperation with other developing countries.211 Thus, coalitions of developing 
countries, such as the G77, were reinforced due to the strengthening of the North-South 
divide in the aftermath of 9/11; this become the way developing countries reinforced their 
positions and assumptions against states of the North.212 
Likewise, several groups of countries were set up. At the regional level, groups 
such as ALCA and IIRSA were established; while on a global scale, the IBSA forum 
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dialogue was established. The IBSA, in particular, created by India, Brazil, and South 
Africa in 2003, aimed to ‘contribute to the construction of a new international 
architecture, to bring their voice on global issues and to deepen their ties in various 
areas’213. The relevance of IBSA is as the multilateral group precursor of BASIC (IBSA+ 
China). BASIC has strongly influenced recent climate negotiations, especially the 
Copenhagen conference in 2009,214 where the accord was negotiated by BASIC and the 
United States.215 
Regarding the G77, it maintains its aims in the present. For example, in 2004, on 
the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the G77 at the UNCTAD, 216 the organisation 
stated that: 
The Group continues to strive for equity and justice in international economic relations 
in the belief that this can build a really solid foundation for world peace and contributed 
to a stable and prosperous world. […] The fact that the Group was born alongside 
UNCTAD reflects the acknowledgment that the establishment of an equitable 
international trade regime has been a central issue to the development agenda. 
Subsequently, the Group brought its collective will to bear on the pursuit of common goals 
in the related fields of, inter alia, finance, foreign direct investment, capital market, 
external debt, food, agriculture, industrialization, intellectual property rights, social 
development, health, education, sustainable development, science and technology, and 
information and communication technology. The institutional development of the Group 
of 77 led to the creation of chapters to defend and promote the interests of developing 
countries within the organizations of the UN system including the Bretton Woods 
Institutions.217 
Likewise, in the Santa Cruz declaration in the Commemorative Summit on the 
occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the Group of G77, in Bolivia 
in 2014, the G77218 claimed among its aims: 
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We pledge to continue the tradition of our countries on building national development 
and uniting at the international level, towards the establishment of a just international 
order in the world economy that supports developing countries achieve our objectives of 
sustained economic growth, full employment, social equity, provision of basic goods and 
services to our people, protection of the environment and living in harmony with nature.219 
The Group of  77 (G77) is the group of  negotiation through which the South raises its 
voice against the North220 and advocates the perspectives of  the developing world. 
Together with the Non-Alignment movement (NAM), this group is the most important 
institutional expression of  the interests and views of  the “South” in the United Nations 
system.221  
It is important to mention that the G77 was established in a similar period to the 
Non-Alignment movement (NAM) under the United Nations umbrella. While the G77 
was focused on economic issues, the NAM was established to address problems of peace 
related to the Cold War. The G77 was born with a profile more economic while the NAM 
was born with a more political one.222  
The G77 emerged to aggregate and articulate the demands of  the developing 
countries to improve their negotiating capacity at UN negotiations. The G77 gives a voice 
to the ‘powerless’.223 
In general terms, the G77 represents the South in the division between the North 
and the South that afflicts much of the UN’s intergovernmental system,224 such as the UN 
General Assembly, its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and a number of its 
functional commissions and executive boards.225 
Through the G77 the South has built in recent decades an idea about itself that 
has been reinforced in the multilateral arena, and recognised by developed countries. For 
instance, the Brandt report, also called the Report of the Independent Commission on 
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International Development Issues (1980)226 states that ‘nations from the South see 
themselves under a common claim’. This common claim, or shared identity, of the 
developing countries of the South is largely based on their being collectively defined in 
terms of what the North’s countries are not.227  
The name “Group of  77” reflects the original number of  countries that established 
the group. Currently the number of  members has grown to 130 countries. The institutional 
structure of  the G77 has developed over time, and is closely linked to selected UN 
institutions such as Geneva (UNCTAD) and New York (UN General Assembly) in 1964, 
Paris (UNESCO) in 1969, and Rome (FAO), Nairobi (UNEP), Vienna (FAO, UNIDO), 
and Washington DC (IMF and the World Bank) in 1972 (G77 2007). This group is 
constituted by a large number of  developing countries that share similar conditions such 
as underdevelopment and marginalisation. They also share similar interests, such as the 
achievement of  comprehensive economic arrangements in favour of  all developing 
countries, and the need for more opportunities in the international economic system.228  
Regarding its administrative structure, in the G77 all organisational features are 
based on the three geographic groups, namely Africa, Asia, and Latin America; the final 
position on any issue is first discussed at those regional levels.229 The chairmanship, which 
is the highest political institution in the organisation, is based on annual rotation between 
those three geographical groupings (G77, 2007). The chair serves as the spokesman for 
the whole G77 caucus. The G77 is not a policy-making body, it is principally a forum for 
the co-ordination and harmonisation of  individual viewpoints.230 It is the group through 
which developing countries demand equity in the international economic system. 
The main aim of the G77 from the beginning was the consolidation of 
international institutions and the restructuring of the entire trading system to establish a 
New International Economic Order.231 The demand for a Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) became one of the key demands of the G77 between 1964 and 1970. 
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For example, Yamin and Depledge232 claim that poverty is the defining characteristic that 
leads developing states to join the G77, and that their primary preoccupation is with 
poverty eradication and the ’right to development’ and ‘respect for sovereignty’.233 Its 
principal achievement was the differentiated recognition of the developing world. 
The G77 was formed to enhance developing countries’ bargaining power. Indeed, 
in order to gain control over their economic futures, they began coordinating their efforts 
within the UN, where their growing number and voting power gave them greater 
influence than they could otherwise command.234 They used their voting power to 
convene the UNCTAD, where they established the Group of 77.  
Scholars state that developing countries tend to form groups of negotiations to 
increase their influence in world politics and achieve aggregate power.235 For example, 
Latin American countries take a common position with other developing countries at the 
UN to increase interdependence among these countries, and to demand a solution to their 
common problems.236 They try to level the playing field among international centre and 
periphery,237 in which the multilateral structure favours industrialised countries’ interests 
in conferences, such as on trade and climate,238 and elsewhere within the UN system.239 
The New International Economic Order they sought could only be brought about through 
joint, concerted political pressure of developing countries on industrial countries.240  
This bloc appears in every set of  negotiations at the UN system, functioning as a 
political instrument for the South addressing North-South issues.241 Whereas the Non-
Aligned movement in the early 1960s was predominantly preoccupied with political and 
military matters due to the Cold War, the G77 was mainly concerned with economic 
issues and initially ranged much wider than the non-aligned in its membership.242 The G77 
has been the most significant group of  negotiations for Latin American countries within 
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the UN system.243 
The G77 was established before the deployment of  neoliberalism in Latin 
America. It emerged in a complicated period of  the Cold War, in which the world was no 
longer divided into two clearly opposed blocs, and in which Latin America was under 
significant US influence.  
The Cold War arrived in Latin America in the 50s when the US decided to fight 
communism in the region.244 The United States’ first Latin American Cold War 
intervention was in Guatemala in 1954.245 The most important events were the Cuban 
revolution and the Cuban Missile Crisis, which distorted US perceptions about the nature 
of  the threat to its security, and led to its strategy to defend Latin American countries 
against an external aggressor.246  
The Cold War in Latin American countries was shaped by US dominance. 
According to Barnet,247 American foreign policy as a representation of  the militarisation 
of  politics at the domestic level was first defined as a policy of  ‘containment’ after ’mass 
reprisal’, and then as ‘limited war’.  
Following the Truman Doctrine, the American government was focused on the 
reinforcement of  a hemispherical security policy that started with the Inter-American 
Treaty of  Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) decades before. The TIAR signed in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1947 established the “hemispheric defense” doctrine,248 and allowed the US the 
right to intervene against what it regarded as communist activity in the region. In this 
process, the Organisation of  American States (OAS) became a vehicle for its anti-
communism.249  
The OAS, established at the First International Conference of  American States 
held in Washington, D.C., between 1889 and 1890, was created ‘for the purpose of  
discussing and recommending for adoption to their respective Governments some plan of  
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arbitration for the settlement of  disagreements and disputes that may hereafter arise 
between them, and for considering questions relating to the improvement of  business 
intercourse and means of  direct communication between said countries, and to encourage 
such reciprocal commercial relations as will be beneficial to all and secure more extensive 
markets for the products of  each of  said countries’.250   
At governmental level, the Cold War reflected US interest in the implementation 
of  authoritarian governments in Latin America. This was because democracy was coming 
to mean a ‘commitment to popular, more particular working class participation in politics, 
and social and economic improvements for the poorer sections of  the population. 
Democracy increasingly became identified with development and welfare. This was a 
vision of  the Latin American Left, both Communist and non-Communist’.251 Thus, 
despite after the Second World War only Paraguay, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua 
and the Dominican Republic existing under authoritarian governments, by 1954 dictators 
ruled a majority of  Latin American governments, and those which retained some form of  
democracy veered to the right.252  
The ECLA was established in 1949 by democratic Latin American governments 
that began to challenge traditional export interests affected by the end of  wars. 
Governments that had enjoyed increased exports during the war found that post-war 
recovery in Europe caused a fall in their numbers again. Government officials and 
economists began to argue that Latin America would need to invigorate its 
industrialisation process in order to compete in the ISI (import-substitution 
industrialisation) to reduce reliance on the import of  manufactured goods; the ECLA was 
established to support these purposes.253 The ECLA project, according to Santa Cruz254, a 
Chilean diplomat and one of  the founder members of  the ECLA, 
[…] was based on the fact that Latin America had entered into a serious crisis stemming 
from the economic effort made to defend the cause of  the United Nations during the war 
and the disruption it had caused to the world economy; and in the fact that it was necessary 
                                                          
250  The OAS history, in:  http://www.oas.org/en/about/our_history.asp 
251 Bethel and Roxborough, 2005:9  
252 Grandin & Klein, 2011 
253 O’Toole, 2014 
254 Santa Cruz, 1995:28. Free translation 
47 
 
to "develop the industry of  the countries of  Latin America and make the most of  their 
enormous natural resources to raise the standard of  living of  their inhabitants, help solve 
the economic problems of  other continents, achieve a better balance of  Building world 
economy and intensifying international trade.255 
The first UNCTAD and the G77 were established in a new wave of  democracies 
in the region. By 1961, there were again only a handful of  Latin American nations that 
were not, at least nominally, democratic and many of  them promoted political and 
economic modernisation backed up by the Alliance for Progress endorsed by John F. 
Kennedy.256 The objective of  the Alliance was to nurture centrist, reformist alternatives to 
dictatorship, premised on the notion that economic development and social reform could 
avert revolution.257 In this period, the ECLA likewise advocated a much greater injection 
of  foreign aid in the South and encouraged socio-economic reform to avoid social 
revolutions, as well as supporting proposals for structural reform, especially agrarian 
reform.258   
Despite this being seen as a demilitarised period, it was a stage in which the US 
encouraged the modernisation and invigoration of  Latin American militaries as well as 
the establishment of  centralised intelligence agencies. In an effort to counter real and 
perceived insurgent threats supported by dictatorial governments, the Military Assistance 
Program of  the US focused specifically on expanding counter-insurgency tactics that were 
defined by the Pentagon as a combination of  military, para-military, political, economic, 
psychological and civic action carried out by a government in order to destroy any 
movement of  subversive insurgency.259 
In this international framework, the economic and political roles of  Latin 
American countries were aligned with the military strategy of  the US in the hemisphere. 
Among the purposes of  the US, the control of  resources from Latin American countries 
was central. Among the goals set out in US military strategy for the region was to ensure 
the continued and growing production of  essential strategic materials and internal 
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security to ensure the protection of  facilities on which these strategic materials depend. 
According to Romano260 in research using classified US government documents, the main 
aim of  the US in security policies was ‘to guarantee the flow of  raw materials and strategic 
materials from Latin America to the United States, for which hemispheric security was 
necessary, but also internal “stability” and security’. Also, Romano261 states:  
The type of  economic-political relationship between Latin America and the United States 
in the early years of  the Cold War continued the dynamic peripheral-center established in 
inter-American relations since the end of  the nineteenth century, 9 only at a juncture of  
rising prices of  some commodities Premiums10. According to the report of  the Office of  
Inter-American Affairs, in 1950 Latin America had exported US $ 2.8 billion in goods to 
the United States, 35% of  the total imports from the United States, including staples such 
as coffee and sugar. Latin America provided 25% of  total US imports of  metal and 
manufactures; 46% of  the imports of  wool; 61% of  the oil and more than 50% of  the 
imports of  copper, lead, nitrate and henequen fibre […] These data show quite clearly the 
importance of  Latin American raw materials for the US economy, and with it, the vitality 
of  guaranteeing the flow of  them.262  
As Latin American states in the late 1950s began to respond to Cold War concerns 
about national security they tightened their centralised control over territory, 
administration and economic resources.263 According to Rabe264 development assistance 
should not be geared towards ‘rapid industrialisation in Latin America’, but rather aimed 
at increasing agricultural production. Consequently, the Latin American role imposed by 
the US in the Cold War was as a supplier of  raw materials and strategic resources, not as 
a region of  competitive manufacturing.265 
 
1.2.3 The possibility of  neoliberal purposes 
Given the previous antecedents, it is possible to think that neoliberalism could be 
linked to Latin American participation in the G77 at the UNCTAD I. Neoliberalism as a 
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governmental rationality could use for its purposes the Latin American participation in 
the G77 at the UN. 
To say that Latin American development was not harmed by the inequity in the 
international economic system runs counter to a discursive interest that takes this for 
granted. However, Latin America could have had other reasons to maintain its discourse 
in the G77 about the need for development and the need to change the economic system. 
For example, the narrative about the liberalisation of markets promoted by a neoliberal 
North could be useful for Southern politicians to blame others for their own failures and 
economic deceptions.  
Likewise, Latin America in the G77 placed the region deliberately outside the 
power centre. This position of underdevelopment gave to Latin American countries the 
possibility of challenging the established order and the opportunity to promote the 
promise of a “better future”, a future in which excluded states could obtain the benefits of 
the international order, a future in which all states are equal. In this future, developing 
countries would be included in the economic order, they would participate in 
international trade without restrictions, and be able to achieve industrialisation and 
development.  
Therefore, it is appropriate to ask how this interest of  Latin America in deploying 
the problem of  their trade terms in the UN is related to neoliberalism. The answer is 
mainly that developing countries’ need for vindication, on one hand, and their need for 
neoliberalism to expand markets, on the other, are in fact interlinked and mutually 
reinforced. Neoliberalism could have used these discourses politically. 
The collaboration among developing countries to address international 
negotiations in world politics has been established by several authors.266 Likewise, this 
collaboration in negotiations has addressed many different areas, such as trade matters267 
and environmental issues.268  Nevertheless, there are not many theoretical writings about 
developing countries’ participation in coalitions such as the G77,269 and there is no 
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literature that addresses the relationship between neoliberalism and Latin American 
participation in the G77. Hence, seeking this relationship appears an attractive issue for 
research, as does exploring the political reasons behind the practice. 
Therefore, this study seeks to explore the Latin American role in the inception of 
the G77 to identify its connection with neoliberalism. The study seeks to examine Latin 
America as a region containing countries that have largely participated in coalitions of 
developing countries, and which has promoted the need for group collaboration at the 
UN.  
Thus, working on an “under-development hypothesis” that explains Latin 
American countries’ participation in the G77, and utilising the precepts of Michel 
Foucault, it is possible to enunciate historical-theoretical questions and historical-political 
questions to organise an alternate possible history: 
Historic-theoretical questions: Do the workings of power, and, in particular, those 
mechanisms that bring Latin America to take part in the G77 at the UN, actually connect 
to the development idea? Are the development forms the means through which power is 
exercised at the United Nations? What is the role of neoliberalism in this mechanism that 
produces discourses about trade inequality in international negotiations? 
Historic-political questions: Did the underdevelopment discourse that addresses 
Latin America through the G77 at the UN come to act as a roadblock to a power 
mechanism that had operated unchallenged; or, is this in fact part of the same historical 
network that promotes the international structure of trade? Is there a historical rupture 
(rather than a consistency) at the beginning of Latin American participation in the G77? 
Is this rupture linked to neoliberalism? 
The aim of these questions is not to deny the trade inequality claimed by Latin 
American countries; the objective is to determinate the regime of knowledge-power-
underdevelopment that has supported Latin American countries’ participation in the 
G77. The final aim is to establish how this discursive underdevelopment is related to the 
neoliberal rationality and what has been its relationship. Therefore, and taking the ideas 
of Foucault on board270 it is expected: 
                                                          
270 Foucault, 1979:11 
51 
 
[…] to account for the fact that it is spoken about, to discover who does the speaking, the 
positions and viewpoints from which they speak, the institutions which prompt people to 
speak about it and which store and distribute the things that are said. What is at issue, 
briefly is the over-all “discursive fact” the way in which [the topic] is “put into 
discourse”.271 
It is necessary to remark that this study recognises that the G77 has discourses 
against neoliberalism. The research accepts that the North (and the countries that 
compose it) is against the purposes of the G77. The research is not about the G77 opposing 
neoliberalism, it is about identifying the relation between neoliberalism and LAT in the 
inception of the G77. 
Indeed, despite the development of this research being conducted over a case that 
uses the G77, it does not mean that this research is intended to understand this group at 
the United Nations. Likewise, this research does not aim to explain groups and the 
elements that propel developing countries to take part in them at UN negotiations. Rather, 
this research seeks a better understanding of the relationship between neoliberalism and 
the ECLA discourses, as a representation of the Latin American perspective, that 










                                                          













2 CHAPTER TWO 













This study is framed in a qualitative methodological perspective that uses 
discourse analysis, which roughly implies the establishment of  a semantic content of  
concepts used in a given discourse. Discourse analysis is most commonly defined as a 
‘large set of  methodological approaches concerned with the production of  meaning 
through talk and texts’.272 Discursive analysis therefore does not amount to a rejection of  
the reality of  the world out there but, rather, investigates that world’s interpretation and 
constitution through human systems of  signification.273 Regarding political perspective, 
and according to Van Dijk,274 Political discourse analysis is both, it is about political 
discourse, and it is also a critical enterprise. 
  Discourse analysis is a dynamic area of  social science that is used by several 
disciplines275 and which has an inter-disciplinary nature. It can be considered a new 
transdisciplinary science that explore theories, text, conversations, messages and speech 
in all branches of  humanities and social sciences.276 However, while strongly rooted in a 
post-positivist approach, discourse analysis is difficult to localise.277 
Discourses are seen as inescapable media to make sense and reproduce reality. 
They are a key source of  information, yet a source which needs to be analysed in itself  
rather than being taken for granted.278 For example, discourse and discourse analysis have 
been among the most popular concepts and tools to study the formation of  geopolitical 
identities.279 Discourse, or ‘discursive formations’ as Foucault puts it, are not to be 
mistaken for political or daily speeches.280 
In researches of  international relations, the use of  discourse in analytical 
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approaches has increased considerably,281 especially in the field of  security studies, but has 
been little used in foreign policy.282 Indeed, according to Loisel283 discourse analysis in 
researches of  international relations discourse analysis frameworks provides interesting 
and complementary tools for an analysis of  the patterns and processes of  foreign policy. 
Milliken284 describes three commitments to establish different types of  research 
and methods in discourse theorising in international relations studies. The first 
commitment uses discourses as a system of  signification. This means that the discourse is 
a structure of  signification that constructs social realities. The second commitment is the 
productivity of  discourses, this means that the discourse is productive or reproductive of  
things defined by the discourse. The third commitment is the discourse as the play of  
practice, which is oriented to study dominating discourses, and their structure of  meaning 
as connected to the implementation of  practices and ways of  making these intelligible and 
legitimate. This last commitment entails a critique of  conventional international relations 
theory as providing “ahistorical accounts of  continuity and structural form that ignore 
historical transformations, and a concern for genealogies”, exploring historical 
discontinuities and ruptures in international relations that conventional theories have 
erased.285 
Ghica286 states three different perspectives on discourse and discourse analysis:  
First, there is the above-mentioned strategy, inspired mainly by socio-linguistics, which 
treats language as a textual unit. A second generation of  discourse analysis research 
developed around some of  the main ideas of  Michel Foucault, particularly around his 
view on the relation between power and knowledge. From this perspective, discourse is 
defined in terms of  social practices, while discourse analysis is a large methodological 
approach that aims at analyzing linguistic and non-linguistic data as discursive forms. This 
argument is shared also by the members of  the third generation of  discourse analysis, but 
it is extended to the entire social realm. Influenced mostly by the work of  Jacques Derrida, 
this third generation represents social reality and discourse as mutually constituting each 
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other. In this sense, “there is nothing outside the text”.287 
This research is in line with the Foucauldian perspective which as a 
methodological approach also includes the three commitments of Millinken. The 
perspective of Foucault is developed around the relation between power and 
knowledge,288 in which discourse is defined in terms of  social practices, while discourse 
analysis is a large methodological approach that aims at analysing linguistic and non-
linguistic data as discursive forms.289  
Notably, Foucault states that all knowledge implies power and all power involves a 
specific power. Hence, all discourses are influenced by power relationships and power 
requires a specific knowledge that gives it a legitimate authority.290 Foucault claims: 
We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it 
because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge 
directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution 
of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the 
same time power relations. These 'power-knowledge relations' are to be analysed, therefore, 
not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, 
but, on the contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of 
knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-
knowledge and their historical transformations.291 
Power lies not in the hands of a particular person or group in the society, but is 
exercised in a relational and transversal way to the whole social body. 
Power in this Foucauldian perspective is an inequality relationship. Power is 
something like stratification, institutionalisation, the definition of  techniques, instruments 
and those that produce knowledge; it is an instantaneous photography of  multiple 
struggles which also is in continuous transformation.292  Indeed, in this research the 
deployment of  neoliberalism and the establishment of  coalitions around fairness 
discourses places this relationship in a structure of  power; discourses of  coalitions against 
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neoliberalism are related to abusive practices in the international system. The 
Foucauldian approach allows identification of  structures of  power in which knowledge is 
defined as a truth deployed by discourses, which are understood as a set of  political events 
through which the power of  the state is transmitted.293 
In this context, Foucault in The Order of  Discourse294 states that there are three 
system of  exclusion: the opposition between prohibition and permission; the opposition 
between reason and madness; and the opposition between true and false. This last 
opposition, which implies the assignment to each one its ‘true’ name, is the most 
important in this research because this represents the idea of  the true about 
underdevelopment.   
These three procedures of  discourse exclusion, which in no way exclude each 
other, are for Foucault purely arbitrary and contingent, as long as they depend on a 
discursive and institutional coercion that imposes it by force.295 
Fair296 states that there are two great modalities of analysis from the theoretical 
point of view of Foucault: some modalities critically analyse the ‘social conditions of 
production’ and legitimisation of power. Other modalities examine the historical 
genealogy of the forms acquired by that application of power. In this research both 
modalities are addressed, which implied exploration of the legitimisation of power in the 
UN linked to the G77 idea and the search for the form that acquires this power in the idea 
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2.2. Foucauldian Approach 
 Genealogy is grey, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a 
field of  entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been 
scratched over and recopied many times.297 
The list of  studies done on methodological perspectives proposed by Foucault is 
uncountable. Countless researchers present an overview of  his work and consequently we 
have innumerable sources of  information about his genealogy, his problematisations, his 
archaeology, his dispositif, and his episteme, among other perspectives.  
Some of  these overviews are similar in approach while others differ significantly. 
Different variables could explain these differences or similarities in perspective, such as 
language, culture, historical context, the reality of  the researcher, their field of  study, and 
their discipline. There is an enormous source of  information about Foucault’s historical-
philosophical perspective. 
Working with Foucauldian approaches can be difficult; indeed, for him it was 
difficult as well. The development of  his methods became a process that took him a long 
period, and his methodological approach suffered setbacks and contradictions that he 
himself  realised and tried to improve on. Despite his final work achieving significant 
coherences, continuous modifications in his methods and the name of  them make it 
difficult for any researcher seeking a methodological unity in his body of  work overall, 
and this becomes more difficult with the enormous range of  interpretations made by the 
many researchers who have studied his work. Therefore, working towards the 
achievement of  one single Foucauldian methodological perspective is not possible, and 
there is not something specific that could be called the “methodology” of  Foucault. 
Foucault often explained his methodological approach and the use of  tools used 
in his researches. However, he was reluctant to define a specific methodology to use in his 
investigations.298 Indeed, he stated: ‘I take care not to dictate how things should be’.299 The 
work of  Foucault is not a disorganised practice. Indeed, he claims the use of  his critical 
                                                          
297 Foucault, 1984:31 
298 Meadmore et al., 2000; Graham, 2005; Harwood, 2006 
299 Foucault, 1994:288 
 
 
approach ‘does not mean that no work can be done except in disorder and contingency’.300  
The work of  Foucault has been built over tools that are closely related to each other, 
and which can be used as a tool-box as he has suggested301: ‘I would like my books to be 
a kind of  tool-box which others can rummage through to find a tool that they can use 
however they wish in their own area. I don’t write for an audience; I write for users, not 
readers’.302 The work in question ‘has its generality, its systematicity, its homogeneity, and 
its stakes’.303 The reading of  his books and interviews shows consistency in his methods 
and it is possible for the researcher to understand the depth of  his approach. It is possible 
to see more clearly the path that he wanted to build, and with this to establish a useful 
methodology for this investigation.  
Foucauldian methods are pertinent because they are centred on questioning of  
historical truths that support the veracity of  concepts, such as development in the North–
South debate. This questioning encourages researchers to identify the “origin” of  ideas 
(or systems) and consequently brings us the opportunity to trace the origin of  the 
relationship between Latin American participation in the G77 and neoliberalism.   
  
2.2.1.  Ontology: the research philosophy 
Ontology underpins this research. Foucauldian methodology is located within a 
modernist tradition of  historical-philosophical reflection,304 which Foucault described 
himself  as a ‘historical ontology’.305 This reflection, framed in the history of  thought, is 
an attempt to build the history of  ourselves by questioning historical constants (the 
common historical explanations) used to legitimise them.306 To achieve this aim, Foucault 
opposes traditional historical methods and tries to discover the primacy of  immutable 
truth origins through analysing how one ‘regime of  truth’ is displaced by another.307 In 
this study, for example, it is shown that the ‘regime of  truth’ of  Latin American 
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coalescence is related to the deployment of  neoliberalism as a rationality of  government.   
 
2.2.1.1. Eventalization as a form of  historical approach 
Eventalisation is the procedure that Foucault uses to present ‘a new kind of  
history’ for the history that is explained by its obviousness. It is a re-problematisation of  
the studied phenomena to find the problematisation that gives its historical acceptability. 
In this research, the self-evident “true” about Latin American participation in the G77 
and its link to the unfairness of  the international economic system is eventalised. This 
means that the eventalisation enables revelation of  the problematisation that produces 
Latin American participation in the G77 and how this problematisation is related to 
neoliberalism. Eventalisation has been a determining factor in building this 
methodological approach. 
Eventalisation emerges in Foucault’s late work308 and is framed as a critic-
historical method.309 This new perspective takes up the challenge to ‘emancipate historical 
knowledge’310 and consequently tries to introduce the complexity of  its progression in the 
history. Using this method, Foucault seeks to show that the historical process is not a 
natural process, it is not linear and it does not possess an absolute continuity. Rather, it is 
a discontinuous process that should be addressed through the singularity of  events.311 This 
idea of  historical singularity refers to the historical point in which the practice became an 
effect.  
Thus, eventalization is the critical process to address the continuous or traditional 
history. Foucault312 states about eventalization: 
What do I mean by this term? First of  all a breach of  self-evidence. It means making visible 
a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an 
immediate anthropological trait or an obviousness that imposes itself  uniformly on all. To 
show that things weren’t ‘necessary as all that’; it wasn’t as a matter of  course that mad 
people came to be regarded as mentally ill; it wasn’t self-evident that the only thing to be 
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done with a criminal was to lock them up; it wasn’t self-evident that the causes of  illness 
were to be sought through individual examination of  bodies; and so on. A breach of  self-
evidence, of  those self-evidences on which our knowledges, acquiescences and practices 
rest. This is the first theoretical-political function of  ‘eventalization’.313 
As a strategy, eventalisation allow us to stand back from what appears obvious and from 
the trend of  putting the event in predetermined unities314 and see things afresh. Thus, the 
Foucauldian history is organised through historical events.315 
Eventalisation allows the continuous question about contexts in which discourses 
(such as the international economic system’s unfairness) have been deployed and 
combined with non-discursive practices (e.g. the Latin American participation in the 
G77). The eventalisation as a historical approach triggers questions to identify the point 
at which the problematisation process around the idea of  development determines a new 
structure of  power, one that transforms in practice Latin America participation in the 
G77.  
Particularly, eventalisation has been used through this study to address the fact 
that singularity presupposes variability across a broad range of  dispersion centres.316 This 
means introducing the fact that we do not face the same tactics of  power in local centres 
in the present as were faced in the past. For example, the practices of  power exercised over 
developing countries to take part in the G77 at the beginning of  the UN were not 
necessarily the same as practices exercised over countries to take part in the same group 
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2.2.2. Research Methods: Foucauldian problematization 
Problematisation is the aim of  Foucauldian methodology. The problematisation 
seeks to identify the historical problem that produces the studied practice as an effect. In 
this research, problematisation allows us to identify that the search for solutions to the 
international need for natural resource availability in international markets to sustain 
international trade produced a reinforcement of  the differentiation of  developing and 
developed countries, and consequently, a differentiated South through the G77. 
Despite not enjoying the same impact on research as other Foucauldian 
concepts,317 problematisation has played an important part in his genealogical work.318 It 
has been fundamental to understand his work. Particularly, problematisation is an 
analytical strategy in the late critical work of  Foucault that seeks to understand the 
“history of  thought”. Problematisation seeks to understand the process of  how the 
solution to a problem (strategy, thought, practice, among others) is successful in creating 
a historical status of  unquestionable evidence. In Foucault’s words,319  
It is the set of  discursive and non-discursive practices that make something enter into the 
play of  true and false, and constitutes it as an object of  thought (whether under the form 
of  moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.).320 
Foucault explains problematisation further in an interview conducted by Paul Rabinow 
in May 1984.321 There, he states that the process of  problematisation should be understood 
as an original, specific or even multiple and contradictory response to difficulties in a 
situation or context of  intelligibility. He claims that ‘to one single set of  difficulties, several 
responses can be made. Moreover, most of  the time different responses actually are 
proposed. But what must be understood is what makes them simultaneously possible: it 
is the point in which their simultaneity is rooted; it is the soil that can nourish them all in 
their diversity and sometimes in spite of  their contradictions’.322 In this study, the single 
set of  difficulties is related to the world wars, the international economic crisis and the 
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problems that emerged; issues related to the end of  liberalism and the beginning of  
neoliberalism and the inception of  multilateral institutions. 
According to Foucault,323 a problematisation should be understood as a work at 
the level of  thoughts which seeks to respond to a particular situation, such as the shortage 
of  natural resources after wars and the international economic recovery after the 
Economic Crisis of  1929. This situation, real, lived by real individuals, creates a 
discussion raising various thoughts, which appears in several texts, or even can be so 
general that it becomes anonymous.324 Undoubtedly, it is clear that it is not possible to 
define, in just one research, the very first origin of  a problem, because a problematisation 
is the result of  a previous problematisation, and so on. The objective here is to find the 
problematisation that created the Latin American participation in the G77 as an effect, 
and then link this with neoliberalism as a governmental rationality. This relationship is 
developed in the later chapters. 
In a general context, to address the self-evidence through the problematisation, 
Foucault is against the historical method based on universals to provide explanations. 
Universals such as theory, discipline, law, science, among others,325 are not the centre of  
the Foucauldian perspective; rather, singularities and contingencies become more 
important.  
Therefore, ‘the analysis of  positivities requires the deployment of  a complex and 
tight causal network’ that accounts the singularity as an effect. This complex network is 
the dispositif that must be identified. Given that genealogy is linked to the archaeological 
process, non-discursive events (the essential component of  the genealogy) can be extracted 
from the archive as well. Genealogy tries to collect a ‘history of  interpretations’ as the 
outcome of  emergence, contingence and subjectivised knowledge.326 This history is 
described in terms of  power that produces an interplay between domination and 
subjectivisation.327 
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2.2.3. The study design: Historical case of  study 
Firstly, it is important to note that the methodological approach is the 
Foucauldian one. The case study is part of this approach and consequently should be 
understood in this context. Indeed, the methodology of Foucault often implies the use of 
a case. For example, in his Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault chooses 
the case study of Henriette Cornier in order to examine the emergence of medico‐juridical 
discourse.328 
Actually, though case study methodology is strongly influenced by a post-
positivist worldview,329 Mohammed, Gastaldo, & Howell330 argue that the case study is 
aligned with a Foucauldian perspective. For instance, Foucauldian methodology is 
concerned with the indistinct boundaries between the phenomenon and the contexts that 
constitute a phenomenon. This research uses the case study to explore the discursive 
contexts that shape a phenomenon, such as, of course, Latin American participation in 
the establishment of the G77. 
The case is triggered by a present problem, which is the North-South divide at UN 
negotiations that impedes the agreement on topics such as development and climate 
change. The practice of  Latin American participation in the G77 is interesting because of  
two main aspects. First, the G77 is the primary representative of  developing countries’ 
criticism of  the international economic system led by developed countries; second, Latin 
America played a significant role in the inception of  the G77 at the first UNCTAD. Since 
the objective of  the Foucault methodology is to explain the present history of  a 
phenomenon, it is necessary to understand the processes and contexts that mark the 
establishment of  this phenomenon. In this context, and given the access to information, 
it is possible to explore the beginning of  Latin America’s participation in the G77 and 
how this relates to neoliberalism. Therefore, the unique case is the historical period that 
precedes the establishment of  the G77 in UNCTAD I. This research uses a single case 
with a single unit of  analysis.331  
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The limitations of  a single case are given in that the results obtained are not easily 
extrapolated to other cases but only allow us to determine plausible relationships and 
establish theoretical propositions, and, therefore, to consolidate the theoretical 
development derived from the case study. In order to understand other Latin American 
practices in group negotiations, in the future more interventions of  this nature are required 
in different contexts, for theoretical replication, in order to verify the general validity of  
such propositions for other contexts.332 Considering these limitations, a case study can be 
interpreted as the first step of  an investigation that proposes new theoretical propositions 
that will be verified in subsequent investigations that may or may not use the case study 
method in its design.333  
A case study is used to facilitate the exploration of  complex and diffuse 
relationships and patterns,334 and such is the relationship between neoliberalism and the 
negotiations of  Latin America at the UN. The historical point to be studied has been 
chosen because the emergence of  the G77 in the international arena is a singularity that 
changed the way in which negotiations among developing and developed countries were 
established. It is the the historical point in which the practice became an effect. 
This case is organised around the period of  the G77 inception using the Latin 
American perspective through data from ECLA documents. Discourses of  the ECLA are 
a representation of  the Latin American thought. Given the Foucauldian methods, the 
temporality of  this case included a glimpse of  several periods of  time, from the 
independence of  Latin America to the inception of  the G77. Hence, to write a history of  
the present, which means to understand the relationship between neoliberalism and the 
discourse of  the G77 about its rejection of  the economic system, this case explores, from 
a Latin American perspective, the period since the beginning of  the Breton Wood 
institution, passing by the failure of  the Habana Charter, until the inception of  the 
UNCTAD and the G77. 
The case is described in a subsequent chapter. 
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2.2.4. Data collection 
2.2.4.1. Foucauldian use of  archives 
In the Foucauldian perspective, the archive is the source of  material for analysis, 
the structure that sustains knowledge. The concept of  archives in the work of  Foucault is 
not always literal. This system, also called ‘a priori’ and ‘episteme’, is the way in which 
discursive events are registered and from where these can be extracted.335 The archive is 
the source of  knowledge that has effects of  power, because a system of  knowledge has 
validated it. In the words of  Foucault:336 
The archive is first the law of  what can be said, the system that governs the appearance 
of  statements as unique events. But the archive is also that which determines that all these 
things said do not accumulate endlessly in an amorphous mass, nor are they inscribed in 
an unbroken linearity, nor do they disappear at the mercy of  chance external accidents, 
but they are grouped together in distinct figures, composed together in accordance with 
multiple relations, maintained or blurred in accordance with specific regularities.337 
The archive is a world view, a slice of  the history in which branches of  knowledge 
impose on each other norms and postulates, a general stage of  reason.338 The archive does 
not link different discourses but rather it represents the space in which the field of  the 
relationship is changing. The archive of  the UN in the period explored is a slice of  the 
history that shows and represents those political considerations from the internal politics 
of  Latin American countries involved in the negotiations. The resolutions, documents, 
working papers and perspectives from the ECLA and the UNCTAD, as the main material 
for this research, collect points in common and represent a joint vision of  the countries in 
the region. 
Indeed, the system in an archive has a specific structure in time and it delimits a 
field of  knowledge that normalises the behaviour of  things, ideas and institutions such as 
the UN. The historical a priori uses units, sets, relations, sequences, to put into play some 
dispersions, disappearances and emergences, subject to certain conditions of  formation 
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and transformation in the history.  
Likewise, the historical a priori does not analyse authors or thinkers, because it 
understands them as the point of  emergences. This research did not use specific authors 
to support ideas; however, it is inevitable that some people are more determinant in the 
establishment of  discourses, such as Raúl Prebisch from the ECLA. 
The proper use of  material became relevant to identifying relationships among 
concepts, while discursive analysis results allowed achievement of  the historical a priori 
(episteme, archive). Foucault339, in The Archaeology of  Knowledge, to show the 
methodological challenge implicit in telling a ‘general history’, defines a guide of  relevant 
points to address the proper use of  archives. These are: 
[…] the building-up of  coherent and homogeneous corpora of  documents (open or closed, 
exhausted or inexhaustible corpora), the establishment of  a principle of  choice (according 
to whether one wishes to treat the documentation exhaustively, or adopt a sampling 
method as in statistics, or try to determine in advance which are the most representative 
elements); the definition of  the level of  analysis and of  the relevant elements (in the 
material studied, one may extract numerical indications; references - explicit or not - to 
events, institutions, practices; the words used, with their grammatical rules and the 
semantic fields that they indicate, or again the formal structure of  the propositions and 
the types of  connexion that unite them); the specification of  a method of  analysis (the 
quantitative treatment of  data, the breaking-down of  the material according to a number 
of  assignable features whose correlations are then studied, interpretative decipherment, 
analysis of  frequency and distribution); the delimitation of  groups and sub-groups that 
articulate the material (regions, periods, unitary processes); the determination of  relations 
that make it possible to characterize a group (these may be numerical or logical relations; 
functional, causal, or analogical relations; or it may be the relation of  the 'signifier' 
(signifiant) to the 'signified' (signifie).340 
In the process of  the selection of  documents, the first challenge was to determine 
the representative core of  document to be analysed, mainly because the UN archive is 
enormous. So, the first step was to identify a group of  documents that allow us to find 
some discursive patterns to address the investigated topic, such as the Latin American in 
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the G77. The annual resolutions of  the United Nation General Assembly were the archive 
chosen to begin. This forum was selected because all UN negotiations converge in it. The 
UNGA meetings discuss all discussions carried out during the year in UN agencies: hence 
reviewing its resolutions was useful to understand the general context in which this 
research was inserted, and also to identify the main source of  documents to be analysed. 
The review started with an exhaustive exam of  the UNGA resolutions, from 1946 
to the present day. These resolutions showed a complete panorama of  discussion at the 
UN. It was interesting to observe that many discussions did not change with passing time. 
The approaches suffered some modifications in scope; some of  them were derived to 
related institutions, and some of  them resolved because they were specific historical 
events, but in general, the discussions were continued year after year.  
From reviewing the UNGA resolutions, it was clear that issues related to 
underdeveloped countries such as in Latin America were mainly addressed by the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Hence I start with the revision of  the 
Resolutions and Decisions of  the ECOSOC. From this examination it was clear that 
topics such as industrialisation and terms of  trade of  natural resources were important 
topics addressed by Latin America.  
In order to organise the information effectively, those resolutions in which Latin 
American countries have a continuous opinion were selected. With this selection of  
resolutions, I proceeded to seek the negotiations that gave birth to the resolutions in the 
archive. The aim was to understand the process of  Latin American participation in the 
negotiations and identify their related discourses. With the selected resolutions, a database 
was created to make comparisons and to look for information quickly. The database 
shows that the ECLA was the main source of  information for debates involving Latin 
American countries. So, I started with the revision of  the yearly Reports of  the Economic 
Commission for Latin America.  
In this context, the starting point of  analysis was complemented by a better 
understanding of  the international context in which neoliberalism and liberalism were 
related to the beginning of  Latin American negotiations at the UN. This context was 
provided by the reading of  authors (in the context of  Foucault) that represented to some 
 
 
extent the common understanding of  these matters. Some of  authors were:  Polanyi, 
Hayek, Cox, Ruggie, Escobar, Hass, Keohane, Stieglitz, Harvey, among others and related 
papers. 
In understanding the historical context and reviewing the ECLA archives, some 
ideas relating to Latin America appeared to be persistent: these ideas were about the 
differences between developed and underdeveloped countries and the process in which 
denomination of  “developing countries” was adopted. I agreed with some authors (such 
as Escobar) that development is a process created in the Global North, and reproduced in 
the Global South; but why did developing countries accept this terminology to represent 
themselves in the international negotiations? If  negotiating groups in which Latin 
America takes part are denominated “of  developing countries”, what is the role of  the 
name in the coalition? Why does it constantly imply the terms of  trade of  natural 
resources? 
With the reading and new perspectives, I thought I was ready to start, but the 
methodological approach was still not easy to apply. It was not clear the scope that should 
be selected for the genealogy, and this selection was a critical part of  the process. Thus, 
the understanding of  methods leads me first to attempt the analysis of  the whole 
participation of  Latin America in the G77, from its beginning up to today. However, the 
revision of  archives and history showed that not all diplomatic actions had the same 
dominion, and, given the purposes of  a genealogy, the beginning seems the most suitable 
point for deepening understanding. 
Finally, and given the great amount of  information to check, the approachable 
scope was Latin American participation in the inception of  the G77. This historical period 
was particularly useful because its birth was also related to the beginning of  neoliberal 
ideas in the international arena. This process moved me to look for information in the 
UNCTAD I. 
During the analysis of  the information, a better understanding of  the 
methodology regarding its philosophical roots was needed. So, the process of  reading 
started again, but this time it was oriented to understand how Foucault developed his 
methodology and the philosophical meaning of  terms used in his work. In this process 
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not only was a rereading of  Foucault needed, it was also necessary to gain a better 
understanding of  the philosophers that motivated Foucault in his methods. Hence, the 
process was supported by the reading of  authors such as Nietzsche, Kant, Derrida, 
Schopenhauer, Deleuze and others that work over the Foucauldian work - Robinow, 
Dean, Rose, among others. Likewise, this moment of  reading was the appropriate one to 
deepen understanding of  neoliberalism from a Foucauldian perspective. 
In a more clear understanding of  the methodology, it was decided to come back 
to archives, but this time with a more narrow scope. This process started with the ECLA 
establishment and its first years’ documents, along with the UNCTAD I documents. In 
the archives again, the focus was put on the need for industrialisation in Latin America 
and the reasons exposed by the ECLA for this purpose. The UNCTAD I was examined 
because in this conference the G77 was established, and because the ECLA’s work was 
relevant to the development of  positions for developing countries’ negotiations.  
From this process, it was clear that the failure of  the ITO conference and the 
imposition of  GATT were determinant in the economic situation of  Latin America. In 
this context, the exploration of  documents related to ITO was crucial to identifying 
important past events related to Latin American participation in the G77.  Therefore, 
documents were scanned: of  the inception of  Bretton Woods institutions, the archives of  
the conferences in Dumbarton Oak and the Havana conference. From this revision it was 
clear that the knowledge provided by the ECLA was fundamental in the construction of  
ideas that reinforced the differences between developed developing countries. 
On the other hand, given that Latin American governments were recognised as 
states before the beginning of  multilateralism, it was necessary to find information about 
the role of  Latin American coalescence before the multilateral structure was established. 
Here, letters related to the Congress of  Panama were relevant. In these letters, it was clear 
that trade and natural resources were an important issue before the beginning of  
multilateral institutions. This revision clarifies that Latin American governments were 
involved in the international sphere due to concern about trade and natural resources and 
that this interest appeared before the inception of  the multilateral institutions. 
In summary, the application of  the methodology meant that each revision of  
 
 
archives was the writing of  a history. So, at the end of  reviewing, I obtained several parallel 
histories relating to Latin American participation in the G77. With the written histories, 
application of  the methodology was easier than before; the use of  archaeology and 
genealogy was possible. The problematisation became apparent. The final part has been 
the work in a puzzle that tries to organise a coherent history that shows this 
problematisation. With problematisation clear, what was the relationship between 
neoliberalism and the Latin American participation in the G77? 
Regarding the selection of  evidence to support the arguments, it is important to 
highlight that the purpose of  Foucault in his work was to reinforce the idea that the will 
of  knowledge is related to power:341 ‘Thus the genealogist recognises that he or she is also 
an evaluator and, therefore, one’s genealogical investigation, including the approach, 
method, and selection of  evidence, is simply a product of as well as a product for, the 
genealogist.’342 
Despite this perspective, the study followed systematisation of  evidence as is 
explained above. Thus, and given that the UNCTAD I was the conference in which the 
G77 was established, where established discourses converged and were agreed, the textual 
evidence was taken from there mainly. In this context, special emphasis was placed on the 
opinion of  those countries that maintained continuous participation in the process from 
the beginning, such as Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Peru.  
Likewise, technical evidence was taken from the technical documents of  the 
ECLA. 
2.2.4.2. The documentary source 
The present study is a documental historical research mainly based on primary 
sources supported by secondary sources,343 which are selected and analysed from a 
Foucauldian point of  view. Primary sources are official documents provided by the UN 
archive available in the Official Document System of  the United Nations (ODS), which 
is an online database of  UN documents that has full-text, born-digital UN documents,344 
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‘including documents of  the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and 
Social Council and their subsidiaries, as well as administrative issuances and other 
documents’.345 The Documents used in this research also came from:  
- The ECLAC Digital Repository, which provides access to more than 35,000 
digital publications, from the first publication of  ECLAC in 1948 to the most 
recent.346  
- The UN General Assembly Resolutions, which provides the UNGA 
resolution since the beginning of  the institution in 1946.347  
- The ECOSOC documentary centre, which provides resolutions by the 
institution from 1946.   
- The UNCTAD I documents. 
The period of  revision of  documents has been bounded between the inception of  
the UN in 1946 and the establishment of  the G77 in 1964. 
Regarding the selection of  documents, documents to be analysed have been 
selected as the base of  discourses that record knowledge about Latin American 
participation in the G77 at the UNCTAD I. Particular emphasis was put on documents 
relating to multilateral treaties in which the G77 was involved. Therefore, the selection of  
relevant documents in the UN archive has been focused on Latin America’s role in the 
establishment of  the G77. This selection of  documents has been exhaustive.  
The material to be analysed has been selected as proposed by Foucault; this means 
material was chosen by the negotiation power exercised over Latin American countries 
through the G77. The level of  analysis of  these documents has been oriented to determine 
if  neoliberalism is the grid or is part of  the grid that determined that a Latin American 
country take part in the G77 at the UNCTAD I. 
Documents checked were: statements of  the G77 from its beginning onwards on 
issues related to development, trade, and the environment; resolutions of  the United 
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Nations General Assembly (UNGA) since its beginning until now; documents, books and 
resolutions of  the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) from its inception 
until the establishment of  the G77 in 1964; documents of  the First United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development linked to G77; resolutions of  Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) linked to Latin America and the establishment of  UNCTAD; 
documents of  Bretton Woods conferences; documents of  the Habana Conference; and 
some others related to these documents from other UN institutions. 
Secondary sources are books related to the primary source. These documents 
complement the historical knowledge linked to the emergence of  the underdevelopment, 
multilateral institutions and the beginning of  neoliberalism; this means the global political 
economy oriented to reconstruct the international economic system after the economic 
crisis of  1929.   
Likewise, texts and documents about the beginning of  neoliberalism were used to 
complement the archive of  the United Nations. Thus, some authors have been 
incorporated in the reading who led ideas of  neoliberalism, recognised critics, and 
histories about the beginning of  the iconic neoliberal institutions.   
 
2.2.5. Data analysis 
Foucault established his ‘process of  analysis’ to identify modes of  thought 
associated with historical happening. This process of  analysis goes against historical 
methods that are oriented to identify the legitimation of  the history, and hence, this 
process is focused on questioning historical constants (e.g. GATT establishment) and 
universals (e.g. the unfairness) used to explain it.  
The process of  analysis is composed of  three components, ‘archaeology, 
genealogy, and strategy’.348 In the analysis process, these components should not be 
worked in ‘three successive levels that would be derived, one from the other’; rather, these 
should characterise ‘three necessarily contemporaneous dimensions of  the same 
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analysis’.349 From these three components archaeology and genealogy are the most 
important in the process because genealogy defines the design of  analysis while 
archaeology brings methods to address this critical analysis in practical terms; according 
to Foucault’s350 words: 
[…] this criticism […] is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. 
Archaeological — and not transcendental — in the sense that it will not seek to identify 
the universal structures of  all knowledge or of  all possible moral action, but will seek to 
treat the instances of  discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many 
historical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce 
from the form of  what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will 
separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of  no 
longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.351 
Archaeology is the particular method to analyse discursivities and it is related to 
knowledge, whereas genealogy allows identification of  the dispositif, and hence it is linked 
to power. Archaeology, for example, is the exploration of  the discourse of  unfairness to 
identify the knowledge related to it, while genealogy is the exploration of  how these 
discourses and knowledge are influenced by power. According to Kendall & Wickham,352 
archaeology and genealogy are complementary in their approach to the discourse. These 
can only be distinguished by their different emphasis; archaeology is focused on 
“historical slice”, while genealogy focuses on the “historical process”. Below is developed 
the idea of  archaeology and genealogy used in this research. 
 
2.2.5.1. Archaeology 
Archaeology, the “method”, is the first component of  the analysis process that 
Foucault started to develop; indeed, his first books were oriented to this matter.  
The main objective of  the archaeological process is the determination of  positivity 
in ‘practical systems’ to identify its ‘pure singularity’. Practical systems are ‘what they 
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[men] do and the way they do it’.353 The practical system to be investigated by this research 
is Latin American participation in the G77 at the UNCTAD I; thus, the developing 
country and the international economic structure became part of  the “universals” 
involved. 
The determination of  positivity of  a system is the process that should identify the 
historical ‘acceptability’ of  this system. In the words of  Foucault, ‘grasp what constitutes 
the acceptability of  a system’.354 Historical acceptability gives us a “reality” of  the system, 
a truth that allows us to accept the concept (system) as “true”. In this research, this process 
has been done through the first chapters. In these chapters is explored the international 
‘acceptability’ of  the Latin American coalescence in the G77 at the UNCTAD I, linked 
to the deterioration of  the terms of  trade in the international economic structure. 
To be more precise, archaeology tries to identify the process that allows the 
transition of  a system toward a system with historical acceptability. In this case, the 
archaeological process aims to determine the transition in which Latin America in the 
G77 becomes historically accepted. To identify the acceptability of  a system, Foucault 
expresses the need to establish a nexus of  power-knowledge that has produced this 
acceptability. Foucault355 claims: 
What we are trying to find out is what are the links, what are the connections that can be 
identified between mechanism of  coercion and elements of  knowledge, what is the 
interplay of  relay and support developed between them, such that a given element of  
knowledge takes on the effects of  power in a given system where it is allocated to a true, 
probable of  false element, such that a procedure of  coercion acquires the very form and 
justifications of  a rational, calculated, technically efficient element, etc.356 
According to Foucault, the terms ‘knowledge’ (savoir) and ‘power’ (pouvoir) are concepts 
that should be used to neutralise the effect of  legitimation by historical constants. Thus, 
knowledge should be understood as ‘all procedures and all effects of  knowledge that are 
acceptable at a given point in time and a specific domain’; while power is a ‘series of  
particular mechanisms, definable and defined, which seem likely to induce behaviours or 
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discourses’.357 The third chapter establishes a nexus of  power-knowledge that has 
produced the acceptability of  Latin America in the G77. This chapter identifies a 
relationship between the surveillance of  natural resources production at global level and 
knowledge about the underdevelopment established by the ECLA. 
Finally, regarding discourse analysis of  documents, it has been addressed in the 
way proposed by Foucault in his The Archaeology of  Knowledge. This method understands 
words, sentences and statements like ‘enunciative modalities’.358 In this context, to 
understand a real message of  these modalities, Foucault suggests that ‘we must first 
discover the law operating behind all these diverse statements, and the place from which 
they come’.359 To do this Foucault proposes making some questions regarding the source 
of  statements, such as: ‘Who is speaking? Who is qualified to do so?’ ‘What is the status 
of  the individuals who - alone - have the right, sanctioned by law or tradition, juridically 
defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such a discourse?’ He states that ‘we must 
also describe the institutional sites from which the [subject] makes his discourse, and from 
which this discourse derives its legitimate source and point of  application’. Finally, it is 
important to bear in mind ‘the positions of  the subject’. This because these ‘are also 
defined by the situation that it is possible for him to occupy about various domains or 
groups of  objects’.360 
 
2.2.5.2. Genealogy 
Genealogy, after archaeology, is the second component of  the analytical process 
that Foucault develops in his books. The methodological aim of  genealogy is to establish 
a historical network of  discursive and non-discursive components (the dispositif) which 
accounts for a singularity as an effect.361 The genealogy seeks to integrate the historical 
context that defines and forms the knowledge associated with discourses. The aim is to 
identify the problematisation that gives life to the system of  power-knowledge that 
sustained Latin American participation in the G77 at the UNCTAD I. This genealogical 
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process is developed in the third and fourth chapters.   
For this research, genealogy has implied the establishment of  a historical network, 
which shows Latin America in the G77 at the UNCTAD I like an effect. In the words of  
Foucault,362 this is to establish: 
[…] something that attempts to restore the conditions for the appearance of  a singularity 
born out multiple determining elements of  which it is not the product, but rather the 
effect.363 
Genealogy, understood as the second part of  the critical process, comes to solve 
limitations raised in the archaeological process. In this process, two main problems were 
identified by Foucault. The first is related to the tendency to identify, as causal agents, a 
priori to explain the acceptability of  a system. For example, the decision of  Latin 
American countries to take part in the G77 at the UNCTAD I is in general explained by 
the problems linked to GATT inception. In this case the a priori can be identify as the 
unfairness suffered by Latin American countries that created the need of  Latin American 
coalescence. Indeed, in a study of  the WTO negotiations, Narlikar & Odell364 in a 
positivist analysis of  the fairness, claim that developing countries in trade negotiations 
have appealed to justice and legitimacy during the last decades. References to fairness 
have been used extensively by developing countries as a reason to take part in a coalition. 
To address this problem, Foucault recommends in the analysis two approaches. First, 
‘bring out the conditions of  acceptability of  a system’, and second, ‘follow the breaking 
point that indicates emergence’.365 For example, one condition of  acceptability of  the 
system in this study is the unfairness. Regarding the breaking point that indicates 
emergence, in this study it is linked to the emergence of  international institutions such as 
GATT. 
The second problem identified by Foucault is the researcher’s trend of  using 
multiple causal factors to explain the acceptability of  a system. For example, factors used 
to explain the participation of  Latin America in the G77 at the UNCTAD I include the 
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structure of  the international system, the power of  developed countries and the Cold War, 
among others. To avoid this temptation of  using multiple causal factors, Foucault366 
recommends ruling out causal factors when these respond to the follow categories: 
- Causal value is only recognized in explanations targeting a final authority, valorised 
as a profound and unique agency; for some, its economics; for others demography. 
- Causal value is only recognized for that which obeys a pyramid formation pointing 
towards the cause or causal focus, the unitary origin; 
- Moreover, finally, the causal value is only renowned for that which establishes a 
certain unavoidability, or at least, that which approaches necessity.367 
The final aim of  the genealogy is to identify the unique causal, which would 
produce the singularity in its pure form, as an effect, among many other pure singularities. 
This means that the principal objective of  a genealogy is the identification of  the 
problematisation point, as the origin of  the system being studied. The focus of  this 
research is to identify the problematisation point as the generator of  Latin America’s entry 
into the G77 at the UNCTAD I and its relation to the neoliberalisation process. The 
problematisation seeks to identify when the problem was thought and its resulting relevant 
singularity produced. 
To Foucault,368 genealogy is ‘the union of  erudite knowledge [such as economic 
science] and local memories [the ECLA documents] which allows us to establish a 
historical knowledge of  struggles [of  power] and to make use of  this knowledge tactically 
today’. In its development, genealogy seeks to identify the ‘dispositif’ that makes possible 
that some knowledge of  the history can be understood and perceived as truth. In a general 
context, Foucault proposes that power is part of  a dispositif that influences the knowledge 
and makes it true. 
Genealogy does not seek to discover substantives entities, such as subjects, virtues 
and forces; it studies the appearance of  a battlefield that defines and creates a new space 
of  knowledge. Indeed, the Foucault approach to ‘institutional analysis’ was working on 
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the growth of  technologies of  power.369 
Dispositif is the category that Foucault370 proposes to conduct the genealogical 
challenge. Foucault defines the dispositif as a grid of  different elements, the relation 
between them, and the nature of  their connection. Particularly, dispositif is: 
[…] a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of  discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions–in short, the said 
as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of  the apparatus.371 
According to Bonditti et al.372 dispositif is what operationalises the genealogical 
method. To address this method Harwood373 proposes using ‘four angles of  scrutiny’ that 
‘provide one way to think about applying genealogy’.374 These angles are ‘discontinuity, 
contingency, emergence and subjugated knowledge’. They provide ways of  conducting a 
genealogical analysis to interrogate the participation of  LAT in the G77. These are shown 
in the figure below. 
As the figure shows and in a methodological 
suggestion, Harwood375 claims to start by seeking the 
‘discontinuity’, which seeks ‘something altogether 
different’ in the discourses. Foucault identifies a 
discontinuity when ‘things are no longer perceived, 
described, expressed, characterised, classified, and 
known in the same way’.376 It means when the 
acceptability of  an old system is dropping and a new 
one arising. In this study, discontinuity has been used to locate specific breaks and ruptures 
in the truth of  Latin American discourses to take part in the G77, and to unsettle 
assertions such as that a coalition is a response to global inequity. Therefore, for 
discontinuity, it is possible to identify ‘points of  rupture and difference in the apparently 
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continuous truth’377 in the Latin American coalescence. 
 The second angle proposed is ‘contingence’,378 which ‘brings to the surface the 
contingent nature of  self-evident truths’.379 For this study, this means to find points at 
which truths arise about the inception of  coalescence and to help answer questions such 
as, what conditions or occurrences in Latin American coalescence are contingent? 
Likewise, Harwood suggests considering two aspects of  contingency. First, things that 
present themselves like natural ends and as a result of  a comprehensible and progressive 
history of  heterogeneous elements. Second, these things do not come together in some 
organised fashion but respond to haphazard conflict.380 Therefore, the question for this 
study could be: what political contingency brings the truth produced about Latin 
American participation in a coalition of  developing countries? At what moment is Latin 
American involvement in coalitions contingent? 
‘Emergence’ is the third angle proposed by Harwood. Emergence constitutes a 
discontinuity of  history that is focused on genealogical inquiry.381 Scrutiny of  it provides 
a way to draw attention to the manifestation of  the studied phenomena.382 Indeed, 
emergence is ‘the moment of  arising’ when a system series comes together in a ‘hazardous 
play of  dominations’ that have given birth to our way of  existence.383 A question could be: 
how has the notion of  Latin American coalescence emerged?  
Therefore, the use of  Harwood’s perspectives of  discontinuity, contingence and 
emergence can be harnessed to interrogate international society about Latin American 
participation in the G77. Thus, discontinuity can be deployed to ask whether coalitions 
of  developing countries remained the same. Contingence can ask whether its 
establishment and continuity is contingent. While emergence promotes questions about 
when and how the Latin American participation in coalitions emerged. Thus, the truth is 
considered in terms of  discontinuity, while contingency supports the emergence of  the 
historical acceptability (the interpretation of  truths). 
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Finally, the fourth angle is ‘Subjugated Knowledge’, divided into two types: subjugated 
erudite knowledge and subjugated disqualified knowledge (local memories).384 The first 
one should be used to develop the genealogy while the second one is useful for 
identification of  the self-formation process, and the subsequent construction of  
subjectivities of  Latin American states. According to Harwood,385 quoting Foucault: 
These knowledges are what Foucault describes as those blocs of  historical knowledge 
which were present but disguised within the body of  functionalism and systematizing 
theory and which criticism which obviously draws upon scholarship- has been able to 
reveal. These knowledges are valuables tools for the genealogist since from these it is 
possible to create something one might call a genealogy, o rather a multiplicity of  
genealogical researches, a painstaking rediscovery of  struggles together with the rude 
memory of  their conflicts.386 
 This angle concerns the self, the forms of  subjectivation fostered by these 
discourses and practices.387 This subjectivation implies considering the way in which Latin 
American countries have constituted perception about participation in coalitions 
according to prevailing narratives. Therefore, this study has been determined by the 
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4. CHAPTER THREE 











4.1. The event and its historical context: 
The inception of the Group of 77 from a Latin American perspective 
 
The practice of developing countries of taking part in the group of the G77 is 
shaping the way in which several decisions are taken at UN negotiations, such as 
sustainable development and climate change. This practice that defines the North-South 
divide makes it difficult to get agreements in relevant bargaining at the UN. The G77 is 
influencing the world in which we live. Likewise, neoliberal ideas deployed from the 
Global North to the Global South are influencing the North-South divide.388 The 
establishment of this case frames the eventalisation of the role of neoliberalism in the 
decision of developing countries to take part in the G77 from a Latin American 
perspective. This means to rethink the known explanations of Latin American 
participation in the G77 to connect this with neoliberalism in a defined context in a 
historical period. 
The G77 was launched in the UNCTAD I at the beginning of the Cold War, as a 
way for developing countries to address the negotiations about commodity trade.389 
However, the history that triggered the G77 started almost two decades before in the 
middle of the crisis that ended liberalism and in which developing countries were mainly 
the Latin American ones. This is the period that this research explored in order to find the 
relationship between the Latin American practice of taking part in the G77 and the 
beginning of neoliberalism.  
For the exploration, this study was focused on two elements related to the G77 
inception and which show that the Latin American participation in the group - in a way 
to promote development in international negotiations - is part of a power/knowledge 
system connected with the deployment of neoliberalism. 
The first element explored (an a priori in terms of Foucault) is the unfairness of the 
international economic system as a condition of acceptation of the Latin American 
participation in the G77. Specifically, it explored the emergence of the Latin American 
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discourse about injustice linked to international economic structures due to GATT. This 
discourse, promoting change in the international economic order, and used subsequently 
by the G77, is widely known. However, some questions appeared: why had this discourse 
to be present in all negotiations? Why has this discourse become important and accepted 
as a Southern view in international negotiations about trade and development? Why, 
despite strong opposition from developed countries and the historical changes, does this 
discourse remain invariable? Is this discourse related to deployment of the neoliberal 
system? How is this discourse related to differentiation of countries in the international 
system?  
The second element explored (a “multiple causal factor” in terms of Foucault) is 
the economy of development. Specifically, what was explored was the knowledge 
production about economy specificity regarding developed countries. This knowledge 
was used to improve industrialisation of Latin America, but also to prepare the position 
of developing countries in the negotiations of the UNCTAD I when the G77 was 
established. In this context, the question was, how was this knowledge related to the 
system of power that created the G77? Did this knowledge feed the power system through 
the establishment of the characteristic of the developing country? 
To present these elements, first, I introduce the relevant role of  Latin America in 
the G77 inception. 
Latin America in the G77’s history. Nowadays, Latin America is a region 
composed of  developing countries that take part in the G77 to address the UN 
negotiations. 
This practice of  grouping with other developing countries to address international 
negotiations with industrialised countries was not a practice used by Latin American 
governments previously. For example, in the nineteenth century when Latin America was 
still in a process of  establishing independent countries, their international needs were 
addressed unilaterally and oriented to strengthen their economies.390 
In those days of  liberal trade,391 the international context was not restricted by 
multilateral institutions. The reformation of  an international economic structure was not 
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among the objectives of  Latin American diplomacy. The achievement of  industrialisation 
was the goal of  Latin American governments,392 and high confidence in the international 
economy dominated by liberal precepts of  free trade encouraged the states to believe that 
it was possible.393 The global structure of  power was not an issue to address in 
international deliberations, and more importantly, there was nothing called 
“underdevelopment” in Latin America. 
As a difference with developing countries from other regions, Latin American 
states got their independence before the UN system and their interest in international 
negotiations started previous to the UN structure. For example, they were active 
participants of  institutions such as the League of  Nations and the Organisations of  
American States (OAS). The League of  Nations not an important target for Latin 
America, but the OAS was highly relevant. The OAS was seen by Latin American 
governments as an opportunity to solve their trade problems associated with the Monroe 
Doctrine.394 Specifically, this organisation was established by the US in a way to take 
control of  the armed forces of  Latin America and of  its market in the region while 
liberalism was in crisis. This doctrine is part of  what is called American Imperialism over 
Latin America, in which the US achieves the power to “protect” American economic 
interests in the region against Europe and against Latin American states themselves.395 It 
is interesting to note that the existence of  the OAS meant an unfavourable point in the 
establishment of  the ECLA because of  its purposes in hemispherical matters. The ECLA 
was seen as a political competitor of  the OAS, but it was established by arguing that this 
would be oriented to global topics.396    
In the 1940s when multilateral institutions were first negotiated, the composition 
of  states in the world was different regarding the present. In those days, there were not so 
many states as today. For example, only forty four countries attended the Bretton Woods 
Conference, and nineteen of  these were from Latin America.397 Thus, Latin American 
states were the key representatives of  non-industrialised countries in negotiations, mainly 
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because the majority of  African and Asian territories were still colonies. 
In this context of  representation of  non-industrialised states, Latin America 
started its participation in negotiations. For this period, it is commonly said that 
developing countries did not take part effectively in the Bretton Woods Conference,398 and 
were not invited to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference399 in which the UN future and the 
Brazilian option to become a permanent member of  Security Council were discussed.400 
The reason could be linked to the fact that these institutions were thought of  in a post-
world war context and Latin America did not participate in the wars (except for Mexico 
and Brazil which sent small troop numbers to Italy and France during the Second World 
War). However, the organisation of  the United Nations on Trade and Employment 
Conference was different to previous conferences about implementing multilateral 
institutions. In this, Latin American countries were invited to take part and participated 
actively.401 
Latin American involvement in this conference was crucial because the terms of  
commodities trade and financing for industrialisation were discussed.402 Indeed, Latin 
American countries viewed this conference as an opportunity to get a solution to issues 
about international trade inherited from the colonial period.403  
Latin American countries sought the inclusion of  topics about industrialisation in 
the discussion at the Conference, despite negotiations in the conference and preparatory 
meetings being led mainly by the US and the UK. Indeed, first ideas about objectives of  
the ITO were drafted by the US in anticipation of  the preparatory committee. This 
document, published in 1947, called the Suggested Charter for an International Trade 
Organisation of  the United Nations, was based on a previous document called Proposal for 
expansion of  World Trade and Employment from 1945.404 
Likewise, in the London Conference in 1946 - a preparatory meeting - issues about 
employment, tariffs and preferences the discussions were also mainly led by the US and 
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the UK. However, despite the economic development of  non-industrialised states playing 
a minor role in the debate, Latin American countries, among other developing countries, 
highlighted the importance of  international trade in the national balance of  payments for 
them.405 The attempt bore fruit in negotiations, and economic development and its 
relation with trade was included in discussions. From Latin America, only Brazil, Chile 
and Cuba were involved in the preparatory meetings.406 
At the consequent meeting, the Geneva Conference, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was negotiated. GATT, which did not include economic 
development among its precepts, was signed by the Latin American countries. 
 In 1947 negotiations in the Havana Conference started and Latin American 
countries tried again to push the debate about development in favour of  its interests, by 
placing the issue of  economic development on the agenda. The focus was trade: they 
wanted to gain special trade exceptions to promote economic development to enhance the 
competitiveness of  its incipient industry.407 Latin America wanted tariff  preferences at a 
regional level, like those enjoyed by industrialised states (ex: imperial preferences) and to 
improve conditions of  trade for commodities through commodities agreements.408 
 After negotiations, developing countries managed to impose their interests related 
to industrialisation. Indeed, the document, signed by fifty three countries, sixteen from 
Latin America,409 (the Havana Charter), included two objectives (point 2 and 5) oriented 
to industrialisation of  states such as the Latin American ones: 
 To assure a large and steadily growing volume of  real income and effective demand, to 
increase the production, consumption and exchange of  goods, and thus to contribute to a 
balanced and expanding world economy. 2. To foster and assist industrial and general 
economic development, particularly of  those countries which are still in the early stages of  
industrial development, and to encourage the international flow of  capital for productive 
investment. 3. To further the enjoyment by all countries, on equal terms, of  access to the 
markets, products and productive facilities which are needed for their economic prosperity 
and development. 4. To promote on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis the 
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reduction of  tariffs and other barriers to trade and the elimination of  discriminatory 
treatment in international commerce. 5. To enable countries, by increasing the 
opportunities for their trade and economic development, to abstain from measures which 
would disrupt world commerce, reduce productive employment or retard economic 
progress. 6. To facilitate through the promotion of  mutual understanding, consultation and 
co-operation the solution of  problems relating to international trade in the fields of  
employment, economic development, commercial policy, business practices and 
commodity policy.410 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment witnessed important 
achievements in terms of  development by developing countries.  
Thus, despite the good omen for Latin American countries in negotiations for the 
establishment of  the International Trade Organisation (ITO),411 and despite developing 
countries (mainly Latin American) making a high proportion of  attendant countries, the 
ITO was not established. Negotiations were difficult, and at the end of  these, the US and 
the UK did not achieve agreement on issues of  employment.  
The achievements of  developing countries were erased with the rejection of  the 
implementation of  the Habana Charter, and given that the charter was not ratified, the 
General Agreement on Tariff  and Trade (GATT) signed in the Geneva Conference was 
adopted as a “Protocol of  Provisional Application”. It was signed by twenty eight 
countries412. Thus, despite the great achievement of  Latin American countries, this meant 
nothing in the final agreement. There was a participative negotiation about commodity 
trade that ended with the implementation of  something different to what was discussed 
in the conference. 
GATT became the legal framework of  trade that represented only a portion of  the 
participant countries in negotiations.413 It was a set of  rules for trade that did not take into 
account the social and economic differences among industrialised and developing 
countries, and it would bring several problems for Latin America. Dr Carlos Calleras, 
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Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of  Colombia, in its intervention at the 
third plenary meeting at the UNCTAD414, held on 24 March 1964, raised this issue:    
For the proper understanding of  the meaning and aims of  this Conference on Trade and 
Development, we have to see it within the general framework of  the evolution that has 
taken place in the last twenty years. […] The Havana Charter, as is well known, never went 
into effect; although, according to terms previously concerted, several of  the countries that 
participated in that conference proceeded to regulate their commercial relations by the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, others have abstained from entering into it. [...] 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Havana Charter were discussed 
when many of  the great Powers were just beginning to emerge from the chaos caused by 
the war and were concentrating on the problems of  their own reconstruction. The 
developing countries insisted, nearly always without success, that their very special 
situation should be taken into account. They alleged that it was not right to apply to all 
the participating nations the same conceptions and rules on such matters as reciprocity, 
the extension of  the most-favoured-nation clause and the establishment of  new 
preferences; and they argued that it was absurd and unfair to prescribe an indiscriminate 
equality of  treatment for unequal situations, and that, although the prosperity of  the great 
nations was undoubtedly an indispensable condition for the prosperity of  the others it was 
false to assume that the former by itself  brought in its train or guaranteed the latter.415 
The GATT, signed in a context different to that discussed, was reinforced a decade later. 
In 1954, Latin American countries achieved a change in the document.416 However, these 
changes were not substantial because the most favoured nation clause did not change and 
the establishment of  new preferences for industrialisation was not addressed.417 This made 
it difficult for developing countries to protect their commodity trade. The weak results in 
the revision of  GATT triggered the need for a conference oriented to solve the problem of  
developing countries.418 This conference was triggered by Asian-African countries, but the 
knowledge about underdevelopment came from Latin America. 
Particularly, around the world, the explicit interest to solve trade issues in 
collaboration among developing countries started in 1955 when the first Asian-African 
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conference was held in Bandung.419 This conference, organised by Asian-African nations 
which were going through their own decolonisation process, marked an important turning 
point for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the first multilateral coalition of  
developing countries established in 1962.420 The aim of  the conference was the promotion 
of  cooperation in economic and cultural issues between Afro-Asian nations; it also 
manifested their concern about natural resources. This is evident in the communique of  
the Asian-African Conference which claimed ‘Respect for the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of  all nations’ among the principles for international cooperation.421 
Although from Latin America only Cuba attended the Bandung Conference, its 
key ideas were discussed in the ECLA context. In the sixth period sessions of  ECLA422 
Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of  United Nations, stressed the relevance for 
developing countries of  this conference; in his discourse he stated that: 
I believe that new opportunities are now opening before us for more effective co-operation 
in the field of  economic and social development. Within the United Nations every 
Member country can exert its influence in promoting a more determined and substantial 
international attack on the problem of  poverty than before. In the regional economic 
commissions, you have a special opportunity and responsibility in this respect. Your own 
record constitutes ample evidence that you will be able to make a sound and imaginative 
contribution to a new common effort to meet this over-riding challenge of  our times.423 
Given the trade problems suffered by developing countries and looked upon with 
great misgivings and reservations by the industrial countries, in July 1962 the Cairo 
Conference on the Problems of  Economic Development was held.424 The Cairo 
Conference was guided by Abdel Moneim Kaissouni, Minister in the United Arab 
Republic, who became the President of  the first UNCTAD. In this conference, the 
attendant countries took a joint position at the UNGA425 to support the realisation of  the 
UNCTAD, as stated in the seventeenth period of  sessions of  the ECOSOC: 
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[...] at the Cairo Conference on the Problems of  Economic Development, the thirty-one 
participating nations had declared themselves in favour of  holding an international 
economic conference within the framework of  the United Nations, the agenda to include 
all vital questions relating to international trade, primary commodity trade and economic 
relations between developing and developed countries.426 
UNCTAD I brought a new discussion about international trade and with it the 
inception of  the G77.427 In the conference discussion was oriented to achieve agreement 
on fifteen principles identified as the “General Principles” to govern international trade 
relations and trade policies conducive to development.428 These principles were built from 
knowledge of  underdevelopment produced in Latin America.429 Indeed, principles were 
established to take into account the document prepared by the Secretary-General of  the 
Conference sent to governments before the conference. This report, entitled Toward a New 
Trade Policy for Development (Vol. II), was a basic document of  the Conference.430 This 
document was written by Raul Prebisch, the former Secretary-General of  ECLA and 
promoter of  the regional economic integration of  Latin America. Therefore, the 
principles presented in UNCTAD I represent the thinking of  the ECLA mainly. Other 
member states also submitted useful proposals and suggestions to the conference, hence, 
the document summarised the trade problems of  Latin America, but on a global scale 
representing all developing countries. 
Despite developed countries accepting principles proposed in the conference, 
some with substantial changes, results were wary of  goals.431 This caution was because of  
past experiences in the Havana Conference on Trade and Employment in 1947 in which 
GATT was established. UNCTAD I was understood as the opportunity to conclude the 
discussion about trade, and hence the opportunity to achieve a final solution to developing 
countries’ problems. This idea was summarised by Raul Prebisch, Secretary-General of  
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the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development432 at the third plenary 
meeting, held on 24 March 1964: 
I simply recognized that the Conference presented a unique opportunity for peripheral 
countries to explain to the industrial centres, clearly and objectively, the problems 
hampering their economic development. I believe, in fact, that this is a historic 
opportunity. Ten years ago, in the region from which I come, a great opportunity arose to 
effect a fundamental change in the policy of  international co-operation. That opportunity 
was missed, with serious consequences which now make it much more difficult to achieve 
what might then have been achieved. I should not like this new opportunity for the 
developing countries to be missed. I do not wish to consider the effects that such a failure 
would have and I believe that we must all try to recognize the importance of  this moment 
and to appreciate the hopes which the developing world places in the developed countries. 
Basically, it hopes that it may be allowed to play its part in the international field.433 
The most important goals of  the conference were two: the idea to implement a “new 
international division of  labour”, to improve terms of  trade for developing countries 
through the facilitation of  industrial exports from developing countries, and the 
establishment of  the Group of  77 with its Declaration of  Developing Countries 
constitution, that was led in large part by Latin American efforts.434   
 The elements for explorations 
The discourse of  inequality in the process that triggered the G77. In the last 
decades it has been accepted that GATT implementation turns the inequality lived by 
Latin American countries into a discourse of  unquestionable reality. This discourse that 
created the need to reform the international economic structure also reinforced the 
differentiation between countries, between industrialised and non-industrialised states, 
between Global North and Global South. 
The history of  the inequality discourse claimed by the G77 started with the end 
of  liberalism, which was triggered by the outbreak of  the Great Depression and the 
Second World War that impeded the restoration of  the international free trade.435 In this 
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complex international scenario, industrialised states that lose their chances for growth 
foster the return of  market confidence as the only way to recover the world economy.436 
Thus, the United States as the world’s foremost economic power, and the United 
Kingdom as the economic hegemon in its final stage decided the establishment of  
multilateral institutions437 to restore and protect “free trade” among countries. This new 
institutional structure would change the “rules of  the global game” in which Latin 
American countries should address industrialisation. “Restoration” of  trade meant the 
creation of  a new international economic “playing field”; an international structure 
related to the emergence of  neoliberalism. 
With the inception of  the UN system the international economic structure 
changed. From 1945, Latin America and much of  the rest of  the developing world would 
be inserted into a new international emergent system. This system was characterised by 
asymmetric economic interdependence, and an increasing differentiation in structure and 
location of  countries in the world hierarchy.438 The beginning of  a multilateral structure 
implied a significant change in negotiation conditions among states, Latin American 
included. Alongside multilateral institutions appeared the “New Diplomacy”, which 
transited from being secret and restricted to being outright and public.439 It was an idea 
deeply rooted in liberal tradition.440 
 This change imposed by international institutions, which also implied a 
modification of  liberal precepts related to free trade and monitoring by institutions, 
triggered a change in the capability of  Latin America to achieve industrialisation.441 This 
was due to the implementation of  the clause of  most favoured nation in GATT.442 These 
restrictions to development are the primary motivation of  Latin America for taking part 
in the G77 and the history of  the origins of  the G77.443 
The international structure of  the UN was built in a way that meant developed 
countries promoted the issues to be discussed in trade matters and imposed their 
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preferences.444 Particularly, in an international scenario dominated by liberal trends that 
promote global access to markets, multilateral agreements assumed that all states are 
equal, and must enjoy the same opportunities to enter new markets.445 However, different 
levels of  industrialisation determine the type of  access to international trade, and these 
economic differences among states were not taken into account, a matter of  high 
relevance for developing countries.446 
The international structure was particularly founded on four institutions, the 
United Nations and the three Breton Woods institutions. The United Nations was 
designed to bring peace, while other three were intended to restore international trade 
after the economic debacle.447 These institutions were the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the International Trade Organisation (ITO). 
The first two institutions were established in the Bretton Woods Conference in 
1944 and they were designed to restore the finance balance and the availability of  
international loans. The third one would be the institution to ensure the stability of  trading 
and a wealthy economic global environment for industrialised and non-industrialised 
countries. This was left as a pending issue that should be oriented to rule international 
trade. The Havana Conference, in Cuba from November 21st 1947 to March 24 1948, was 
the culmination of  a process to establish the ITO. GATT was the replacement of  the ITO, 
waiting for its ratification. 
In January 1948, GATT became the main document to rule international trade.448 
Its aim was ‘raising standards of  living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of  real income and effective demand, developing the full use of  the 
resources of  the world and expanding the production and exchange of  goods’.449 With the 
outbreak of  the Korean War on December 6 1950, President Truman announced that he 
would no longer seek Congressional approval of  the ITO Charter, and it was 
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abandoned.450 The establishment of  GATT became the icon of  unfair trade conditions, 
but more importantly, GATT became the target of  the industrialised and non-
industrialised states’ opposition. 
GATT became the unique framework to handle international trade relations 
among countries. In comparison with the Havana Charter, GATT did not consider 
concessions for the industrialisation of  developing countries.451 From the Latin American 
perspective, this agreement contained significant restrictions on their capacity to achieve 
economic development, imposed by industrialised states.452 Indeed, GATT meant that the 
export-oriented industrialisation strategy was no longer a feasible option for Latin 
America to achieve development.453 
According to Latin America, GATT is unfair because it imposes ’equality of  
treatment for unequal situations’;454 this means GATT takes industrialised states and non-
industrialised states as equal in terms of  trade. This situation of  “false equality” 
heightened rather than helped the differences among countries. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Havana Charter were 
discussed when many of  the major powers were just beginning to emerge from the chaos 
caused by the war and were concentrating on the problems of  their own reconstruction.455 
The Latin American countries insisted, nearly always without success, that their very 
special situation should be taken into account. They alleged that it was not right to apply 
to all the participating nations the same conceptions and rules on such matters as 
reciprocity, the extension of  the most favoured nation clause and the establishment of  new 
preferences; and they argued that it was absurd and unfair to prescribe an indiscriminate 
equality of  treatment for unequal situations, and that, although the prosperity of  the great 
nations was undoubtedly an indispensable condition for the prosperity of  the others it was 
false to assume that the former by itself  guaranteed the latter.456 Latin America embodied 
the underdevelopment problem. 
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 This concern about development was the result of  widening gaps in well-being 
between industrialised and non-industrialised countries in the post-war years. Indeed, 
developing countries faced economic and social problems such as inflation and poverty. 
This is A. M. Kaissouni, Minister of  Treasury and Planning of  the United Arab Republic 
and president of  the UNCTAD,457 at the first plenary meeting: 
The existence of  growing economic disparities side by side with an alluring political 
equality between the less-developed and the advanced countries of  the world is one of  the 
most serious problems that faces the international community at the present time. It would 
be a tragic error to resort to mere palliatives in the face of  such a situation. The real need 
is for a new and vigorous policy of  international co-operation wherein international trade 
and finance must play a key role in promoting economic development especially in the less 
advanced regions of  the world.458 
The signature of  the GATT created an international economic system that eludes 
any responsibility for deterioration of  terms of  commodities trade, which were the 
primary source of  Latin American trade.459  The difficulty of  changing GATT, a document 
that was part of  the ITO negotiations and accepted by states in that specific context of  
negotiations, meant a new strategy was required. This would trigger the coalitions of  
developing countries we have discussed. This process is summarised by Joao Augusto de 
Araujo Castro, Minister of  State for External Relations, the representative of  Brazil, at 
the UNCTAD,460 held on 24 March 1964, who took an active part of  GATT discussions: 
An appendix to the Havana Charter conveniently outlived the main body which never 
came to life. This was GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. And from 
1948 to 1954, all the efforts of  the under-developed countries concentrated on changing 
the GATT Contract, in order that it could be made more comprehensive, to take care of  
particular situations peculiar to problems of  economic development. The delegation of 
Brazil took a major part in provoking the industrialized countries to come forward and to 
accept the challenge to draft a modified GATT Contract. As all of  you know very well, 
this resulted in the GATT Revision of  1954.461 
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The unsolved problems left behind by the GATT Revision were heightened by the creation 
of  economic groupings that adhered to the preferences already accepted and 
institutionalised in GATT.462 This made international terms of  trade worsen, and Latin 
American countries was adversely affected. This situation caused Latin American 
countries to reinforce their claims, and forming alliances with other developing countries 
became the likeliest solution. 
GATT implies a discontinuity in the history of  the Latin America at the United 
Nations negotiations. GATT implementation became the reason to legitimate the claims 
of  the South about the economic system and the consequent claims of  the G77. Hence, 
Latin American participation would be no longer perceived and known in the same way, 
it would be linked to the conceptualisation of  the South. 
The inequality produced by GATT implied the recognition of  a different country, 
the developing country that should receive international support. This idea was supported 
by A. M. Kaissouni, President of  the UNCTAD, at 23 March 1964, who as we saw 
claimed that the existence of  growing economic disparities side by side with an alluring 
political equality between the less-developed and the advanced countries of  the world was 
one of  the most serious problems facing the international community at the present 
time.463 Therefore, the only way to address this challenge was through international 
cooperation wherein international trade and finance must play a key role in promoting 
economic development: 
It is gratifying that there is at present general recognition that international peace and 
prosperity cannot really be achieved and maintained if  we allow such dangerous and 
explosive economic trends to continue unchecked and if  we do not truly endeavour to 
combine our efforts to narrow the already wide and growing gap that separates the 
advanced from the developing countries. This is definitely one of  the main sources of  
prevailing world tensions and neither the advanced nor the developing nations can afford 
to ignore it.464 
 The discussion around the liberal ideas, summarised in the free markets and the 
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role of  GATT, is relevant to the UNCTAD purposes. Particularly, in the UNCTAD I,465 
in the chapter about “The problem of  International Trade and Development”, GATT was 
criticised because of  its incapacity to fulfil the function designed to promote international 
free trade. In this context, GATT was unable to avoid the deterioration of  terms of  trade 
because it had no clear code of  rules and principles to govern international trade. This 
lack did harm the economy of  developing countries, mainly because these rules and 
principles were based on an abstract notion of  economic homogeneity which concealed 
the great structural differences between industrial centres and peripheral countries with 
all its important implications.466  
Therefore, the request of  developing countries was focused on creating a new 
institution useful to support the development of  developing countries and recognising that 
the industrialisation of  developing countries was occurring in a very different context to 
industrialised countries. This was summarised by the Chilean representative, Carlos 
Martinez Sotomayor: 
Thus, the institutions which emerged from the post-war period endeavoured to bring some 
order in the system of  trade but soon revealed their inadequacy in face of  the new 
economic realities. It is precisely the basic theory prevailing during and immediately after 
the war, and upon which those institutions were based, that is under judgement today. 
Later developments have shown that the theory of  economic equality among States—-one 
of  the foundations of  theory in those years—was a false assumption and incompatible 
with justice, which ought to govern international relations. […] We also fully subscribe to 
the idea that the new structure of  world trade must favour the setting-up of  machinery and 
regulations designed to stimulate trade among developing countries and among countries 
at different stages of  economic development, and, finally, among countries with different 
political systems.467 
Later on, Latin American participation in coalitions was linked to the same ideas. 
Thus over the last decades, some Latin American countries have taken part in coalitions. 
These include the G24, established in 1971 to coordinate positions against developed 
countries in financial matters as part of  the G77; the G29, established in 1974 to face the 
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Paris Conference468 on issues of  international cooperation; the Group of  Ten (G-10) in 
the mid-1980s addressing the so-called “Big Five”,469 which sought to address in positive 
terms a new round of  negotiations in trade (Uruguay); the IBSA group (comprising India, 
Brazil, and South Africa), established in 2003 to protect trade interests due to the failure 
of  negotiations at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) ministerial in Cancun; and, 
finally, the BASIC Group, (IBSA+China) established in 2009 to protect economic 
interests in climate negotiations at the UNFCCC in Copenhagen,.BASIC rose due to 
failure in the continuity of  the Kyoto protocol, and of  developed countries to establish 
commercial commitments to support mitigation actions in developed countries. All these 
coalitions are linked to the G77. 
The creation of  knowledge about the economy of  development. The inequality 
associated with GATT creates the need of  production of  knowledge about development 
to address negotiations. For example, the representative of  Brazil, argued that the bad 
results of  negotiations in issues of  trade were due to the no understanding of  developing 
countries about their economic problems. Their position was not enough prepared; hence 
it was not possible to discuss the problems of  development. Thus, Joao De Araujo 
Castro470, Minister of  State for External Relations of  Brazil, stated at the fourth plenary 
meeting held on 24 March 1964: 
Many people sitting around this hall will certainly remember how badly prepared were 
the underdeveloped countries when they faced the delegations of  the industrialized 
countries at the Havana Conference. Even the name of  the Havana Conference—on Trade 
and Employment—was an indication of  the unconscious desire of  that meeting not to 
arrive at ways and means to develop the under-developed countries, but to maintain 
employment levels in the industrial countries devastated by the economic depression of 
the Thirties. [...] And the irony of  history is that the major industrialized countries did 
not ratify the Havana Charter, thereby giving the under-developed countries a chance to 
attempt and strive towards the solution of  their own problems, at their own risk, and to 
pursue keenly the study of  these difficulties and solutions for those problems, laying the 
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very seeds of  this gathering. This Conference resulted from the failure of  the Havana 
Conference in dealing properly with the problems of  economic under-development.471 
The deterioration of  terms of  trade was the key issue that triggered the need for 
knowledge. The economic problems started with GATT and the industrialised countries’ 
decision to establishing price-fixing regimes for commodity products in international 
markets, affecting economic development in Latin America significantly.472 This Latin 
American problem induced a “problematisation of  underdevelopment”, which sought the 
solution for industrialisation and which sustained the idea of  inequality in international 
trade and the consequent difference between “developing country” and “developed 
countries”. It was the pillar of  the Latin American participation in the G77. 
The problematisation and the consequent knowledge for under-development was 
produced by Latin America and is associated with the establishment of  the Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA). The ECLA, the UN regional institution that 
supports Latin America in economic matters, showed the world the new truth regarding 
the economy of  non-industrialised states, and their trade framework under liberal 
principles; it denounced the unfairness that LAT was suffering, and stressed the need for 
alliances to gain strength. 
 With its work, the ECLA unveiled the unfairness of  the international economic 
structure and its effects on industrialisation and development. Ideas of  Raul Prebisch - 
General Secretary of  the ECLA - and his centre-periphery theory, produced the 
arguments needed to demand changes in the international economic structure in favour 
of  developing countries.473 This implied the exigencies of  trade concessions and 
international aid, statements that developing countries would demand through the G77. 
This knowledge produced by Latin America was determinant for the South to 
obtain the implementation of  UNCTAD I. For example, the discussion of  commodity 
problems was based on the conclusions stated by two committees; the first one was the 
International Commodity Trade Committee (CICT),474 in its ninth session from 1 to 12 
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May 1961, and the second one was the Interim Co-ordinating Committee for 
International Commodity Arrangements (ICCICA) in its eighteenth session in May 1961. 
These meetings reinforced the connection between underdevelopment and international 
trade. On the one hand, the CICT reviewed progress on international trade in primary 
commodities. It concluded that instability in international commodity markets was 
serious and that there was no valid reason to suppose that the problem would not persist 
for a number of  years. Hence it recommended implementation of  a system of  insurance 
against a decline in export proceeds owing to instability in international commodity 
trade.475 
This conclusion was made in consideration of  a report prepared by the Secretary-
General in accordance with a General Assembly resolution of  5 December 1959 entitled 
“Ways and means of  promoting wider trade cooperation among States: Trade relations between 
under-developed and industrially advanced countries”.476 Its aim was to examine the nature of  
trade relations, including the level and pattern of  trade and the significance of  trends in 
exports and of  short-term fluctuations in exports. In addition, as a result of  discussion 
with ICTIC, the ECOSOC noted the relevance of  promoting exports of  manufactured 
goods as well as of  primary products in countries in the process of  development, and it 
stated that problems of  world trade could not be fully understood or fully met within a 
purely regional or even an inter-regional framework but must be seen in their world 
perspective.477 
Finally, at the ECOSOC discussion stressed the situation generated by European 
integration, which was considered to have hampered outside countries.478 Some countries 
even state that this movement was discriminatory in effect and might be detrimental to 
the growth of  world trade; however representatives of  France and Italy were convinced 
that the movement towards integration did not involve discrimination and would be 
beneficial to the growth of  world trade.479 In this context, Latin American countries were 
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very interested in the deployment of  liberal measures in international trade. According to 
the Yearbook of  the United Nations480 many members stressed the need for liberal trade 
policies, as follows: 
Agricultural protection not only hampered the expansion of  trade but also prevented the 
advanced countries themselves from reaping the full benefits of  the international division 
of  labour. [Also] the representative of  Uruguay, among others, also stressed the need for 
liberal export policies with respect to manufactures originating in the less developed 
countries. In view of  the progress of  industrialization, manufactures would become 
increasingly important in the exports of  developing countries.481 
In a way to reduce the concern of  the US and developing countries, mainly Latin 
American ones about the implementation of  Rome Treaty and protection issues related 
to trade, the ECOSOC adopted in August 1961 a resolution focused on promoting the 
reduction of  agricultural protection from industrialised countries. The resolution, called 
“Growth of  world commercial trade in agricultural products”,482 was based on a revised version 
of  a proposal put forward in the Council’s Economic Committee by Brazil, France, the 
United States and Venezuela.483 Its focus was that industrialised countries should reduce 
their agricultural protection, and was oriented to avoiding prejudice to the trade prospects 
of  efficient producers from outside their countries and regions. Further, it invited ‘the 
governments to consider the possibility of  liberalising such revenue of  fiscal charges of  
other barriers to trade as may at present unduly limit consumption of  agricultural 
commodities from underdeveloped or other developing countries’.484  
 This discussion about trade conditions of  the less developed economies were also 
discussed later, at the General Assembly’s sixteenth session in 1961. Approval was given 
for the resolution called “International trade as the primary instrument for economic 
development”,485 in the same plenary meeting that designated the decade of  the 1960s as 
‘the United Nations Development Decade’ through resolution 1710 (XVI).486 Both 
resolutions were the origin of  the conviction that the economic aims of  the United 
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Nations Charter would best be furthered by a bold new programme of  international 
economic cooperation, and it was requested that the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development be opened. Specifically, the committee at the UNGA wrote to: 
Request the Secretary-General to consult Governments of  States Members of  the United 
Nations and members of  the specialized agencies and ascertain their views on the 
advisability of  holding an international conference on international trade problems 
relating especially to primary commodity markets and, if  they deem such a conference 
advisable, the topics that might be considered for a provisional agenda.487 
 The committee took this via a draft resolution proposed by Argentina and later 
revised and co-sponsored by Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru 
and Uruguay, after restating the main problems encountered by the less developed 
countries in securing a steady expansion in their external trade. As a response to this 
requirement, some representatives observed that most of  these problems were already 
being discussed in the various bodies of  the United Nations, as well as in other 
international bodies such as GATT; however, most representatives held the view that an 
international conference of  a comprehensive nature would be valuable. 
The preparation for the UNCTAD implied for Latin American countries a new 
wave of  knowledge production about underdevelopment and natural resources. Indeed, 
given that the topics to be addressed were important for developing countries, the regional 
economic commissions and other regional organisations emphasised the preparation of  
the conference and therefore organised their arguments and adopted important 
resolutions and declarations. They build the appropriate knowledge to show the economic 
reality of  Latin America. 
Latin America, supported by the ECLA, prepared two documents. The first one 
was the Alta Gracia Charter488 approved by the Special Latin American Co-ordinating 
Committee of  the Organisation of  American States, and the second one was the reports 
relating to the Brasilia meeting convened by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America. Africa prepared the resolution adopted by the Economic Commission for Africa 
and by the Economic and Social Commission of  the Organisation of  African Unity at 
                                                          
487 UNGA, 1961: 5 
488 Carta de Alta Gracia, 1964 
103 
 
Niamey. Europe prepared the resolution of  the Economic Commission for Europe. And 
in Asia and the Far East the Tehran resolution of  the Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East was prepared. 
 The Alta Gracia Charter, released on 8 March 1964, particularly reinforced the 
thinking prevalent in Latin America and consequently the thinking of  ECLA. This 
document was the conclusion of  experts and representatives of  the governments from 
Latin America, which gathered at Mar del Plata (Argentina), Santiago (Chile), Sao Paulo 
(Brazil), Brasilia (Brazil) and finally at Alta Gracia (Argentina). The origin of  this 
document lies in the Latin American interest in promoting unified foreign trade policies, 
and to work jointly to address its common problems (Alta Gracia Charter, 8 March, 
1964).489 
 Furthermore, the charter stressed the difficulties faced by Latin America in 
international trade. Despite the increase of  its exports, Latin America depended on 
financial support from developed countries to keep its growth. However, given its slow 
growth it could not pay its debts.490 Likewise, the interdependence of  regional economies 
was recognised as a way to achieve and keep the global peace. Thus, the Latin American 
countries requested a new structure of  international trade and supported the requirement 
made by the developing countries through its “Joint declaration of  developing countries”. 
 Finally, on 23 March 1964 the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development started. The UNCTAD organised twenty three years after the UN, was the 
culmination of  the developing countries’ efforts to achieve a fair trade, and was the 
conference in which the G77 was established. 
 Regarding the “Declaration of  Developing Countries”, all countries recognised the 
work done by Latin America through the Alta Gracia Charter as a culmination of  their 
efforts, and stressed the significance of  the work done by the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA) in this context. According to the representative of  Mexico, Raul 
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Salinas Lozano, Secretary of  Industry and Commerce of  Mexico, at the thirteenth plenary 
meeting at the UNCTAD I491 held on 1 April 1964: 
No sooner had the United Nations approved the resolution for the convening of  this 
Conference than ECLA set about the task of  forming a group of  experts who, assisted by 
the Institute's research body, produced the document which served as a basic paper for the 
Brasilia meeting and culminated in the Alta Gracia Charter.492 
 These ideas proposed by Latin America were supported by countries from Central 
America as well. The Central American Representative, Carlos Enrique Peralta, Minister 
of  Economy of  Guatemala, speaking on behalf  Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua at 
the sixth plenary meeting of  the UNCTAD,493 held on 25 March 1964, said: 
Central America supports the Latin American position set forth in the Charter of  Alta 
Gracia; for it subscribed, when it was adopted, to its principles and suggestions in which 
our own views are presented in conjunction with those of  the other Latin American 
countries. The Charter of  Alta Gracia is the result of  a series of  preparatory reunions 
within the scope of  Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and the 
Organization of  American States (OAS) at which the Central American countries have 
always expressed themselves as one voice feeling that they could make a significant 
contribution to the common stock of  ideas.494 
It is noteworthy that developing countries such as in Latin America made a 
particular effort to participate in the preparatory meetings around the world. This 
participation in the preparatory meeting allowed the exchange of  ideas and experiences 
between developing countries to be intensified; this was fundamental to find adequate 
ideas to achieve the joint positions. The representative of  Mexico, Raul Salinas, 
emphasised this effort at the UNCTAD I: 
May I be permitted at this juncture to express our gratitude to those delegations which 
enthusiastically attended the various preparatory meetings. I shall first mention the 
memorable meeting held in Cairo, and then those held respectively in Ethiopia, Iran and 
Niamey. In our own Latin American region, I must mention Chile and Brazil where, at 
the Brasilia meeting, the Latin American approach to this Conference began to take shape, 
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and finally Argentina, where the position of  Latin America was clearly defined in the Alta 
Gracia Charter. 495 
 The joint work made by developing countries was very important to achieve the 
arguments to negotiate at UNCTAD. In this point the representative of  Argentina, 
Eugenio Blanco, Minister of  Economy of  Argentina at the fifth plenary meeting, held on 
1 April 1964, noticed how Latin America, as a group, worked on the most suitable ideas 
discussed at UNCTAD I496 to achieve coherence with the ideas established by the 
developing countries from other regions: 
In the course of  the preparatory work we have considered the meaning of  the 
contemporary scene. In doing this, we naturally proceeded from the consideration of  our 
national problems to a study of  the problems with which the whole vast Latin American 
region is confronted, and setting these in turn in the framework of  the problems of  the 
developing countries throughout the world. We believe this work to have been extremely 
useful since it has enabled us to work out definitions which have been unanimously 
accepted at the regional level and favourably received by developing nations in other areas. 
True though it may be that different countries and regions have individual characteristics 
and varied problems, a common factor exists in the developing world, namely the need to 
speed up economic growth. This common factor, which inspires the will of  our countries 
to act at the present time, leads to a combination of  effort, to a pooling of  resources and 
to responsible co-operation. At the same time, we are convinced that the developing 
nations of  other regions will harmonize their efforts with due regard to Latin America 
because, through a series of  contacts and exchanges of  views, we have begun to evolve the 
guidelines of  a long-term policy of  solidarity.497 
 Furthermore, these arguments prepared by Latin America were discussed with 
the representatives from other developing countries. In the preparatory meetings, Brazil 
was the country that made the linkage outside Latin America in order to identify the 
common arguments related in international trade; this was affirmed by its representative 
at the UNCTAD I: 
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Subsequently, at the first session of  the Preparatory Committee, in New York, and at the 
second session of  the same Committee, here in Geneva, the Brazilian delegation joined 
the delegations of  other developing countries in setting up a comprehensive agenda for 
our discussions and in identifying, as clearly as they could, the problems related to trade 
and development.498 
 This discussion with other countries was facilitated by the previous work of  Raul 
Prebisch. As the Secretary-General of  the UNCTAD, he visited the UN Economic 
Commissions in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia and Pacific in order to find similarities 
and differences in international trade problems and to prepare arguments for bargaining 
in the conference: ‘In preparing the report, the Secretary-General of  the Conference was 
also fortunate in being able to consult the Executive Secretaries of  the four regional 
economic commissions who spared no effort in providing him with suggestions for which 
he is most grateful’.499 The representative of  Peru, Edgardo Seoane, Vice-President of  
Peru noted the role played by the integration of  Latin America in this process, at the tenth 
plenary meeting, held on 30 March 1964 at the UNCTAD I: 
The problems common to all under-developed countries of  the world must be duly 
appraised. The differences are not fundamental and are related to varying degrees and 
gradations of  poverty determined by local conditions. The reasons for the unity of  the 
Latin American group constitute also the basis to a certain extent of  the unity of  the Afro-
Asian group of  countries, and therefore it should be possible to take co-ordinated action, 
in order to render it more effective, for the achievement of  common prosperity.500 
 Given the preparatory meetings, the Latin American countries were willing to 
cooperate with other developing countries, as confirmed by the representative of  Chile, 
Ambassador Carlos Martinez Sotomayor, at the sixteenth plenary meeting, held on 2 
April 1964 at the UNCTAD I: 
One of  the most salient facts in this historic meeting is the unity of  the developing world. 
From our part, we want to declare our intention of  strengthening this unity, and in order 
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to do so, we are prepared to maintain and build up further the dialogue with Africa and 
Asia.501 
Likewise the representative of  Uruguay, Donato Grieco, Under-Secretary of  State 
in the Department of  Finance, at the fourteenth plenary meeting, held on 1 April 1964 at 
the UNCTAD I:  
With regard to regional groupings, my delegation unreservedly supports all moves towards 
integration on the part of  the developing countries, as a sound and sure means of  
advancing and strengthening economies which, in the face of  the existing difficulties, 
would be unable to overcome in isolation the complex problems that stunt and retard their 
all-round growth.502 
The representative of  Venezuela, Manuel R. Egana, Minister for Development, at 
the ninth plenary meeting, held on 30 March 1964 at the UNCTAD I, had said these 
words:  
The Geneva Declaration, subsequently reaffirmed by the General Assembly of  the United 
Nations, and the Cairo Declaration define the purposes of  this Conference. We believe it 
is essential to keep their contents in our minds when we are studying the items on our 
agenda, since the latter are similar to the points made in both Declarations.503 
The representative of  Mexico, Raúl Salinas Lozano, Secretary of  Industry and 
Commerce, at the thirteenth plenary meeting, held on 1 April 1964 at the UNCTAD I 
added his thoughts: 
No doubt the African and Asian countries and Yugoslavia have progressed as far as, or 
even further than we Latin Americans in the understanding and identification of  their 
problems, which, when all is said and done, are the same as ours. We are prepared jointly 
with them to put forward our just claims to the industrialized countries.504 
And the representative of  Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua, Carlos Enrique Peralta Mendez, Minister of  Economy of  Guatemala, at the 
sixth plenary meeting, held on 25 March 1964 at the UNCTAD I gave his view: 
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We likewise express our sympathy for the aspirations and strivings of  that important sector 
of  the developing world which is represented by the group of  Afro-Asiatic countries. 
Central America will be speaking in the various Committees, as on this occasion, with 
one voice, and all our delegations have been instructed to act together during the 
discussions of  the Conference in a spirit of  solidarity with and support for all developing 
countries.505 
The conformation of  groups of  industrialised countries such the European 
economic group as well as the group of  socialist countries, were attributed unreserved 
responsibility for international trade problems by the developing countries. In general, the 
developing countries sought to reduce or eliminate adverse effects produced by economic 
groupings of  industrialised countries and to promote integration among the developing 
countries. In the words of  the representative of  Peru, Edgardo Seoane, Vice-President, at 
the tenth plenary meeting, held on 30 March 1964 at the UNCTAD I:   
The industrialized countries of  the West have created the European Common Market and 
the European Free Trade Association. The communist countries are, in fact, with very few 
exceptions, associated. The poor and developing countries of  Latin America have decided 
to build up the trade between them and to arrange for joint action in their relations with 
the developed countries. We should like to extend this joint action to countries in a similar 
position on other continents.506 
The idea of  the new order was introduced by Prebisch in the documentation for 
the conference. It was previously presented in the Alta Gracia Charter, in which was 
requested a ‘new structure of  the global trade’. At the conference, the term “New 
Economic order” was used for the first time by Carlos Martinez Sotomayor, Ambassador, 
Chairman of  the Chilean Delegation at the sixteenth plenary meeting, held on 2 April 
1964 at the UNCTAD I: 
Let it be clearly understood that we did not come here with the intention of  requesting 
industrialized countries to assume the full responsibility for remedying the existing 
imbalance; nor are the developing countries trying to make out that the new economic 
order they demand should be a substitute for their own effort, which must always be the 
main element in their progress. […] Regarding the measures which must be considered in 
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order to achieve the new economic order which we are demanding, the delegation of  Chile 
considers it necessary to reaffirm its adherence to the principles, conclusions and 
recommendations set forth in the Charter of  Alta Gracia.507 
 The New International division of  labour, which became later the New Economic 
Order, was focused on improving terms of  trade for developing countries through the 
facilitation of  industrialised exports from developing countries. This initiative meant 
shifting from the division of  labour based on the exchange of  primary goods for 
manufacture, into a new one, in which processes of  industrialisation and the improvement 
of  agriculture in developing countries would be promoted.508 The final objective of  this 
change in the international order was to improve conditions of  trade, constituting a new 
management of  natural resources and new developmental policies. According to 
Prebisch, ‘it is imperative to build a New Order to solve the serious problems of  trade and 
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4.1 Questioning the acceptability of an unfair trade  
The archaeological approach to Latin America in the G77 
 
As was said in the methodological chapter, the archaeology as method seeks to 
explore the elements that give acceptability to the system studied. In this case, the system 
is the Latin American participation in the G77 at the UNCTAD I. This chapter shows 
that international interest to promote the idea of underdevelopment is related to the 
acceptability of international unfairness denounced by the G77. Latin American countries 
took part in the G77 to support the truth related to this unfairness.  
According to the “official history”, it can be said that Latin American countries 
joined the G77 to denounce the unfair international economic structure that started with 
the implementation of GATT by developed countries.510 Indeed, the failure of the ITO, 
the imposition of GATT, the establishment of the European common market, and, 
generally speaking, the indifference of developed countries about the deterioration of 
terms of trade of Latin American exports, are the historical evidence (a priori) that supports 
acceptance of discourses about unfairness of the economic system supported by Latin 
America in the G77 at the UNCTAD I. 
According to the discourse of inequality, developed countries had no interest in 
solving the Latin American problem of low industrialisation and underdevelopment; they 
did not show any intention of changing their practices in commodity trading. 
Industrialised countries did not wish to recognise their responsibility for the destructive 
results of the international scheme in this matter, and the multilateral structure was not 
able to force developed countries to respect commercial agreements. GATT was not able 
to promote the economic development of underdevelopment states. Given the weakness 
of developing countries in negotiations, the Latin American involvement in the G77 at 
the UNCTAD I became the only way to address the situation.  
The history behind the unfairness that leads to international acceptance of the fact 
that Latin American governments take part in the G77, as a diplomatic practice, is so 
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consistent that it is not questioned. Since its beginning, Latin American countries 
participated in the G77 to denounce the international structure that is harming 
development and this participation was sustained by the knowledge produced by the 
ECLA.  
Clearly, given that Latin America is a raw material producer, the inequality of the 
economic system is adequate to sustain discourses claiming national economic interests 
in trade negotiations. Nevertheless, other situations related to the involvement of Latin 
American countries in the G77 are not completely explained by the history of unfairness. 
For example, Latin American coalescence at the UN is a practice commonly used in 
issues related to trade and natural resources, but in negotiations such as health, education, 
and labour, coalescence is not put into practice. In this regard, it is also important to 
mention that, despite criticism by Latin American countries towards GATT, no coalitions 
were established in its negotiations.511 Hence, the discourse is linked to the UN 
negotiations. 
Likewise, participation in the G77 is used mainly at UN summits, in which the 
most states are represented. Certainly, Latin America sought to make clear to all in the 
international community that the unfairness of the international economic system affects 
its development, its commodity trade and its economic growth, as well as the recognition 
that developed countries are the primary responsible parties. Then new questions appear; 
for example, has the international structure of power needed a declaration of inequality? 
How was this structure related to the production of knowledge about commodity trade? 
Was this structure related to neoliberalism?  
 These facts show the need to explore more deeply the acceptability of unfairness 
as the explanation of Latin American participation in the G77. To be precise, I am not 
suggesting that unfairness and the proposal of the ECLA about GATT effects on the terms 
of trade of commodities did not trigger, in some way, the decision by Latin American 
countries to take part in the G77. It is clear that the ECLA studies of the deterioration in 
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terms of trade of raw materials and the impoverishment of Latin American countries were 
an important source of the evidence for this decision.512 
Here, it is questioned why the international commodity trade problem triggered 
by GATT’s inception turned into a discourse about unfairness that should be addressed 
through the G77 in specific negotiations at the UN. Surely, there is a political action 
influencing Latin American involvement in coalitions, and that is being exercised in a 
structure of power at international level, in which, at least, knowledge about trade, 
development and natural resources is important. It is clear that regarding the practice of 
joining the G77, the Latin American government has defined a framework in which 
participation is pertinent.  
Consequently, a “domain for participation in the G77” could be established. In 
this domain, Latin America used the knowledge from the ECLA and claimed improved 
terms of commodities trade at the UN. In this context, we can ask why the unequal 
economic system became an issue to be addressed by Latin American governments 
through the G77. Why the acceptation of the unfairness denounced by Latin American 
countries through the G77 was necessary in the international community? Why 
participation in the G77 is more significant for some negotiations at the UN, such as 
trade? Is this practice related to neoliberalism?  
It seems clear that the participation of Latin American governments in the G77 
belongs to a more complex system. This system could be linked to the exercise of 
governmental power interested in natural resources and development, and which could 
still be in operation. In terms of the eventalisation, it is not evident that the only unfairness 
is the Latin American motivation to take part in the G77. This study seeks to question the 
ostensible cause of unfairness as the system that gives acceptance of the Latin America in 
the G77.   
Likewise, this system presented a component of knowledge that supported the 
power around the Latin Americans in the G77 at the UNCTAD I, and this knowledge 
was the “economy of development” worked initially by the ECLA. The economy of 
development was the knowledge oriented to show each aspect of the unfairness lived by 
                                                          
512 Toye, 2014 
 
 
the region due to the international structure of trade (Prebisch, 1950). Indeed, the ECLA 
studies addressed the roots of unfair trade largely ruled by developed countries through 
GATT. The ECLA focused on showing that each aspect of inequality and economic 
abuse over the Latin American region was caused by the international trade conditions 
imposed by GATT. 
The ECLA mainly aimed to show that international trade affected the 
development of Latin American countries deeply.513 In this context, at the beginning of 
multilateral institutions, and in a condition of underdeveloped economies, the ECLA 
claimed that economic growth in Latin America as a developing country depended on 
multilateral agreements, and argued that the terms of trade of raw materials was the 
dynamic factor of its economies.514 This discourse was taken by Latin American countries 
and deployed in UN conferences, firstly unilaterally and then through the G77. For 
example, the issue of the relevance of international trade for developing countries arose 
in the London Conference in 1946, a preparatory meeting of the Habana Conference. 
This idea was summarised in an intervention by the Chilean representative in the London 
Conference: 
Chile is one of the countries whose economic stability depends fundamentally on its 
foreign commerce […] It forms part […] of one economic group, in which are included to 
a greater or lesser degree all the Latin-American nations and other countries of similar 
economic development. 
The factor which most influences the conditions of these countries is their exports. They 
provide the means of payment for and determine the volume of imports; they place these 
Republics in a position to meet their foreign financial commitments and service State and 
private loans; they furnish a considerable part of Government and private revenue, and, 
finally, constitute the most important factor in the monetary stability of those nations. 
The exports of these countries, which consist principally of raw materials and semi-
manufactured products, are thus the dynamic factor in their economy, and their value 
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greatly influences the internal conditions of the nations concerned and is mainly 
responsible for a state of national prosperity or depression.515 
Here, the Latin American interest remarks the relationship between international 
trade conditions and its economic development, but also remarks the differences among 
industrialised countries and those non-industrialised. In this context, in the ITO 
negotiations it was possible to observe that discourses about multilateral unfairness were 
linked to claims of special measures in international trade to achieve better conditions for 
raw materials trade because Latin American countries were underdeveloped. The fact of 
underdevelopment is an important part of the declaration related to the unfair economic 
system made by Latin America through the G77. The Brazilian representative at the 
London Conference summarised this difference in 1946: 
International trade means more than just one aim. It has not just the aim of increasing 
indefinitely the production of goods, it has also the aim of augmenting the welfare of 
peoples by means of correcting and levelling economic inequalities. International trade 
has the duty and the task of contributing to the diminution of different levels among 
nations - nations not equally endowed by nature and differing in historical fact. Brazil 
agrees that an increase in the volume of international exchange is most desirable. This 
could be arrived at by two means, One, the reduction and possibly the elimination of trade 
barriers, or secondly, an increase of the buying capacities of the peoples. These two 
procedures have as their aim the same result. One is negative and the other positive. We 
are convinced that the positive measure will bring to world trade a greater increase than 
the negative measures would bring to it. As it is a dynamic measure, it can create new 
consumers. Based on this condition, Brazil intends to support any measures which may 
be adopted to bring about greater industrialization of the countries which are at present 
less developed.516 
According to the Brazilian intervention, the needs of industrialisation were not 
taken into account in the establishment of multilateral institutions. Thus, discourses about 
multilateral unfairness arose as a way of supporting discourses about the lack of concern 
of industrialised states about development - understood as the industrialisation of states 
which were producers of raw materials - which also reinforces the distinction among 
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industrialised and non-industrialised states. In the Habana Conference, Latin American 
states established clearly this situation in a joint declaration: 
…there remain undecided questions of the greatest importance regarding problems on 
whose equitable solution depends the establishment in the Charter of the desired 
equilibrium between the industrialized countries and those others that aspire to the 
increasing development of their resources in order to realize the guiding principles of 
economic co-operation contained in the United Nations Charter. We believe that the 
desire expressed by our delegations that formulas should be found to permit the 
diversification of our sources of production and the development of our industries has not 
been adequately met, and this explains the differences in views that are still outstanding 
regarding the provisions of the Draft Charter, and which we consider to be of fundamental 
importance.517 
   Then, it seems that the aborting of the ITO, the subsequent implementation of GATT, 
general changes of international trade conditions, and the distinction of states according 
to their level of industrialisation - or, in other words, their capacity to produce natural 
resources - belongs to the same mechanism. This is a mechanism that seeks the 
international availability of raw materials over discourses of the equity of conditions of 
trade. Indeed, the purpose of GATT has been the ‘substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous basis’.518  
However, this ‘reciprocal basis’, allowing neither tariff concessions nor any 
special concessions to countries mostly dependent on the export of natural resources, puts 
greater pressure on raw materials production due to the need of reciprocity, which, in 
turn, provoked the deterioration of terms of trade of raw materials produced by Latin 
America. The situation caused by GATT also provoked the Latin American government 
to change its internal practices to increase its export of raw materials, to compete in 
international markets and achieve development.  
The Alta Gracia Charter recognised a need for change to make efficient the 
exploitation of natural resources at a national level.519 But it also claimed that those 
                                                          
517 UNCTAE 1948: 1 
518 GATT, 1947:2 
519 La Carta de Alta Gracia, 1964 
117 
 
responsible for Latin American impoverishment are the industrialised countries. Hence, 
developed countries were being requested to rectify the international system’s defects, and 
to help those “developing countries”: 
It is therefore the primary responsibility of the industrialized countries which benefit from 
the system in force, to correct the defects and contradictions inherent thereto, contributing 
to change the existing trade structure, thereby permitting a more equitable distribution of 
wealth. […] It is the responsibility of the developing countries adversely affected by the 
system in force to promote the organization of trade in accordance with the principle and 
norms set forth hereunder and at the same time, to reform their economic and social 
structures in order to make fuller and more efficient use of their human and material 
resources.520 
Therefore, the Latin American practice of taking part in the G77 to denounce the 
multilateral unfairness is linked to the challenge of Latin American countries to achieve 
development in unjust international trade controlled by developed countries.  
At the same time, the Latin American initiative of revealing multilateral 
unfairness through discourses of coalitions such as the G77 in multilateral conferences at 
the UN, is without doubt the expression of a new political “region” in international 
negotiations. By negotiations through coalitions, Latin America has not only defined a 
“region of the G77 participation” at UN international conferences, such as on the 
unfairness in trade; rather, by its participation in the G77 at the UNCTAD I, Latin 
America, through the ECLA’s knowledge, declared and promoted the connection 
between two important discourses: the discourse about multilateral unfairness and the 
discourse about the “reality” lived in a developing country, which is different to a 
developed one. 
Then, was Latin American participation in the G77 to tackle the first UNCTAD 
only intended to claim justice in the multilateral system? No, it seems that Latin America, 
by involvement with the G77, is being built an artefact to produce more and more 
discourses about the differences between underdevelopment and development.  
                                                          
520 UNCTAD I, 1964c:57 
 
 
Apart from the denouncing the unjust economic system, the Latin American 
governments in the G77 began a discourse about the need for clear differentiation between 
underdevelopment and development, as well as definitions of their role in the 
international community. Indeed, the orientation to raw materials reinforced differences 
among industrialised and non-industrialised countries. The relationship between 
international trade conditions and raw materials availability is closely linked. 
Consequently, the relevance of raw materials in international trade boosted international 
interest in practices taken by commodities exporters, also called “countries in 
development”.  
The discourse against the economic system seems useful to sustain the global drive 
to achieve necessary development, and consequently of “improving” the exploitation of 
raw materials by the international community. This idea of underdevelopment implies a 
reinforcement of the classification and characterisation of the underdeveloped country, 
and this has been in hands of the UN and its regional commissions such as the ECLA. 
Discussion of underdevelopment and its scope is not only promoted by Latin 
America through the G77. It is a practice with structure and organisation through 
multilateral institutions, in need of procedures of management, and which is taking part 
in international power relations, so it should be considered by analytical perspectives. 
Therefore, through the G77 at the UN conferences Latin American countries also support 
the political and technical incitement to talk about underdevelopment and the breach of 
development. 
  The exploitation of natural resources and the international trade restoration after 
the world wars and consequent outbreak of the Cold War led to a greater US need of raw 
materials, which became relevant for further understanding of this practice and its relation 
with the idea of underdevelopment. Indeed, with the economic crisis of the 1930s and the 
outbreak of the Second World War, the international community agreed to take actions 
to restore international trade; the actions agreed implied the establishment of the UN and 
Bretton Woods institutions, forming the multilateral system.521 Given that restoration of 
international trade meant the restoration of European industry, highly affected by war 
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and the economic crisis, the international availability of raw materials, itself a significant 
source of industrialisation, would become all the more vital for the international 
community. The exploitation of raw materials was the issue to be managed by multilateral 
institutions, with consequences to their owners, the underdeveloped state. 
From the Foucauldian perspective, it is possible to say that this interest in natural 
resources, starting with the independence process, was influenced by liberalism and its 
ideas of mutual enrichment. Empirically, thinking about mutual enrichment in Europe 
was based on the development of industrialisation and commerce. This process of 
industrialisation was supported by raw materials provided by colonies, which were 
understood as always available. 
Particularly, the emergence of political economy in the liberal rationality raised 
the idea that the enrichment of the European state did not depend on the accumulation 
of gold, but rather in the ability of the state to create new markets in peaceful contexts. 
The perpetual peace enabled by the Concert of Europe would allow a continuous trade 
with the rest of the world.522 In this context, the establishment of the Concert of Europe 
in a liberal rationality produced a variation in the counterbalance of the state. In contrast 
to the Raison d’État, in liberalism the peace is no longer oriented to limit the forces of 
countries, but rather it should ensure the continuous exchange of goods in international 
trade, goods such as raw materials, through the perpetual peace. Consequently, in 
liberalism a particular international structure is needed to keep this, as Foucault states: 
From the eighteenth century, the idea of  perpetual peace and the idea of  international 
organization are, I think, articulated completely differently. It is no longer so much the 
limitation of  internal forces that is called upon to guarantee and found a perpetual peace, 
but rather the unlimited nature of  the external market. The larger the external market, the 
fewer its borders and limits, the more you will have a guarantee of  perpetual peace.523 
 In this context, liberal empires from Europe had unlimited access to raw materials 
because these came from their colonies. Because of the nineteenth century independence 
process in America, firstly in the US, empires in the twentieth century gradually lost their 
direct control of raw material production, provoking the start of the process by which 
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developing countries became dependent economies to manage industrialisation. Since 
developing countries such as in Latin America are independent they are entitled to decide 
how to administrate their resources. However, these countries are young, and they still 
have a long way to go to achieve development. Consequently, neither they themselves 
nor the international community can trust in their performance and practices to ensure 
availability of raw materials. 
The lack of skills in Latin America to efficiently produce raw materials has 
triggered their interest in improving the mechanisms to exploit natural resources, and to 
ask for help in issues related to poverty, inflation, population, statistics, industrialisation 
and planning, among others. Thus, to solve this lack of skills, in Latin America the need 
of knowledge about underdevelopment has become important. This task would be in the 
hands of the ECLA, the institution that produces statistics for the region; but, statistics 
that must be evaluated, monitored and “approved” by the international community. 
With this idea it is possible to address historic-political questions. The discourse 
of multilateral unfairness that Latin America address through coalitions has operated 
unchallenged, and is in fact part of the same historical network that promotes the 
multilateral structure. The G77 is related to commodity trade in an international 
mechanism that also establishes multilateral institutions. Likewise, it is possible to affirm 
that there is a historical rupture at the beginning of Latin American participation in 
coalitions formed by developing states, the emergence of underdevelopment and the idea 
of the developing country. So, it remains to answer, is this rupture linked to neoliberalism? 
 Finally, it is proper to say that for Latin Americans in the G77 at the 
UNCTAD I, it is less a matter of  discourse about unfairness than of  multiplicity 
of  discourses about underdevelopment produced by a range of  mechanisms 
operating in different multilateral institutions. So, rather than asking for the 
reasons of  multilateral injustice as an explanation for Latin American 
participation in coalitions, the question that guides this study will be: what is the 
nexus of  power-knowledge regarding underdevelopment behind this Latin 
American coalescence that combines natural resources, industrialisation, and 
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trade? With this it will be possible to establish the problematisation that leads to 

























4.2 The Police of Development, the nexus Power/knowledge 
 
This chapter continues the archaeological part of the study and introduces some 
elements of the genealogy. Indeed, the chapter integrates the historical context linked to 
the emergence of the Latin American state and how this process determined the idea of a 
non-industrialised state that gives life to discourses about underdevelopment.  
Likewise, elements of knowledge of a political economy of underdevelopment 
that arose in Latin America have been used as a mechanism of power in the international 
community. This power is called here “police of development”. This “police” that support 
the idea that the underdeveloped state is something different to the developed one, is a 
mechanism of surveillance that gave acceptability to the Latin American decision to join 
the G77. 
The Latin American discourse at UN negotiations that seeks to enhance 
commodity trade conditions, and, generally to achieve the desired development in the 
face of unfair international economic structures, cannot be set aside if we are to 
understand Latin American participation in the G77 at the first UNCTAD. After all, was 
it not control of commodities prices and restriction of imports of semi-finished products 
by the centre that triggered reaction by the periphery? Were the differences between 
industrialised and non-industrialised governments not what defined the establishment of 
the G77?  
It seems that the Latin American participation in the G77 at the UNCTAD I is 
associated with a mechanism that exercises influence over the international trade of 
commodities. Likewise, this mechanism, linking diplomatic practices and trade and 
which started with the inception of multilateral institutions, was related to the 
establishment of a new kind of government, the developing country one. This new kind 
of government was reinforced by the production of knowledge about underdevelopment 
in Latin America. 
To introduce the police of development, it is important to deepen understanding 
of the relationship between markets and the (neo)liberal rationality of government, and 
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how this produces a difference among states. Thus, it is relevant to understand the 
mechanism behind the Latin American interest to improve the terms of trade conditions 
of natural resources and to understand the developing country and the production of 
knowledge about it. 
According to Foucault524 and as was explained in chapters above, governmental 
practices related to interaction with other states (such as diplomatic practices) are guided 
by market mechanisms. Particularly, in the nineteenth century, when multilateral 
structure did not exist as it is known nowadays, liberalism was the rationality of 
government and the legitimacy of the state was provided by the mechanism of prices.525  
This price mechanism that determines the ‘natural truth’ for liberal government, 
was the ‘nature of government’.526 Thus, from a liberal perspective, practices of 
government were evaluated according to regimens of true and false, and political 
economy was the “ratio governmental” that claimed the market nature of the character 
of the government (its rationality), as well as its object and operations.527 About this issue 
Foucault argues:   
In other words, it is the natural mechanism of the market and the formation of a natural 
price that enables us to falsify and verify governmental practice when, on the basis of these 
elements, we examine what government does, the measures it takes, and the rules it 
imposes [...] Consequently, the market determines that good government is no longer 
simply government that functions according to justice. The market determines that a good 
government is no longer quite simply one that is just. The market now means that to be 
good government, government has to function according to truth.528 
The political economy is an integral part of the liberal state, and it determines the 
governmental truth. Likewise, political economy limited the liberal government 
domestically. This limit is the Foucauldian reason to call liberalism ‘the Raison d’État 
auto-limited by the political economy’. In Foucault’s words: 
But what does “the self-limitation of governmental reason” mean? What is this new type 
of rationality in the art of government, this new type of calculation that consists in saying 
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and telling government: I accept, wish, plan, and calculate that all this should be left alone? 
I think that this is broadly what is called “liberalism”.529 
This idea of verification by markets is important because it determines that the 
action of the liberal government, and accordingly its practices, are defined by the 
mechanism of prices. This as a result of the need of governments to avoid control of states 
by a “king”. Indeed, the liberal government’s aim is 'the art of not being governed quite 
so much'.530 
Political economy and liberal ideas are important for Latin America. The Latin 
American government was born highly influenced by them, hence, their rationality 
obeyed largely the economic veridiction. In fact, liberal ideas explain Latin American 
interest in gaining independence from Spain and Portugal and their interest in integrating 
with international markets.531 The verification by markets gives the Latin American state 
the form to govern and the model of success. In this regard, Foucault argues that the state 
is: 
…precisely a practice, or rather the rationalization of a practice, which places itself 
between a state presented as given and a state presented as having to be constructed and 
built. The art of government must therefore fix its rules and rationalize its way of doing 
things by taking as its objective the bringing into being of what the state should be.532 
However, the liberal rationality was not concerned with particularities of the state 
producer of natural resources, the scope of the liberal rationality was the industrialised 
state, such as the European one. In fact, there was no other kind of state in those days.  
Specifically, when Latin American territories were colonies, their government 
was understood to be inside the government of the empire. But in the final period of 
liberalism, when Latin America got its independence, the rationality was interpreted by 
the new independent government, a government different to European ones. For 
example, in the eighteenth century when the independence process started in the 
Americas, the US achieved its independence in the middle of the industrial revolution. 
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Given the global context, this ex-British colony became a new state with a desirable level 
of industrialisation. Nevertheless, the process of independence of the Spanish and 
Portugal colonies in America in the nineteenth century resulted in the emergence of a new 
kind of state, a state with a low level of industrialisation. Indeed, it was this low level of 
industrialisation, caused by the Spanish and Portuguese imperial policies aimed to control 
trade and production of raw materials which itself in part triggered its independence 
process.533  
Notably, during the colonial period, the Spanish and Portuguese empires 
exercised strong power over their American colonies through the control of trade534. This 
control implied that Latin American production was mainly based on natural resources, 
which were exported to Spain and Portugal. Local producers from colonies did not have 
the option to trade freely with other empires or colonies. The obstruction of free trading, 
the lack of competition and the control of production prevented regional industry’s 
expansion, and in comparison with Europe, the industrialisation process was barely 
developed in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies. Latin American producers did not 
enjoy free markets offered by liberalism. The Liberator Simon Bolivar, in the “Letter of 
Jamaica” from 1815, summarises the situation of the American territories due to imperial 
control in times of the independence process: 
The role of the inhabitants of the American hemisphere has for centuries been purely 
passive. Politically they were non-existent. We are still in a position lower than slavery, 
and therefore it is more difficult for us to rise to the enjoyment of freedom. 
Americans today, and perhaps to a greater extent than ever before, who live within the 
Spanish system occupy a position in society no better than that of serfs destined for labor, 
or at best they have no more status than that of mere consumers. Yet even this status is 
surrounded with galling restrictions, such as being forbidden to grow European crops, or 
to store products which are royal monopolies, or to establish factories of a type the 
Peninsula itself does not possess. To this add the exclusive trading privileges, even in 
                                                          




articles of prime necessity, and the barriers between American provinces, designed to 
prevent all exchange of trade, traffic, and understanding.535 
Ideas of political freedom enacted by liberalism in Europe promoted the 
independence process in Latin America.536 These liberal ideas with tremendous impact in 
the region stimulated the Latin American desire to trade freely to improve their social and 
economic conditions. 
The Latin American government arose under the liberal rationality after its 
independence process, but the industrial backwardness inherited from the colonial period 
determined its future as a different kind of state. Thus, the Latin American government 
emerged into the international scene as “another”, a “new” kind of state, a “special” kind 
of liberal state, one with an underdeveloped industry mainly oriented to producing raw 
materials. 
The Latin American government, aligned with the economic veridiction of 
liberalism, was born oriented to ‘securing the conditions for optimum economic 
performance’.537 Its aim was to be a successful government by achieving economic growth 
through free trade. In its beginning, Latin America was oriented to get free trade of its 
commodities in international markets. This reasoning would be also important 
subsequently when the Latin American state sought commodity trade protection through 
the G77 to ensure its economic growth, when this had become the measure of 
governmental success. 
In another perspective, the recognition of independence and the status of a state 
by other countries was necessary for participation in international trade. When Latin 
American governments emerged, there was not an international institution such as the 
UN to facilitate recognition as an independent state. The relevance of this recognition was 
because the category of state gave the Latin American government the freedom to access 
international markets independently and in equal conditions.538 The Latin American 
government should seek by itself recognition of its independence at an international level, 
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and this was only through unilateral negotiations. The US and the UK were the first states 
to recognise the independence of Latin American states.539 This recognition allowed them 
to begin trading, but it was not on equal terms, mainly because of their lack of 
industrialisation and of power in negotiations. 
Despite low industrialisation hampering Latin American competitiveness in 
international trade, and despite it causing differentiation fom other states, their economies 
were not considered in need of transformation into proper industrial states. The Latin 
American government was born differently from “other states” around the world, and 
their discourses in negotiations would show this difference. They did not use just “state” 
to describe themselves, they used other terms such as “new republics”, “new states”, 
“Americans”, “Spanish-American nations”, among others.  
Latin American governments, in an international context guided by political 
economy, understood that commodity trade was the main way to obtain funds to 
implement the modernisation expected.540 The Latin American government had 
confidence in liberalism as the base for organising their governments, and they knew that 
access to trade was determinant in this process.  
Latin Americans therefore tried to enhance theirtrade conditions, and this was 
done through cooperation mainly with other Latin American countries. For example, in 
negotiations convened by the Liberator Simon Bolivar around the Amphictyonic Panama 
Congress in 1825, one of the most important issues deliberated by the American nations 
was the “laws of nations”. Establishing a ‘Hispanic commercial preference’ among 
participant nations was thought to strengthen their possibilities in international trade.541 
In this Congress, Bolivar reinforced the invitation to the UK to take part as an integral 
member of the Confederation, to enhance its trade conditions.542 
Latin America considers its governments more inexpert and younger than the 
European states in many areas, but they were confident about their abilities, in all cases, 
of fulfilling requirements to be a “proper industrialised country”. They were clear about 
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the abuse suffered at imperial hands. However, they had high expectations and confidence 
in free trade and liberal precepts. In a fair international trade, the enrichment needed to 
become an equal to European states was achievable.  
In the international understanding, Latin American problems of trade did not 
have a clear differentiation regarding European states problems. The Latin American 
need of industrialisation was understood as a way of integration into international 
markets. Taking the ideas of Foucault, the Latin American interest was to take part in the 
world’s mutual enrichment. 
Mutual enrichment as we saw previously is a characteristic of liberalism that has 
a significant impact on the organisation of international trade. In fact, the overall target 
of foreign political technologies of European states under the liberal rationality was the 
promotion of “mutual enrichment”, understood as a great collective effort to ensure 
economic growth of the world, though a world largely composed of European states.543  
This mutual enrichment is a field possible, necessary and determinant for the 
structuration of international trade since it identifies Europe itself as the economic centre 
of the world.  
This mutual enrichment is a fundamental idea of liberalism and subsequently in 
neoliberalism, in which Europe (or rather industrialised states) as economic subject, 
understands the world as its stable market, and also as its permanent provider of raw 
materials. Foucault argues: 
In other words, we are invited to a globalization of the market when it is laid down as a 
principle, and an objective, that the enrichment of Europe must be brought about as a 
collective and unlimited enrichment, and not through the enrichment of some and the 
impoverishment of others. The unlimited character of the economic development of 
Europe, and the consequent existence of a non-zero sum game, entails, of course, that the 
whole world is summoned around Europe to exchange its own and Europe’s products in 
the European market.544 
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Liberal ideas of mutual enrichment were relevant to define the international 
structure for trade and for Latin American territories. In the liberal mutual enrichment, 
when Europe identify itself as an economic subject, the rest of the world, such as the 
independent Latin American state, takes a different status in the international trade; a raw 
material producer. Indeed, according to the Ricardian precepts, Latin American countries 
had a role of raw materials producer in the global structure due to their low level of 
industrialisation. The Latin American government is liberal, but not equal to the liberal 
European government. 
Despite political economy being relevant for the liberal rationality of 
industrialised states, they did not possess the same understanding of it. Latin America had 
to choose a model. The liberal international trade proposed by Adam Smith, recognised 
as the “English system”, was not completely appropriate for the Latin American states 
because of their low level of industrialisation.545 Given that the process of independence 
experienced by the United States occurred recently in comparison with the European 
states, and that this country had active industrialisation, its political ideas were more 
coherent for Latin America. Therefore, Latin American governments sought 
industrialisation under the “American System”.  
Particularly, the “American System” was a system oriented to protect nascent 
industries, expand the financial system, and strengthen the national infrastructure. This 
system was based firstly on Alexander Hamilton’s ideas from his book Report on 
Manufactures published in 1791, and later based on Friedrich List’s ideas published in his 
book called The national system of political economy of 1834. The difference between the two 
systems is summarised in a much-known paragraph of Henry Carey’s book, The Harmony 
of Interest, published in 1841: 
Two systems are before the world; the one looks to increasing the proportion of persons 
and of capital engaged in trade and transportation, and therefore to diminishing the 
proportion engaged in producing commodities with which to trade, with necessarily 
diminishing return to the labour of all; while the other looks to increasing the proportion 
engaged in the work of production, and diminishing that engaged in trade and 
transportation, with increased return to all, giving to the labourer good wages, and to the 
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owner of capital goods profits. One looks to increasing the quantity of raw materials to be 
exported, and diminishing the inducements to import men, thus impoverishing both 
farmer and planter by throwing on them the burden of freight; while the their looks to 
increasing the import of men, and diminishing the export of raw materials, thereby 
enriching both planter and farmer by relieving them from the payment of freight. One 
looks to giving the products of millions of acres of land and of the labour of millions of 
men for the services of hundreds of thousands of distant men; the other to bringing distant 
men to consume on the land the products of the land, exchanging day's labour for day's 
labour. One looks to compelling the farmers and planters of the Union to continue their 
contributions for the support of the fleets and the armies, the paupers, the nobles, and the 
sovereigns of Europe; the other to enabling ourselves to apply the same means to the moral 
and intellectual improvement of the sovereigns of America. One looks to the continuance 
of that bastard freedom of trade which denies the principle of protection, yet doles it out 
as revenue duties; the other to extending the area of legitimate free trade by the 
establishment of perfect protection, followed by the annexation of individuals and 
communities, and ultimately by the abolition of custom houses. One looks to exporting 
men to occupy desert tracts, the sovereignty of which is obtained by aid of diplomacy or 
war; importing men by millions for their occupation. One looks to the centralization of 
wealth and power in a great commercial city that shall rival the great cities of modern 
times, which have been and are being supported by aid of contributions which have 
exhausted every nation subjected to them; the other to concentration, by aid of which a 
market shall be made upon the land for the products of the land, and the farmer and 
planter be enriched. One looks to increasing the necessity for commerce; the other to 
increasing the power to maintain it. One looks to underworking the Hindoo, and sinking 
the rest of the world to his level; the other to raising the standard of man throughout the 
world to our level. One looks to pauperism, ignorance, depopulation, and barbarism; the 
other to increasing wealth, comfort, intelligence, combination of action, and civilization. 
One looks toward universal war; the other toward universal peace. One is the English 
system; the other we may be proud to call the American system, for it is the only one ever 
devised the tendency of which was that of elevating while equalizing the condition of man 
throughout the world.546 
                                                          
546 Carey 1868:228 
131 
 
These differences between the American and the English political economy 
perspectives show the differences between industrialised states and those that require 
more industrialisation. This world organisation of industrialised and non-industrialised 
states that was replicated by neoliberalism and reinforced by the inception of multilateral 
institutions also defined the needs for knowledge to address industrialisation. 
The inception of the IBRD (subsequently the WB), the IMF and GATT due to 
the (European) need for international trade restoration, caused a fundamental change in 
relationships among states and issues negotiated. Multilateral institutions raises the idea 
of an equal treatment of states, as was established in the charter of the UN. Indeed, 
multilateral institutions are distinguished from other forms of international collaboration 
by three properties: ‘indivisibility, generalised principles of conduct, and diffuses 
reciprocity’.547 This means that treatment accorded to one party must be extended to all 
sides, and agreement is expected to provide a rough equivalence of benefits over time.548 
States are equal and should be treated in equality.  
Nevertheless, as multilateral institutions first appear, the industrialised state was 
defined as the pillar on which international system was built. They were the main ones 
affected by the world wars, and they were the ones who took the decision to restore the 
economic world. The industrialised state became the model to follow, while the non-
industrialised state was addressed by its relevance in the production of raw materials for 
international trade, in order to solve problems of food production. Thus, though 
multilateral institutions were established under principles of equality, negotiations were 
done around needs claimed by industrialised states. The states that were producers of raw 
materials were not established as different to non-industrialised states in the discussions, 
except in those about trade. 
In negotiations that implied terms of trade of natural resources, such as the ITO 
one, Latin American countries were not “states” ready to achieve industrialisation 
through international trade, but rather states called “non-industrialised” or 
“underdeveloped economies”.  
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With a backwardness regarding industrial development in comparison with 
Europe and the US, Latin America was considered a region composed of states oriented 
mainly to producing commodities; these states were called insufficiently developed. 
Indeed, in negotiations convened by the US and the UK to establish the first multilateral 
institutions in the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944549, states were labelled as “highly 
industrialised countries” and “raw material producing countries”550. The paragraph on 
the purposes of the International Monetary Fund in the Bretton Woods Conference, 
below, summarises the clear distinction made among states in trade issues. 
No country is completely free from the influence of foreign trade. Raw material producing 
countries need foreign trade in order to find markets for their output. These countries need 
the proceeds of the sale of their products abroad for the purpose of buying goods for 
consumption as well as for the development of their country. Industrial countries usually 
require foreign trade both for the acquisition of raw materials which they use in 
manufacturing and for the disposal of their products. There are great differences between 
countries in the extent to which they depend on foreign trade.551 
 At the beginning of  negotiations about trade, the idea of  developing country 
emerged. New words like “under development” started to be commonly used in 
international vocabulary for states such as in Latin America. States oriented to produce 
raw materials were called “undeveloped”, and states of  Latin America that used to be 
called “raw material producing countries,” began to be called “undeveloped nations,” and 
“underdeveloped economies.” The industrialised state became the “developed state” and 
consequently the norm, the guide for those non-industrialised states. According to 
neoliberal precepts established by Foucault552, any evolution to development should be 
done without compromising international market independence, which would remain 
untouched. GATT defended this independence. 
The industrial backwardness inherited from the colonial period; the decades of 
unbalanced trade with the US (in which it set the price of commodities);553 the results of 
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the wars and the great depression that reduced trade with Europe,554 among other 
situations, produced the Latin American understanding that the conditions of 
commodities trade would not be enough to achieve industrialisation.555 The need for 
international aid became relevant because international commodity trade in conditions of 
low industrialisation and free trade imposed by GATT was not sufficient to achieve 
development. In this international context, Latin America should address the multilateral 
aid in a strong agreement of developing countries; this was done through the G77. 
With the beginning of multilateral institutions there was an encouragement of raw 
material production in Latin America because of the need for food,556 and in parallel, the 
self-perception about its capacities to achieve wealth and development began to erode. 
Thus, while the idea of industrialisation began to be strengthened as the only way to 
achieve economic development, involvement in the G77 at the UNCTAD I to defend its 
needs in international negotiations was crucial. 
 The differentiation among states due to new names about development triggered 
questioning about the roles and problems of  underdeveloped states, questioning about 
how to make complete a state that is not complete. The idea of  underdevelopment brings 
to the states the need to evolve, the need to change, the need to transform this incomplete 
state into a developed one. The required knowledge to support the road to development 
came from Latin America, the region composed of  non-industrialised states and 
majoritarian in number at multilateral negotiations. 
 The changes linked to the multilateral institutions also brought the need of  
knowledge, and consequently knowledge about the state producer of  raw materials. In 
Latin America, the production of  knowledge about the non-industrialised state emerged 
after the world wars through the establishment of  the ECLA.557 Better information for 
negotiations was one of  the reason of  Latin America promoting its inception. In fact, 
after conferences that created multilateral institutions, Latin America realised a need for 
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a greater strategic capacity to negotiate its interests with external partners, and 
consequently further knowledge about the region. 
 Before the ECLA, the economic knowledge used to understand Latin American 
countries was produced from the perspective of  industrialised countries, and so the needs 
of  non-industrialised ones were not integrated into the analysis. Poverty, health problems, 
natural resource exploitation, were issues not analysed from the perspective of  states such 
as the Latin American ones. The industrial state was the norm, and the centre of  all 
international decisions; industrialisation was the guide for all research about 
governmental practices. 
 To solve this lack of  economic knowledge about non-industrialised states, the 
mandate of  the ECLA was to produce knowledge in the discipline of  economic 
sciences.558 This, with the purpose of  supporting global aims related to achieving 
international economic stability and ‘to promote social progress and better standards of  
life in larger freedom’,559 as stated at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 in which the 
UN was established. Following the terms of  reference of  the commission, as adopted by 
the Economic and Social Council at its sixth session, the ECLA observed: 
[…] shall direct its activities especially towards the study and seeking of solutions of 
problems arising in Latin America from world economic maladjustment and towards 
other problems connected with the world economy, with a view to the co-operation of the 
Latin-American countries in the common effort to achieve world-wide recovery and 
economic stability.560 
This knowledge was essential for Latin American negotiations.  
Given its aim, one of the first tasks of the ECLA requested by the General 
Assembly was the formulation of an “Economic Survey of Latin America”561. It was intended 
to achieve a wider knowledge of the region for its economic exploitation. This report was 
structured according to a previous study made for the European region. In contrast to 
European initiatives, the Latin American study was not oriented to promote the 
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industrialisation of countries, but to determine the capacity of their economies to produce 
food given global needs. Particularly and according to the “letter of transmittal” of the 
document, it was: 
[…] divided into two main parts: “Trend in Production” and “Other Economic Aspects”. 
The first present the salient features of industrial and agricultural development; the second 
discusses the effects of such development on special aspects of the economy - especially 
foreign trade, the balance of payment and the inflationary process.562 
The ECLA produced knowledge on different issues such as Trade Trends and 
Policies in Latin American Countries;563 Economic and Legal Status of Foreign 
Investments in Selected Countries of Latin America;564 Studies on Agricultural Credit in 
Central America;565 Immigration;566 Study of Cyclical Fluctuations, among others. 
Established with research purposes in economic matters, the ECLA achieved an 
excellent performance in its first years.567 It defined the base of a political economy 
oriented to developing countries, focused on delineating their key features and defining 
their differences from developed countries. And the main conclusion of these studies was 
of course that raw material exports were not enough to achieve development because 
commodities products show declining trade relative to industrialised ones.568  
ECLA success was mainly due to its Executive Director, Raul Prebisch, and his 
study, The Economic Development of Latin America and its Main Problems.569 Published in 
1949, this study helped Latin America to construct ideas regarding trade, establishing a 
first proper differentiation among industrialised and non-industrialised countries.  
The book clarified that the structure of trade did not take into account the reality 
of non-industrialised states and hence these states were disadvantaged in the international 
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trade.570 It argues that the scheme based on the comparative advantages of Ricardo was 
devised for the world in which all states are industrialised, and all could obtain the major 
benefits of their trade571. However in the real world non-industrialised states depend on 
raw materials prices determined by the industrialised states: 
A long-term deterioration in terms of trade, such as has been found to obtain for primary 
producers over a long period, may be an effect of differences in the rate of increase in 
productivity in the production of primary commodities and manufactured articles, 
respectively. If we can assume that the deteriorating terms of trade for underdeveloped 
countries reflect a more rapid increase of productivity in primary commodities than of 
manufactured goods, the effect of worsened terms of trade would, of course, be less 
serious. It would merely mean that, to the extent that primary commodities are being 
exported, the effects of increased productivity are being passed on to the buyers of primary 
articles in the more industrialized countries. Although statistical data on differential rates 
of increase in productivity of primary production in under-developed countries, and 
production of manufactured articles in industrialized countries, are almost entirely 
lacking, this explanation of the long-term changes in terms of trade which were observed 
in this study may be dismissed. There is little doubt that productivity increased faster in 
the industrialized countries than primary production in under-developed countries. This 
is evidenced by the more rapid rise in standards of living in industrialized countries during 
the long period covered, from 1870 to the present day. Hence, the changes observed in 
terms of trade do not mean that increased productivity in primary production was passed 
on to industrialized countries; on the contrary, they mean that the under-developed 
countries maintained, in the prices which they paid for their imported manufactures 
relative to those which they obtained for their own primary products, a rising standard of 
living in the industrialized countries, without receiving, in the price of their own products, 
a corresponding equivalent contribution towards their own standards of living.572 
The ECLA explained from an economic perspective differences among 
industrialised and non-industrialised states with the aim of promoting industrialisation. 
With the publication of The economic development of Latin America and its main problems, the 
ECLA reinforced that developing countries must follow a different pattern of 
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development than those followed by developed states in the past to achieve 
development.573  
The ECLA success, sustained by the UNGA, promoted an adequate environment 
for the development of a political economy for developing countries.574 This meant that 
Latin America should have a different behaviour in its economic trajectory from the 
industrialised states from Europe and the US, which is not known a priori. 
According to the ECLA, the structure of international trade based on the theory 
of comparative advantage was the main thing responsible of the difficulties of Latin 
America to achieve economic growth despite its increased raw material exports after the 
world wars.575 Prebisch explained that during the world wars Latin America, like other 
producers of natural resources, had a period of economic prosperity because of the 
increase of its exports and terms of interchange of commodities.576 This is clarified in the 
following table that shows the population, export and capacity to import of Latin America 
in the period between 1935 and 1949. 
Population, export and capacity to import of Latin America 1935 - 1949. 
Percentages of variations over the annual average of 1925 (29) 
 Index of physical 
volumes of exports 
Index of price Terms of 
interchange 
Index of the capacity to 
export 
Year Population Total Per capita Export Import Total Per capita 
1930-34 8.5 millions -8,8 -15,8 -44,3 -26,7 -24,3 -31,3 -36,6 
1935-39 18,6 millions -2,4 -17,5 -30,5 -22,1 -10,8 -12,9 -26,3 
1940-44 30,8 millions 7,9 -29,5 -11,1 11,1 -20,3 -26,7 -44,9 
1945 -49 44,3 millions 16,6 -19,1 49,0 49,0 4,4 22,1 -15,6 
1949 49,6 millions 15,3 -22,9 57,4 57,4 11,3 27,1 -14,9 
Source: UN CEPAL, 1950:20 
This prosperity, linked to the shortage of raw materials in industrial centres, 
produced the impression that an increase in commodity production and export in 
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international trade would improve local economic conditions. However, the increase of 
exports at the end of the Second World War did not become an increase in economic 
growth, but rather an increase in inflation in many states of the region.577 The export price 
of raw materials declined mainly because of the Great Depression and the implementation 
of commercial restrictions by the industrial centre.  
The ECLA, through an evaluation of the Latin American economic situation, 
stated that the international division of labour put limits on regional economic growth 
based on natural resources which  consigns Latin America to the “periphery” of the 
industrial world.578 In his document, Prebisch579 states that ‘in this scheme [of an 
international division of labour] the specific task that fell to Latin America, as part of the 
periphery of the world economic system, was that of producer of  food and raw materials 
for the great industrial centres’. The ECLA studies pointed out that Latin American 
economic problems were caused by a change in international trade rules, which impeded 
the Latin American region, solidifying its role as raw materials producer.   
The Latin American development and the consequent industrialisation would 
therefore only be possible through the improvement of terms of trade of natural resources 
and/or international aids. This idea was opposed to the mainstream about the 
development produced in industrialised countries, which emphasised that development 
depends mainly on states’ internal economic performance.580 From a practical perspective 
and in contrast with the thinking about development, the ECLA encouraged 
industrialisation in order to achieve development as well as as an efficient exploitation of 
natural resources in economic terms. 
The “estructuralismo cepalino”, as the ECLA thinking was called in Spanish, 
claims that the international system characterised by a division of labour showed a global 
stratification. This stratification placed nations according to their stage of industrialisation 
in top, middle or bottom categories.581 Nations can move up or down the hierarchy, but 
only a few manage to move up. The structure largely remains unchanged. In this 
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stratification, Latin America is placed by itself on the periphery of trade, setting its 
position in a structure of economic power. These ideas of stratification were deployed 
internationally through the UN and shared by all non-industrialised states in the G77. 
 The ECLA work received strong support from international institutions. The 
ECOSOC and the UNGA stated the relevance of  the ECLA’s studies and promoted the 
enlargement of  its functions. In fact, the UNGA agreed that ‘the Commission was a useful 
and indispensable instrument for the solution of  the economic problems of  Latin 
America; and that it should not only be continued indefinitely but also expanded and 
strengthened’.582 
 Recognition of  the ECLA by the international community was a big step in the 
promotion of  knowledge about underdevelopment. Thus, in 1951 the UNGA recognised 
that the commission made its most significant contribution in the fields of  economic 
development, international trade and current economic trends. Studies in economic 
development, especially the report on Practical and Theoretical Problems of  Economic 
Development, and those in the field of  international trade have already demonstrated their 
usefulness to Latin American governments in the formulation of  policies and practical 
decisions.583  
 From the Foucauldian perspective, it is possible to say that the international 
community’s interest in the enlargement of  the ECLA functions and the production of  
knowledge about natural resources produced in Latin America put the institution in a 
position of  power. Indeed, the institution’s success in its first period of  life gives it the 
status of  a producer of  authorised knowledge, using the terms of  Foucault. From this 
point, the ECLA became an institution that creates truth, and which is also in a position 
of  authority, because this is a UN organisation. 
In this context, the recognition of the ECLA as a producer of knowledge 
transforms it into an institution able to execute surveillance, mainly over natural resources 
and development. With its international recognition its purposes changed and it was 
“authorised” to make recommendations to Latin American governments. The 
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commission was said to have ‘made substantial progress toward this objective since its 
work has now reached the stage where the Commission can assume the practical and 
highly useful role in making recommendations to Member governments’.584  
In the same process and given the lack of economists in the region, the ECLA 
started to give academic information. The choice was made therefore to transform the 
ECLA into a platform of economic training: it was ‘decided to establish the ECLA Centre 
for Economic Development, in cooperation with the United Nations Technical 
Assistance Administration. This would train Latin American economists and arrange for 
special seminars in the various fields of economic development.585  
Thus, considerations from the ECLA, and subsequently from the UNCTAD, 
allowed Latin America to determine the issues that should be solved by the multilateral 
system to promote economic development. These problems determined specific areas in 
which the global structure should attempt improvement, such as issues around raw 
material production. Using Foucault’s words,586 this means that for the multilateral 
system, problems of developing countries became centres of power, and the international 
community was charged with solving them. 
The way to address these problems was through an operation of power that is 
called here “the police of development”. In Foucaldian terms, with the need for economic 
growth development became an issue of the “police”.  Here “police” is used in Foucault’s 
sense, which means: ‘not the repression of disorder, but an ordered maximisation of 
collectives and individual forces’.587 
 It seeks to “normalise” the path to development in order to fulfil international 
requirements specifically related to developing countries’ production of raw materials. To 
achieve this aim, the police of development produce knowledge, and create truth about 
the kind of state called “developing country”. This developing country, that is different to 
the developed country, is evolving, so its evolution needs to be monitored. The police of 
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development promote the surveillance of the development path via international 
institutions. 
This police of development is the way in which the international community 
executes power over raw materials producing countries. The police of development were 
nourished by the liberal rationality that gave birth to Latin American government.588 
A good example of this police of development is the discussion about the 
“multilateral compensation of international payments”. In 1948 at the ECOSOC 
negotiations, and due to a Peruvian suggestion based on the proposals of Brazil and Chile, 
the topic of “multilateral compensation of international payments” among Latin 
American countries and the rest of the world was introduced.589 To evaluate the feasibility 
of this idea, the ECOSOC requested the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to undertake 
a study on transitional measures for the implementation of the initiative.590 The study of 
the IMF concluded that the application of multilateral compensation of international 
payments would not be effective to increase the volume of trade; despite that it could 
improve it.591 The IMF study resulted in the cancellation of “multilateral compensation 
of international payments” in Latin America. The reason argued for the cancellation was 
that Latin American economies exhibit internal and external problems related to their 
economic expansion and suffer economic vulnerability due to a different rate of growth 
of their national income and their population.592 
The failure of this initiative also implicitly underlined IMF recommendations 
about the need for better understanding of Latin America’s foreign trade.593 Hence, it was 
agreed that the ECLA would increase its cooperation and coordination with specialised 
agencies.594 The results of these studies would be analysed by a governmental expert 
committee from Latin America. The new studies concluded that foreign trade problems 
were being caused by the change of patterns of exportation and importation from Europe 
and the United States. Indeed, before the war, Latin America enjoyed good trade with 
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Europe that decreased afterwards; in contrast, trade with the US rose, but because of the 
lack of US dollars, many governments in Latin America were unable to pay their debt 
balances from the US with their credit balances from Europe.595 Particularly: 
The problem of restoring trade between Latin America and Europe is complicated by the 
fact that there have been structural changes in the trade between the two areas. On the one 
hand, Europe has become more dependent upon imports of foodstuffs and raw materials 
from the United States and less on imports from Latin America; and has experienced 
difficulties in competing with the United States for Latin American markets on the other 
hand.596 
The severe problem of payments linked to the lack of monetary reserves because 
of trade with Europe and the United States, caused a reduction of Latin American 
international trade. In fact, the trade with Europe and the US did not allow currency 
exchange; the Latin American trade with the US then implied an accumulation of a 
foreign currency - the US dollar - which could not be used in trade with Europe, and vice 
versa.597 Thus, given that multilateral compensation of international payments was not 
viable for Latin America due to its economic weakness, the IMF recommended the 
adoption of ‘general policies for increasing and directing investment, both public and 
private, towards purposes consistent with economic development, such policies to include 
principles applying to currency, credit and taxation’.598 
According to these recommendations, Latin American governments agreed to 
modify their policies to boost their productivity.599 This was applied to rents and 
capitalisation, through a general increase in commodity production, which implies a 
strengthening of their regional market and the promotion of industrialisation to minimise 
the impacts of international imbalance and increase the flexibilities of their economies.600 
With this decision by the IMF there was a discontinuity in the discourse about the way to 
achieve development. With this decision a discontinuity arose in the discourse about the 
way to achieve development. The IMF recommendation forced Latin American countries 
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to improve the efficiency of their raw material production as well as their exports to solve 
the problem of availability of capital resources development.  
The implementation of these policies did not mean that Latin America was 
moving to autarchy; on the contrary, its objective was to obtain a broad diversification of 
their economies to access the greater integration of the global economy. Therefore, the 
objectives of the international community and the aims of industrialisation would have 
been the same, which was to achieve beneficial changes in the world economy through 
increasing availability of raw materials, and through taking advantage of the promotion 
of industrialisation. In the words of Raul Prebisch, the Executive Secretary of ECLA: 
Emphasis has been laid on the fact that a policy of import substitution must be combined 
with measures aimed at facilitating inter-Latin-American trade. The agreements 
concluded in this respect in recent years hold out promising prospects, and it is to be hoped 
that advantage will be taken of this initial experience to widen the sphere of trade, while 
simultaneously constructing a progressively multilateral system. This is also one of the 
primary objectives of the Central American Economic Co-operation Committee, of which 
the Secretary General spoke yesterday in most encouraging terms, and a report on whose 
work is submitted for the consideration of the delegates.601 
This argument is an important point because Latin American interests suffered. 
Given the failure in the implementation of regional multilateral payments, and the 
consequent lack of funding for development, the ECLA changed its research aim about 
international trade effects on Latin America and moved toward the improvement of 
national capacities to increase the production of raw materials to get financing for 
economic development. From now on, the ECLA made detailed studies in the pre-
identified issues and started to work in new areas in Latin America.  
On the other hand, the request for several studies from the UNGA to the ECLA 
represented in some sense the strong interest that Latin America had in producing 
knowledge to support the developmental process from its beginning. For example, in the 
first report of the ECLA it is possible to observe this situation: 
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All delegations agreed that the production of a basic survey of the economic situation of 
Latin America was an urgent and essential need. It was repeatedly stressed that the 
absence of statistical and economic data on the various aspects and divisions of the 
economic structure of Latin America was a grave handicap and a serious obstacle to the 
study of concrete problems and the search for adequate solutions to those problems. The 
essential need for studies on agriculture and cattle raising, mining, industry, power, 
machinery and equipment, transport, commerce, finance, etc., was therefore 
emphasized.602 
In the discussion of this initiative about multilateral payments, it is possible to 
identify the discontinuity of the system related to the ECLA’s production of knowledge. 
There are the same activities but with a different purpose. Here the practices of the ECLA 
to find industrialisation became a formal conclusion and this conclusion was the increase 
of raw material production. Therefore, areas such as the economic and legal status of 
foreign investment, specific industries studies, technological research, agricultural 
improvement, training, reporting on forest production, foreign trade effects of US defence 
programmes, and population census, among others,603 were investigated to improve the 
production of commodities and also to influence related negotiations in the UN system. 
The decision of Latin America to try to influence international negotiations 
intended to change the multilateral structure to improve developing countries’ trade 
conditions was a significant step in its process of joining the G77. Indeed, while its stance 
positively denounced the unfairness, it also reinforced the idea of the developing country. 
The differences among states defined by the ECLA were the basis for Latin American 
support of the G77 establishment. Since the G77 inception, all Latin American 
interventions at UN conferences have had this differentiation about industrialisation as a 
central point. 
This situation brings some questions: What was the political strategy behind the 
emergence of this idea of developing country? What was the strategy behind the interest 
of the international community to solve development problems and the interest of Latin 
America to join the G77? Was the international interest in addressing issues such as 
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commodity prices, technology, financing, among other, a manifestation of a genuine 
interest from the international community to solve these problems?  
Alternatively, was this interest in solving underdevelopment the beginning of 
monitoring developing countries around the world, the beginning of a kind of control? If 
so, why? How are natural resources related to such control? What is the purpose of Latin 
American participation in the G77? 
Perhapsthe important point is not the interest or the amount of monitoring of 
developing countries. The important point, taking ideas from Foucault, is the way in 
which power is exercised in the international community and how this is connected with 
Latin America participation in the G77. Then, another question appears: is the 
nomination and recognition of the developing country idea a strategy to promote its 
exclusion from the reality, from the truth of a true state?  
It is evident that the knowledge that emerged to solve underdevelopment and its 
calamities was at the same time part of a system that was interested in the production and 
control of natural resources. Likewise, with the establishment of multilateral institutions 
a period of interest began in countries who were producers of raw materials; the under-
developed state began to be built around this role, becoming classified, a formal truth 
about how the real world worked.  
 Therefore, it seems that the function of power exercised by the international 
community over developing countries, related to the participation of Latin America in the 
G77, is not about unfairness but rather an operation of power that considers control of 
natural resources among its main aims. The administration of  natural resources, taken as 
the unlimited resource under the imperial control in previous centuries and the basis of  
mutual enrichment of  liberal rationality, was relevant for the neoliberal multilateral 
structure as well.  
 With neoliberalism, questioning began about international availability of  natural 
resources and the role of  the resources’ new owners, the non-industrialised state. However, 
as we have seen, with this the non-industrialised state acquired a character of  difference, 
of  incompleteness, of  underdevelopment; the bifurcation between industrialised and non-
industrialised states begins. This need to organise the world’s economy and the 
 
 
international structure would bring concerns about forms of  governing the the non-
industrialised state, the way in which it produces wealth, and clearly, the way in which a 
state interacts with other states.  
 Faced with the international community’s need to restore the world, Latin 
America through the ECLA defined important new topics to be addressed in international 
negotiations, such as commodity prices, technology, financing for industrialisation, 
markets for raw materials, sovereignty of natural resources and economic independence, 
among others. In this questioning about the interests of Latin America, the region started 
to define its role in international trade, and started to be clear that the Latin American 
government was different to the industrialised state in economic matters. This difference 
among states due to the emergence of the developing country idea and the importance of 
raw materials is the basis for understanding the link between Latin American participation 
in the G77 and neoliberalism. 
Therefore, the aim of the police of development is the promotion of differences 
between countries according to their level of industrialisation. Indeed, the mushrooming 
of discourses about underdevelopment, produced by the ECLA and deployed by the G77 
stated that the developing country is not industrialised and its aim is to be producer of raw 
materials. The ECLA studies produced the standardisation of developing country 
characteristics creating the labelling of countries according to their capacity to exploit 
natural resources.  
This structure, oriented to promote and preserve differences between states, was 
reinforced by the UN structure. Specifically, at the UN member states were unofficially 
divided into five geopolitical regional groups to share the distribution of posts for General 
Assembly committees. There is a group of African states, another of Latin American 
states, one of Asian states, another of eastern European states and one of the Western 
European and other group states, all of whom are developed countries. This organisation 
by proximities enacts surveillance procedures, and segregation linked to the development 
of coalitions of developing countries. This differentiation that produces the emergence of 
the developing country creates a new reality. Indeed, the specification and classification 
of problems related to the underdevelopment such as commodity price, technology, 
147 
 
sovereignty of natural resources, climate change, among others, facilitates integration of 
the idea of the developing country into the global structure.  
 There is a perpetual spiral of  power and development around the idea of  the 
developing country, using the Foucauldian terms.604 The reality of  the trade problem does 
not seek to eliminate a kind of  state (turning the developing into developed); rather it tries 
to recreate a reality in which the underdevelopment and its vices must be removed. The 
specification of  Latin American states and its problems that have been declared by the 
G77 during the last decades have also built other kinds of  states such as the recent 
“emergent economy” Likewise, given that the developing country is “in evolution” 
towards development, this police of development promotes monitoring and surveillance. 
Developing countries need the support of  multilateral institutions because they are “by 
definition” incapable of  getting complete finance for development. Thus, international 
organisations have to give support to developing countries and this brings a need for 
monitoring and surveillance. The WB and the IMF are commonly oriented to give this 
kind of  “support”, but other institutions at the UN have also fulfilled the role. These 
recommendations have not always found the expected results. However, developing 
countries continue asking for support, which produces more funding needs and more 
support in an endless cycle. The need for development, taking the words of  Foucault, is 
‘an effort that has always been destined to fail and always constrained to begin again’.605 
 In this context, Latin American actions again reinforce the problem they seek to 
solve. The claim made for better terms of  natural resources trade by the Latin Americans 
in the G77 supports a mechanism in which the intervention of  multilateral institutions is 
always needed. The recognition of  “evils” linked to the problems of  international trade 
that Latin America denounces through its participation in the G77 at the UNCTAD I, 
then produces the need for specific knowledge and monitoring by the multilateral 
structure. The ECLA generated this knowledge and executed this monitoring, through a 
form of  surveillance that does not imply repression or discipline. The ECLA produced 
the stats of  Latin American states for monitoring by different international agencies such 
as FAO, UNDP, WHO. These stats are a requirement from international institutions to 
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enable access to their benefits and aids. Latin American countries’ denunciations through 
the G77 of  impediments to development and to the status of  developed countries, seems 
an exercise in futility, doomed to fail and to be repeated endlessly. Underdevelopment is 
identified as the universal evil that should be eradicated, but at the same time it seems to 
be used as the justification for developed countries’ actions over developing ones.  
An important matter here is that all changes in the labelling of states are related 
to challenges arising from the end of liberalism. With the beginning of neoliberalism, 
multilateral organisations changed regarding control of trade and control of states. It is 
clear that things are ambiguous. The large number of institutions devoted to development 
shows not only the international community’s concern with developing countries, it also 
signals control through mechanisms of surveillance linked to these institutions, mainly on 
issues about natural resources and the knowledge related to them. It is possible that today, 
interest in recognition of independence and exploitation of raw materials have lost their 
relevance a hundred years after first becoming key issues in world affairs, but interest in 
development remains important in all its complex and contradictory ways, including the 
way it has been deployed through the G77 at UN summits.  
In this context, perhaps, the purpose of Latin America in the G77 claiming 
improvements in commodity trading is only a way to denounce the reality of a state that 
will never achieve development.  
Thus, the important thing about the Latin American participation in the G77 at 
the UNCTAD I perhaps is not opposition to developed countries, or its criticism of the 
multilateral economic system, but rather that there are other ways in which power at 
international level has worked, that go beyond the surface of those discussions to natural 
resources themselves and development as an idea. So, when Latin America took part in 
the G77 at the UNCTAD I claiming solutions to problems of terms of trade of natural 
resources in the international arena, was the real purpose of these countries becoming a 
developed country? 
Thus, it seems that the power linked to the Latin America participation in the G77 
at the UNCTAD I is a type of power that gives names to create some truths. This kind of 
power builds elements that compose this reality; consequently, it requires evaluation, 
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analysis, statistics, and a complete battery of knowledge linked to development. This 
knowledge is used and produced by the UN institutions. The police of  development seems 
to be a governmental technology that gives Latin American countries more than 
discourses of  injustice, it creates the new accepted category of  underdevelopment, which 
is defended by the G77 at the UN negotiations. Moreover, this power requires discourses, 
actors, and a form to deploy them in;, this is where coalitions became relevant. The 
knowledge produced to support development was also used to implement organisations 
oriented to eradicate underdevelopment. The power did not invent these institutions, but 
has used them to apply and deploy its power. 
Clearly, in the international structure discourses about the terms of  trade of  
natural resources were institutionally accepted, and it is clear that these discourses have 
been reinforced in subsequent decades. They were reinforced through several negotiations 
at the UN and they culminated at the UNCTAD I with the establishment of  the G77. The 
declared opposition to the economic system is an effect of  international unfairness but it 
is also an instrument used by the multilateral structure around the idea of  developing 
country. On the idea of  developing country, the power promoted the need for change to 
achieve economic growth and this idea allows a legitimate intervention. Likewise, the 
increase of  institutions oriented to solve underdevelopment reinforces the pursuit of  
development, leading these institutions to get more power: power comes from those that 
the system is trying to guide, the developing countries. 
During the last decades, a whole economy has been built on the idea of  
underdevelopment, power, unfairness and opposition. These are not contrary but are part 
of  the same system; a system in which the G77 plays an important role.  
It appears necessary therefore to deny the hypothesis of  unfairness in the 
international trade structure as the way to explain the Latin American participation in the 
G77. That unfairness is not only a cause of  the underdevelopment, rather the power 
executed is part of  a dispositif that produces knowledge and which is outside the 
multilateral structure and its multilateral treaties such as GATT.  
This allows us to answer the historic-theoretical questions, and it is possible to say 
that the workings of  power, and, in particular, those mechanisms that are brought into 
play through Latin American coalescence at the UN conferences, do not belong in the 
 
 
category of  unfairness. Unfairness, exclusion and opposition are the forms through which 
power is exercised at the United Nations. The knowledge-power implied in the Latin 
American involvement in the G77 is part of  a more complex structure of  power that needs 









4.3 The problematisation that promote the G77,  
the access to natural resources 
 
This chapter extends the genealogy that started in the previous chapter and introduces 
the international historical context.  
The methodological chapter explained that the final aim of  the genealogy is the 
identification of  the problematisation that identifies reasons for Latin American 
coalescence in the G77 at the UNCTAD I. Thus this chapter shows how knowledge that 
sustains the idea of  the “developing country” was triggered by international concern 
about what I call “problematisation about commodity availability” in global markets. 
Particularly, it explains how the shortage of  raw materials and food in Europe due to the 
world wars, and the parallel need of  resources for industrialisation in underdeveloped 
countries, is part of  a problematisation around natural resources that was addressed 
through multilateral institutions.  
Therefore, it will illuminate how police of development as a mechanism of power 
executed by the international community sought to ensure the availability of raw 
materials in international markets and access to appropriate resources for restoration of 
the world economy. 
According to previous chapters, Latin American participation in the G77 at the 
first UNCTAD was sustained by acceptance of the historical fact that the international 
economic system has been unfair for developing countries. ECLA studies pointed out that 
the international Ricardian structure deepened differences among states, while GATT 
worsened the terms of commodity trade. The ECLA claimed that implementation of trade 
rules affected negatively Latin American access to international markets and harmed the 
Latin American economy, a situation the international community has observed with 
indifference. 
Likewise, the work of  the ECLA allowed acceptance that the foreign trade in 
commodities plays a crucial role in the economic development of  underdeveloped 
 
 
countries internationally.606 This does not means that the international community was 
not concerned with the production and export of  natural resources before the ECLA; on 
the contrary, this interest was present even before the inception of  the United Nations.   
As was explained in the previous chapter, the police of  development that seeks to 
“normalise” the path to development was triggered by the need to ensure the availability 
of  raw materials in the international trade. I call this concern about natural resources in 
international markets the “problematisation of  commodities availability”. This chapter 
proposes that international interest in natural resources has been so important for the 
international community that it has produced in a certain way the police of  development. 
This interest is also part of  the system that produces the Latin American participation in 
coalitions. In this context, the exploitation of  natural resources became a “centre of  
power” over which the multilateral structure exercises its power, as is explained below. 
 It is important to introduce at this point the concept of  the counterbalancing 
mechanism of  the power of  the state. This helps us to understand the interest of  the 
international community in multilateral institutions and its relation with natural resources 
availability. Specifically, the Raison d’État, that shaped the ‘body of  this new art of  
government organised’,607 imposed a balance of  the exercise of  power in the state between 
national and international assemblages of  political technologies. Thus, according to 
reigning governmental rationalities such as liberalism and neoliberalism, when the 
exercise of  state power is unlimited over national technologies, the exercise of  state power 
is self-limited on international technologies and vice-versa. In Foucault’s words: 
That is to say, when it is a question of  an independent power facing other powers, 
government according to raison d’État has limited objectives. But there is no limit to the 
objectives of  government when it is a question of  managing a public power that has to 
regulate the behaviour of  subjects.608 
 Internal and external political technologies of  government are closely linked to a 
complex interaction of  power that causes tensions and adjustments in a counterbalancing 
mechanism of  power.609 This interaction means that the state has an unstable equilibrium 
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of  power between itsouter and inner spheres. Likewise, state power exercised on its 
internal and external political technologies, in a limited or unlimited way, organises itself  
according to the reigning rationality of  government. Regarding the political rationality 
prevailing in a historical period, the power of  the state is exercised on political 
technologies at different intensities. 
 For example, Rose610 argues that the Treaty of  Westphalia, and other agreements 
that ended the Thirty Years War, gave governments the supreme political authority to rule 
their domains (unlimited power); but at the same time, these agreements restricted rulers 
from intervening in the religious affairs of  other states (self-limited external power). These 
arrangements had the novel effect of  assigning to governments the capacity to execute 
unlimited power on their populations while the treaties regulating large-scale territorial 
conflicts and hence regulating and limiting the power of  government in its relationship 
with other states.611 
 This counterbalance of  power in the Raison d’État that enables the state to protect 
its sovereignty, also enabled the state to limit the growth of  other states to protect its 
interests. This protection of  sovereignty was also the aim for Latin American governments 
to support the establishment of  multilateral institutions later, in neoliberalism. This 
limitation of  state power is achieved through the war in the Raison d’État, producing the 
European balance. Foucault states: 
 Raison d’État, accepts that every state has its interests and consequently has to defend 
these interests, and to defend them absolutely, but the state’s objective must not be that of  
returning to the unifying position of  a total and global empire at the end of  time. It must 
not dream that one day it will be the empire of  the last day. Each state must limit its 
objectives, ensure its independence, and ensure that its forces are such that it will never be 
in an inferior position with respect to the set of  other countries, or to its neighbours, or to 
the strongest of  all the other countries.612 
 In liberalism and neoliberalism, this limitation of  state changed. In the shift from 
liberalism to neoliberalism, the international economic situation forced the international 
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community to intervene in international markets to restore international trade. This 
“liberal” intervention, first materialising in the League of  Nations, implied the 
establishment of  multilateral institutions. This multilateral system promoted the self-
limitation of  the power of  the state at international level, changing international rules of  
competition between states. Thus the establishment of  multilateral institutions to achieve 
financial recovery also allowed the establishment of  a structure to promote and protect 
the international trade in natural resources. 
  Given that the (neo)liberal governmental rationality of  countries is based on the 
truth of  markets, the protection and continuity of  these is determinant for the success of  
governments. As was explained above, as well as capital markets natural resources form 
a cucial component of  the world economy, so assurance of  their availability in 
international markets is also vital for the function of  the complete system.613    
The interest of  the international community in the trade of  natural resources 
related to Latin America and its interest in the G77 linked with two important and related 
global processes. The first process was the scarcity of  commodities for industrial 
requirements in Europe as  a consequence of  two world wars which left a foodstuff  
shortage and lack of  raw materials available in international markets.614 Regarding Latin 
America, this process was reinforced by the outbreak of  the Cold War, which promoted 
the interest of  the US in the region’s resources.615 
The second process was the increased control of  natural resources by developing 
countries due to the decolonisation process and discussion about the sovereignty of  
natural resources.616 This decolonisation, mainly promoted by the UN, transformed 
territories rich in natural resources into new states that were mostly non-industrialised. 
These processes led to dependency on the part of  industrialised countries on commodities 
produced by non-industrialised countries.  
Particularly, the outbreak of  world wars that interrupted natural resources trade 
to Europe highlighted to industrialised governments their dependence on overseas raw 
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materials.617 The availability of  natural resources in international markets was seen as a 
problem. The problematisation started.  
Historically, the implementation of  tariff  systems between industrialised and non-
industrialised countries (or colonies) is a point that can be determined as the beginning of  
the concern about the international availability of  natural resources related to non-
industrialised countries. This point in the middle of  the liberal rationality constitutes a 
discontinuity in the discourse. 
The most important initiative of  tariff  systems, related to the commodity market 
in the new multilateral system was the Imperial Preference System,618 launched in the UK 
through the Ottawa Trade Agreements of  1932. This system, under the principle of  ‘home 
producers first, Empire producers second, and foreign producers last’,619 implied that UK 
dominions accepted making preferential concessions to British imports of  raw materials, 
in exchange for similar concessions on UK markets.  
The concern arose because implementation of  the Imperial Preference System 
was against liberal paradigms that ruled international trade in that period.620 The US saw 
this as a problem: they saw in this initiative the risk that other European states were 
interested in taking the same actions to save their economies too. Given that this initiative 
was putting at risk raw materials exports, the US decided to take action to restore the free 
markets.621 
This event changed the pattern of  interest in natural resources. Prior to this the 
US as an economically autonomous and liberal statewas  strongly isolationist, did not pay 
much attention to international economic problems and was not interested in 
international cooperation.622 Indeed, arguing that national governments must not 
intervene in the allocation of  world resources, the US did not join the League of  
Nations.623  
However, implementation of  preferential tariffs by the UK triggered US interest 
in international discussions related to trade restoration after the wars; mainly because the 
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US saw in protectionist practices a risk for the international trade freedom, and hence a 
risk for its own markets.624 In an attempt to reduce tariff  restrictions to avoid protectionism 
expanding, the US government decided to collaborate with the UK for the restoration of  
the international trade.625 One of  the results of  this collaboration was the Atlantic Charter 
signed by the US and the UK in 1941.  
The Atlantic Charter showed international interest in natural resources clearly. It 
defined Allied goals for the post-war world and, considered the first document of  
multilateralism, it addressed the issue of  ‘access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the 
raw materials of  the world which are needed for their economic prosperity’.626  
This ‘access, on equal terms, to the trade’” established in the Atlantic Charter 
became the foundation for Latin American criticism of  the international economic 
system, since it made clear that all states were not equal627. This recognition of  inequality 
was the base of  their discourse through the G77. The ITO conference was where these 
ideas about “access, on equal terms, to the trade” were addressed subsequently and where 
Latin America started to take part in the problematisation of  commodities availability. 
This interest in the natural resources of  non-industrialised countries was related 
to the strengthening of  knowledge about the limit of  natural resources outside the 
empires. There is a relation between the production of  knowledge and the production of  
natural resources.  
This relation between knowledge/natural resources started before the inception 
of  multilateral institutions. A good example was the discussion about the protection of  
wildlife, and the need to feed the rising global population at the beginning of  the twentieth 
century. These discussions drove the increase of  international scientific interest in 
understanding the characteristics and the potential of  natural resources present in colonies 
(also called the Western hemisphere). 
Before the inception of  multilateral institutions, discussion by industrialised 
countries about the future of  natural resources in the Western hemisphere was incipient 
and centred on conservationism. The first institutional initiative was the adoption of  the 
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first regional conservation treaty in 1900, called the African Convention on the Conservation 
of  nature and natural resources and the Convention on the nature protection.628  
This treaty, signed in London by the major powers that controlled the continent 
of  Africa, sought to regulate the exploitation of  wildlife through encouraging the creation 
of  nature reserves on the continent. Following this initiative to protect the resources in the 
Western hemisphere, in 1940 the US government, through the Pan American Union, 
pushed The Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western 
Hemisphere629/630 intended to protect natural resources and scenic beauties on the 
American continent. Known as the Western Hemisphere Convention, it was signed by all 
Latin American countries.  
With the inception of  the United Nations, concern about natural resources from 
colonial territories was transferred to UN conferences. As expected, the purpose changed 
because of  the need for European restoration and, instead of  conservationism, the 
international community was more interested in the availability of  natural resources for 
productive matters. Mutual collaboration on international trade between industrialised 
and non-industrialised countries was critical to find solutions to the international 
economic crisis. 
The “problem” of  the shortage of  raw materials in the post-world war period put 
forward the need for cooperation among nations. Cooperation from Latin America was 
needed because of  its natural resources. This integration into global negotiations was 
through the ITO Conference. Despite that, negotiation were “against” the Latin American 
demands because of  the cancellation of  the institution and the establishment of  GATT. 
They were not, on the other hand, against the need for more commodities from Latin 
America in international markets.  
According to the ECLA, as we saw, the results of  the ITO conference and the 
formation of  GATT harmed rather than helped the terms of  commodity trade. The 
imposition of  GATT and its “most favoured nation” clause led to developing countries, 
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including Latin American ones, to further focus on achieving industrialisation and 
development,631 based on improving the production of  raw materials and their export.  
The ECLA was the institution that brought the knowledge needed to address this 
challenge. ECLA studies were focused on the evaluation and quantification of  different 
resources of  the region. These periodic studies gave the opportunity to the international 
community to analyse, compare and monitor natural resources. The police of  
development was an important ally to satisfying the constant need of  natural resources in 
international markets. Non-industrialised states such as Latin American ones had to 
export raw materials because that was the implicit “agreement” under the banner of  
comparative advantages.  
 The influence of  comparative advantage as the international organisational 
structure promoted the idea that natural resources of  the world were a global patrimony 
that must benefit the whole world. Thus, global natural resources exploited to their 
maximum capacity, and then placed on the markets would bring global welfare and 
stability in the international economy to universal benefit. This idea about “collectivism” 
of  resources was proposed by the chairperson of  the First General Assembly in 1946: 
[…] to constitute the General Assembly of  the United Nations and to make a genuine and 
sincere beginning with the application of  the San Francisco Charter. That instrument, 
having been freely and democratically debated, has been unreservedly accepted by all in 
the knowledge that the machinery set up under its provisions will prove adequate to the 
achievement of  its historic purpose; this, in a Word, is the maintenance of  peace and 
security by collective recourse, when needed, to the use of  land, sea and air forces and the 
establishment, through cooperation in the economic, social, educational and 
humanitarian fields, of  those conditions of  stability and well-being which will ensure 
peaceful and friendly relations, based on the principle of  equal rights and self-
determination among the nations of  the world.632 
Brazil in its intervention reinforced this idea of  cooperation to achieve the global 
welfare. The Ambassador Luiz Martines de Souza Dantas stated in his intervention at the 
First Regular Session of  the General Assembly of  the United Nations in 1946: 
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Thus, man will have made his greatest conquest, and we can join in a common effort to 
stamp out the three great scourges of  war, disease and want, which at the moment are 
dividing and oppressing us. One single thought should inspire our actions toward setting 
up on unshakable foundations the Organization of  the United Nations and I hope that it 
may be its motto: “Communis humanitatis causa”.633 
The objective of  international collaboration was aligned with the aim of  the 
United Nations Charter, signed on 26 June 1945. The charter in its preamble stated its 
aim ‘to promote social progress and better standards of  life in larger freedom’ and to this 
end pledged ‘to employ international machinery for the promotion of  the economic and 
social advancement of  all peoples’.634 This objective was also aligned with the ECOSOC 
Resolution 32 (iv), called Conservation and Utilisation of  Resources635 and reinforced by 
Resolution 109 (VI).636 It states: 
The Economic and Social Council, recognizing the importance of  the world's natural 
resources, particularly due to the drain of  the war on such resources, and their importance 
to the reconstruction of  devastated areas, and recognizing further the need for continuous 
development and  widespread application of  the techniques of  resource conservation and 
utilization.637 
Therefore, in the first stage of  negotiations, Latin America supported the 
European need of  restoration after war on the understanding that this was a cooperative 
effort among nations.638 In this period, Latin America was willing to produce more 
commodities to export, but also expected that their compromise would turn into more 
support for Latin American industrialisation. This spirit of  cooperation among nations 
that supported the Latin American compromise with the UN initiatives was linked to 
problematisation of  natural resources availability, and the need for development as part 
of  its solution. 
The problematisation of  commodities availability was also linked with the 
problem of  scarcity of  food that had to be addressed by collaboration (or distribution of  
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productive capacity) of  all state parties of  the United Nations. For example on 2 February 
1946, in the twenty second plenary meeting of  the General Assembly, the British 
representative stated: 
Last night, at a very late hour, we faced the grim fact of  what a world shortage of  food is 
likely to mean in the coming months. This resolution deals with an equally urgent 
problem, the distribution of  productive capacity.639 
It is important to note that the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) was the 
institution at the inception of  the multilateral structure that most reinforced collaboration 
among states, and which claimed the relevance of  the natural resource destination. 
Indeed, this institution was created with this objective, as stated in the preamble of  the 
institution constitution: 
…to promote the common welfare by furthering separate and collective action on their 
part for the purposes of  raising levels of  nutrition and standards of  living of  the peoples 
under their respective jurisdictions, securing improvements in the efficiency of  the 
production and distribution of  all food and agricultural products, and bettering the 
conditions of  rural population, and thus contributing toward an expanding world 
economy.640 
The FAO, implemented in 1946 as a result of  deliberations at the League of  
Nations about the need for a world food authority, was the first multilateral institution in 
which it was possible to identify a problematisation of  commodities availability. It became 
the first institution entrusted with the management and organisation of  natural resources 
from non-industrialised countries. The FAO inception in part led the way to the need for 
a surveillance of  natural resources. For instance, in the FAO negotiations to establish the 
International Emergency Food Council641 (the body oriented to replace the Combined 
Food Board in 1946 and the predecessor of  the International Emergency Food Committee 
formed in 1949),642 it was remarked that the institutional aim should persuade importers 
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and exporters to adjust their available supplies in accordance with the provision of  the 
most urgent needs.643 
The establishment of  the FAO promoted a major multilateral interest about 
practices in developing countries related to the availability of  food.644 Accordingly, more 
understanding of  these practices was requested to improve them, which implied the 
production of  comprehensive statistics on hunger levels and the production of  
commodities from around the world, but mainly from non-industrialised countries. For 
example, in its first negotiations it was agreed that a mission would be sent to developing 
countries to produce the needed statistics to respond to the request foraid made by 
developing countries.645 The first mission was in Greece, and with it began the interest in 
economic growth in underdeveloped states. The FAO triggered the organisation of  
production and consumption of  raw materials produced by non-industrialised countries 
and consequently, the first stage of  the police of  development.  
The mission to Greece implied an intromission of  multilateral institutions in 
national policies related to development and natural resource exploitation.646 The FAO 
Standing Advisory Committee on Economics in 1946, in an analysis regarding 
implementation of  the World Food Board, declared: 
[…] habilitating or of  raising the efficiency of  agricultural production. The "mission" to 
Greece was the first F.A.O. effort of  a major character and its report offers the basis of  a 
thorough re-organisation and development of  the Greek rural economy. The success of  
this mission, as measured by its report, is bound to lead to similar requests for aid by other 
countries and F.A.O. will grow in status if, and as, it is able to meet such calls for aid. If  
the mission was a "success" in terms of  the apparent sound ness of  its report, the crucial 
test of  its ultimate significance lies in the efforts to give effect to its recommendations. 
Much of  the advice given is wholly a matter for the national government's own powers. 
Much, however, depends on various types of  international assistance; especially as the 
solution of  agriculture's problems in under-developed economies is so largely a function 
of  general economic policy.647 
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 This “intromission” of  the international community into non-industrialised 
economies in order to find solutions to the problematisation of  commodities availability 
would trigger the need of  development in developing countries.  
 Likewise, this development idea needed knowledge to improve the use of  natural 
resources. In Latin America, this knowledge was produced by the ECLA and it was 
focused on development and the need to improve the international trade in raw materials. 
In the ECLA research began with economic aspects of  exports and production of  raw 
materials; later studies were oriented to classification, monitoring, conservation, 
preservation and diversity, among other topics.648 These pioneer studies in developing 
countries, that allowed analysis of  their natural resources practices, would allow at the 
same time them to be surveilled.  
This need of  knowledge production to solve the problematisation of  commodities 
availability is clear in the United Nations Conference on Conservation and Utilisation of  
Resources (UNCCUR). Held at Lake Success, New York, 17 August to 6 September, 
1949, the UNCCUR was the first international conference at the UN to address the 
problem of  natural resources from a scientific point of  view.649 Though the motivation of  
this conference was the conservation and utilisation of  natural resources from around the 
world to achieve the maximum human benefit (UNCURR), discussion was mainly 
centred on resources of  the “Western hemisphere” such as the Latin American ones.  
 In the conference negotiations dealt with topics related to natural resources of  
non-industrialised countries. For example, the ‘Plenary meetings dealt with such 
important topics as the World Resource Situation, Interdependence of  Resources, 
Regrettable Resources, Methods of  Resource Appraisal, Resource Techniques, River 
Basin Development, the Adaptation of  Resource Programs, and Education for 
Conservation’.650 Discussion among delegates, mainly scientists, was about how 
industrialised countries could help non-industrialised ones to enhance exploitation of  
their natural resources, and how to improve the technical assistance given by multilateral 
institutions. The foreword of  the conference stated: 
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From the standpoint of  the United Nations, this chance to meet and know these scientists 
will, I am sure, prove invaluable particularly in the development of  the new and growing 
programme of  technical assistance to the economically less-developed countries, on which 
the United Nations is now embarking.651 
Focusing on the depletion of  natural resources, this conference was held one year 
after the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (the ITO conference) in 
which GATT was agreed. This depletion was divided into categories dependeing on 
country type. It was understood that industrialised countries consume an enormous 
amount of  raw materials for industry while developing countries consume more resources 
due to increasing populations and destruction of  resources because of  their poverty. The 
official discourse about the lack of  resources for development started. 
Therefore, problematisation about commodities availability that triggered 
scientific interest was reinforced by the familiar differentiation among industrialised and 
non-industrialised countries. In fact, the UNCURR discussed the value of  dividing 
countries by their level of  development. The US delegates to the conference, in later 
analysis, remarked the relevance of  this discussion: 
In commenting upon Raushenbush's analysis, John D. Black, U.S.A., pointed out some 
limitations of  dividing the world into two worlds-the underdeveloped and the developed. 
According to Prof. Black, there is neither one nor two worlds as far as resources are 
concerned. Instead, there are a number of  social aggregates each bound together by 
national and trade-bloc ties.652 
 After all interventions by attendants in the UNCCUR, the way in which the non-
industrialised countries would be incorporated into the global structure to solve the 
shortage of  raw materials became evident. Developing countries were integrated as 
producers of  raw materials, and their role was the production of  these resources in an 
adequate amount to respond to the global needs; the Ricardian model was being imposed 
by a multilateral structure of  collaboration. This matter was mentioned in a posterior 
evaluation of  the conference by one participant: 
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Finally, mention was made of  the necessity for international cooperation in resource 
utilization. It was pointed out that world resources are not distributed in relation to 
population or national boundaries. Hence, if  people of  the world are to benefit from the 
world's resources, there must be free and full exchange of  products among nations. Only 
in this way can each nation specialize in those products for which it enjoys the greatest 
comparative advantage or least comparative disadvantage. Thus it was that while tariffs, 
duties, cartels, quotas, monetary manipulations and various other political and economic 
devices were generally recognized as constituting the major obstacles to improved 
utilization of  the resources of  the world, these obstacles were mostly outside the scope 
and organization of  the Conference.653 
 With the beginning of  the United Nations, the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC), established by the UN Charter in 1946, was the main 
institution preoccupied with non-industrialised states. Indeed, this institution, considered 
nowadays ‘the UN’s central platform for reflection, debate, and innovative thinking on 
sustainable development’, is ‘the principal body for coordination, policy review, policy 
dialogue and recommendations on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as 
for implementation of  the internationally agreed development goals’.654 
 However this institution did not achieve enough autonomy to solve problems of  
underdevelopment.655/656 ECOSOC was not seen by the international community as 
having a major operational role in advancing development. ECOSOC and the General 
Assembly were seen as ‘legitimating and coordinating mechanisms’657. For their part, the 
IBRD and the IMF did not have programmes to help developing countries to achieve 
development.  
 Likewise, the first regional commissions658 proposed in the ECOSOC were not 
trying to solve problems of  development; the Economic Commission for Europe and the 
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Economic Commission for Asia-Pacific were suggested to support European countries to 
overcome the devastation of  these regions after wars. This lack of  orientation to 
development of  institutions was one of  the problems denounced by Latin America in the 
UN General Assembly at the beginning of  Bretton Woods institutions. The ECLA 
became the institution established to provide information on Latin American countries in 
issues related to trade; it became the institution concerned with development.   
 The production of  commodities and their availability in international markets 
became an important part of  the global economy and a pillar for world trade 
restructuration, and the multilateral system was engaged in to ensure commodity 
production. However, although the Latin American region accepted this role of  raw 
material producer driven by the problematisation of  commodities at the beginning of  
multilateral institutions, the role was not recognised by Latin America ultimately, because 
the region desired industrialisation to end its position on the economic periphery. The 
establishment of  multilateral institutions earned the support of  Latin American 
governments because these saw in a multilateral system the opportunity to become a state 
like others and achieve development. With better commodity trade, Latin America would 
be able to achieve development and the economic growth that in those days only 
industrialised states could enjoy.  
 The expectation of  justice motivated Latin American governments to be part of  
global mutual enrichment. Latin America saw in the restoration of  international trade 
after the wars, and the consequent self-limitation of  state power in the international 
sphere, an opportunity to improve conditions for the terms of  trade in its raw materials.659 
The idea of  development became the main way to maintain this Latin American engage 
in the production of  natural resources. The Latin American participation in coalitions at 
the UN conferences was part of  this mechanism. 
 The US, the main builder of  multilateral system, also had a particular interest in 
the relationship between development and availability of  natural resources. Indeed, the 
Scientific Conference on Conservation and Utilisation of  Resources was promoted by the 
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Truman government,660 who had an interest in the discussion and understanding of  the 
development of  developing countries and the subsequent use of  their resources to achieve 
this purpose. This interest was sustained by the contingence related with the threat of  
communism. 
 In 1947 in particular, Truman as the US president launched the programme 
known as the Truman Doctrine. This programme had the aim of  “helping free people of  
liberal states against the communist menace” through the support to achieve their 
development and economic growth. The “free states” that required assistance were 
Greece and Turkey in Europe, and the states of  Latin America; after all, Latin America 
was liberal, poor and underdeveloped. The support offered by the US government was in 
part military but mainly economic and would be realised through the Marshall Plan for 
Europe, that was implemented, and the Progress Alliance for Latin America that was 
suspended close to its beginning. These programs were oriented to support government 
by “guidance” to development: 
I believe that it must be the policy of  the United States to support free peoples who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that 
we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that 
our help should be primarily through economic stability and orderly political process.661 
Truman’s words in 1947 can be complemented with other pronouncements two 
years later in which the objective was explicitly the development of  underdeveloped areas; 
this interest in development was known as the Point Four.662 In this support, promoted by 
the US, the UN had a predominant role. It became the dispositif for development. Truman 
stated: 
The American people desire, and are determined to work for, a world in which all nations 
and all peoples are free to govern themselves as they see fit, and to achieve a decent and 
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satisfying life. […] In the coming years, our program for peace and freedom will emphasize 
four major courses of  action. First, we will continue to give unfaltering support to the 
United Nations and related agencies, and we will continue to search for ways to strengthen 
their authority and increase their effectiveness. We believe that the United Nations will be 
strengthened by the new nations which are being formed in lands now advancing toward 
self-government under democratic principles. […] Fourth, we must embark on a bold new 
program for making the benefits of  our scientific advances and industrial progress 
available for the improvement and growth of  underdeveloped areas.663 
However, the aid offered to Latin America would be diverted by the United States 
Defence Program to serve US military requirements in the Korean War. As a result, the 
Point Four assistance tended to be funnelled into military support programmes in 
recipient nations rather than to social care, or agriculture, which changed the focus of  aid 
programmes.664  
Thus, the outbreak of  the Cold War and the menace of  communism brought 
changes in the ideas that led the UN. It brought new challenges to find solutions to the 
problem of  natural resource availability and consequently it triggered changes in the 
practices of  developing countries at the UN, such as Latin America’s entry into the G77.  
Particularly, multilateral institutions, established on the liberal ideals that 
promoted the expansion of  markets and that the US supported strongly, opposed the 
spread of  states with communist ideas.665 Thus, in order to maintain the alignment to 
capitalism, states that received multilateral aid were subject to more surveillance, and the 
monitoring of  practices related to development became the primary aim of  multilateral 
institutions.  
In the international contingence of  the Cold War, the practices to achieve global 
development and general welfare of  raw materials producing states became something to 
be administrated. The development required a police of  development. That “police” was 
not interested in all national issues, but rather in those linked to international prosperity. 
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Multilateral institutions monitored procedures and concrete actions to achieve economic 
growth.  
Given the international relevance of  natural resources for the global economy, 
these matters were not left in inexpert hands, such as those of  developing governments. 
As Truman pointed out, development should be guided by the multilateral structure to 
guarantee the interest of  people: 
Such new economic developments must be devised and controlled to the benefit of  the 
peoples of  the areas in which they are established. Guarantees to the investor must be 
balanced by guarantees in the interest of  the people whose resources and whose labor go 
into these developments.666 
 The reduction of  European control over natural resources for the reasons we have 
outlined, led liberal governments in the UN to address the problematisation of  their 
availability. Industrialised states came to think about how best to organise global 
production of  resources outside their territories and how to sustain the mutual enrichment 
of  liberal rationality.  The need for administration of  natural resources allowed at the 
same time the surveillance of  non-industrialised states practices. Thus, in order to receive 
the multilateral assistance for development, the developing countries had to limit their 
national actions on the use of  these natural resources.  
 In a general perspective, the multilateral structure had the function of  organising 
and monitoring the development, which meant the police of  practices related to the use 
of  natural resources. Therefore, more than a dialogue about natural resources in 
themselves, the UN negotiations would entail dialogue about techniques for the use of  
natural resources in developing countries. This idea was clarified in the introduction of  a 
UNESCO conference:          
 Techniques for under-developed countries was another question which not only occupied 
the discussion of  several entire meetings but formed a continual focus of  discussion 
throughout the Conference. It is impossible without full presentation of  the many 
viewpoints represented even to list the numerous points and questions which were raised 
with respect to this subject. However, among the more outstanding were the following: the 
                                                          





techniques essential to accelerate the most efficient development of  the local processing 
of  raw materials produced in the less-developed countries where this is desirable from an 
economic standpoint; the mutual contribution of  industrialization and improved 
agricultural techniques to the economic development of  the under-developed countries; 
the adaptation of  techniques to the special conditions of  the under-developed countries 
[…]; special conditions essential for the education and training methods both for 
conservation and development, the important role to be played by local national and 
regional technical institutes, and extension methods of  bringing education directly to the 
farm; the vast contribution to be made by improved health.667 
 The problematisation of  commodity availability implied, at the national level, 
that a correct administration of  natural resources was required to establish better use of  
them. After all, a government that administers its resources correctly could achieve 
development in a better way. 
 In this context of  international surveillance as a result of  the Cold War, and the 
international community’s interest in natural resources of  non-industrialised states, the 
discussion started in Latin America about commodities trade was reinforced. This 
discussion, that triggered the acceptance of  Latin America into the G77, also protected 
the availability of  natural resources in international markets. Latin American countries 
through the G77 have discussed issues mainly about sovereignty of  natural resources, the 
productivity of  natural resources to increase exports, the terms of  trade of  natural 
resources, and natural resources and climate change. 
Therefore, since the inception of  multilateral institutions the planning of  raw 
material production and food became determinant for the world economy prosperity. The 
future of  humankind depended on the developing countries decisions about production, 
export, and conservation. In the present, this is represented in the topic of  sustainable 
development, and nowadays such research is carried out within the framework of  climate 
change. The natural resource is a matter of  analysis and centre of  power intervention. 
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4.4 Latin America in the G77,  
a practice that favours neoliberalism 
 
This chapter presents the relationship between neoliberalism and the Latin 
American decision of  taking part in the G77 at the UNCTAD I. In a general context, it 
illustrates how Latin America tookk part in the G77 as a response to its (neo)liberal 
rationality aimed to promote the expansion of  markets. Latin American practices oriented 
to deal with other states in the international trade acquired a neoliberal rationality as a 
response to the neoliberalisation of  international institutions. Latin America joined the 
G77 to reinforce the idea of  “developing country”, which at the same time enhanced the 
differences between countries according to their level of  industrialisation. This 
differentiation strengthened the need for development, and encouraged Latin American 
governments to compete for new markets. It promoted the export of  natural resources 
required for international markets to keep the expansion of  trade, which is one aim of  
neoliberalism.    
Previous chapters explained how shortage of  raw materials during and after the 
world wars led, to some extent, the establishment of  a police of  development. This police 
promoted the surveillance of  the developing country, while also assuring the availability 
of  raw materials in international markets. This chapter explains how the Latin American 
involvement in the G77 was linked to neoliberalism, as the rationality of  government. 
 The introductory chapter explained why the economic system is important to give 
life to neoliberalism. Now, in order to understand how it started at the UN and in Latin 
America this chapter explains the relevance of  the competition mechanism.  
Neoliberalism, at domestic and international level, does not emerge as a 
mechanical process, it emerges as an economic system that is practicable in an 
institutional framework only, which creates the conditions for its own survival.668 This 
economic system has three parts. One part is a legal-economic framework that enables 
governments to intervene in social institutions to re-create capitalism. The second part is 
                                                          




a legal interventionism as a consequence of  the legal-economic intervention. And the 
third part is the increase of  legal procedures.669  
This framework enables the manipulation of  the economic order through formal 
principles in which economic agents are able to decide freely in markets,670 and can be 
established at domestic and at international level. At international level, the establishment 
of  multilateral systems after the Second World War meant the establishment of  new 
practices of  power and knowledge that were integrated into the international structure.671 
For example, the outbreak of  communism in Western Europe implied a change in the 
practices of  the Bretton Woods System. Institutions such as the WB and IMF changed 
their strategies for international aid and became more surveillant of  the international 
market and domestic policies.  
Problems arose when some countries that were eligible for financial support from 
the IBRD and the IMF (mainly from Europe) started to develop a rationality outside the 
model promoted by multilateral institutions. The US, the main financier of  the system 
and strong supporter of  liberalism, decided to impose restrictions on those countries.672 
The international economic crisis brought the need to establish new rules for the 
international aid. For example, Kahler673 affirms that after the Second World War 
developing countries that wished to participate in multilateral negotiations or join the IMF 
and the IBRD were compelled to sign the General Agreement on Tariff  and Trade 
(GATT).  
States were called on by the international community to reject collectivistic 
ideologies, and international surveillance got underway. The international system was in 
place, under the embedded liberalism.674 
This new system implied a new interaction among states and a new perception of  
state power.675 In fact, the new practices implemented after the war influenced the liberal 
principles of  international institutions and how these would promote interaction among 
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countries. Helleiner676 claims that  ‘the ‘embedded liberal’ vision of  Bretton Woods was 
in fact first put forward in the context of  US–Latin American financial relations in the 
1938–42 period, and that this experience influenced the subsequent Bretton Woods 
negotiations’.  
The post-war economic system that spread market-friendly policies after the 
1970s,677 also drove the deployment of  neoliberalism (embedded liberalism) in Latin 
America. Its legal system allowed neoliberals to create a new capitalism, one under the 
mechanism of  competition.  
 Neoliberalism is a liberal rationality in many aspects, except in its mechanism of  
veridiction. Mechanisms of  verification in neoliberalism are not so different from the 
liberal ones; the major differences between them are the fundamentals of  market 
mechanisms. Thus, while the veridiction in liberalism was based on the mechanism of  
prices, in neoliberalism the veridiction was based on the mechanism of  price under a 
competition.678  
 This change of  the veridiction mechanism was because liberals realised through 
an historical analysis of  economic phenomena that the mechanism of  price is determined 
by a factor inside markets that enables it to work correctly. This factor was the market 
competition and they believed it should be promoted by the state.679 
 According to Foucault,680 competition is an ‘essence’ of  the internal structure of  
neoliberalism. It only shows its effects if  markets respect the logic of  inequality. Given 
that competition does not appear as primitive data in free markets, the neoliberal 
rationality should seek and promote competition. The neoliberal interest is to install 
competition mechanisms at all levels of  the society, and because of  the globalisation of  
markets, this competition should also be installed at international level. The final aim is 
an always continuous market, and, consequently, a continuous availability of  natural 
resources. Foucault affirms: 
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So, what does [neoliberal government] want to do in relation to this society that has now 
become the object of  governmental intervention and practice? It wants, of  course, to make 
the market possible. To play the role of  general regulator, of  principle of  political 
rationality, the market must be possible.681 
 The main aim of  neoliberalism is to promote competition. To do this, 
neoliberalism cannot intervene in the market but, instead, it can intervene in the 
institutions that sustain it. Under the rule of  law, the neoliberal government can only 
intervene in elements that affect the market, but it can never intervene in the market itself  
to achieve its economic rationality. This means that the state in neoliberalism can act 
whenever needed if  this responds to the competition mechanism (the neoliberal 
mechanism of  veridiction). Foucault states: 
Since this [neoliberalism] is a liberal regime, it is understood that government must not 
intervene on effects of  the market. Nor must neoliberalism, or neoliberal government, 
correct the destructive effects of  the market on society, and it is this that differentiates it 
from, let’s say, welfare or suchlike policies that we have seen [from the twenties to the 
sixties]. Government must not form a counterpoint or a screen, as it were, between society 
and economic processes. It has to intervene on society as such, in its fabric and depth. 
Basically, it has to intervene on society so that competitive mechanisms can play a 
regulatory role at every moment and every point in society and by intervening in this way 
its objective will become possible, that is to say, a general regulation of  society by the 
market.682 
 In international trade, the neoliberal structure dictates to states what they should 
or should not do in a pre-determined framework, but the market is not corrected as a 
function of  the effects. GATT settled rules that cannot be changed and that should be 
known by all in international trade; however no one knows the final economic outcome 
for the implied states. Accordingly, the concept of  development emerged as a way to 
influence the international market without intervening directly. This need for 
development, facilitated by the inception of  multilateral institutions, was also promoted 
and reinforced by Latin American countries and its support to the establishment of  the 
G77.  
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  The neoliberal rationality was oriented to promote the differentiation of  states and 
the idea of  development. As was explained above, due to neoliberalism’s aim to expand 
international trade based on liberal principles, its practices trigger the surveillance of  non-
industrialised states. This surveillance - police of  development - also promoted 
competition among states. 
 Neoliberalism as a political rationality is interested in the implementation of  
mechanisms of  competition at all levels of  the society, even in the control of  raw materials 
exchange. Foucault states: 
The society regulated by reference to the market that the neo-liberals are thinking about is 
a society in which the regulatory principle should not be so much the exchange of  
commodities as the mechanisms of  competition. It is these mechanisms that should have 
the greatest possible surface and depth and should also occupy the greatest possible 
volume in society. This means that what is sought is not a society subject to the commodity 
effect, but a society subject to the dynamic of  competition.683 
The aim of  neoliberalism is the protection of  market competition, no matter the 
social cost. Neoliberalism transformed liberalism when the theory of  pure competition 
was changed into a structure with formal properties that guaranteed economic 
regulation.684 Competition in markets is the reason neoliberalism seeks regulation; 
neoliberalism means surveillance, an active and permanent intervention inside and 
outside government,685 such as the police of  development that was raised because of  Cold 
War contingence. In the words of  W. Lippmann Colloquium quoted by Foucault, 
neoliberalism is a positive liberalism, and hence a surveillance liberalism. Neoliberalism, 
according to authors cited by Foucault: 
It is a liberalism about which Röpke, in the Gesellschaftskrisis, which he published shortly 
after the Lippmann colloquium, says: “The free market requires an active and extremely 
vigilant policy.” In all the texts of  the neo-liberals you find the theme that government is 
active, vigilant, and intervening in a liberal regime, a formula that neither the classical 
liberalism of  the nineteenth century nor the contemporary American anarcho-capitalism 
could accept. Eucken, for example, says: “The state is responsible for the result of  
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economic activity”. Franz Böhm says: “The state must master economic development.” 
Miksch says: “In this liberal policy”—and here the phrase is important “there may be as 
many economic interventions as in a policy of  planning, but their nature is different.686 
 The government is called to refrain from any change of  the competitive situation 
as it exists, and to avoid introducing elements that may distort competition. Consequently, 
although in eighteenth century liberalism the market economy was laissez-faire, in 
neoliberalism, competition was established as the essential economic logic. Foucault 
argues: 
[…] the state must therefore refrain from altering the existing state of  competition and 
carefully avoid introducing elements that will alter this state of  competition through 
phenomena of  monopoly, control, and so forth. At the most, it must intervene to prevent 
competition being distorted by phenomena like monopoly, for example687. 
For example, given that companies compete in the international market, the protection of 
private property has been a fundamental part of the neoliberal state, with the aim of 
promoting the productive and ensuring that investments receive their expected income. 
Foucault again: 
[…] the state was called upon to intervene in production in the sense that liberal 
economists in the middle of the eighteenth century said that when you produce something, 
that is to say, when you are investing work in something, it is necessary that everyone 
respects the individual ownership of what is produced. It was for this, the necessity of 
private property for production, that state authority was demanded. But the market must 
be a cleared space free from intervention.688 
 Market competitiveness only appears therefore as a result of  an active 
governmentality that the state produces at domestic and international level, such as the 
police of  development exercised over developing countries. Since the implementation of  
the current economic system, the state governs for the market and not because of  the 
market, and its aim is competition. 
 The low level of  industrialisation of  Latin American countries and their capacity 
to trade successfully internationally define those governments as less competitive.  This 
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discourse is reinforced through the G77. The differentiation of  states and the low level of  
industrialisation meant that Latin America was considered inferior in comparison with 
industrialised countries despite its richness in natural resources.  
 Given that measures to keep full employment detached from international trade 
were part of  the establishment of  IBRD and IMF,689 and that tariff  concessions for 
development were not implemented because of  the ITO’s failure, the industrialisation and 
economic growth of  Latin America were dependent on domestic political measures to 
achieve progress. Thus, the Latin American government faced these restrictions on 
economic growth. The competitive state must be constituted by an educated and skilled 
labour force that produces enough technical innovation to increase exploitation of  natural 
resources, and Latin America was not that. Under the international circumstances defined 
by GATT, only the most powerful states were able to keep their welfare and increase their 
competitiveness.690  
 The power of  industrialised countries over the multilateral structure and its 
negotiations allowed them to impose political technologies on other states. Poor states 
had to accept imposed trade conditions no matter the impact on their economies. For 
example, the lack of  power of  Latin America over the management of  the international 
system in the Habana conference pushed regional states to seek enrichment through 
improvement of  commodity trade mechanisms and by increasing export of  raw materials 
to achieve industrialisation.691  
 The situation that produced international inequality also implied encouragement 
of  more international competition for markets, and, accordingly, better conditions for the 
expansion of  trade, which was desirable for the neoliberal rationality. In this context, the 
shifting from liberalism to neoliberalism (embedded liberalism) in the inception of  
international institutions meant that the balance of  power among participating states in 
the multilateral system should be according to their level of  industrialisation. This means 
that the power exercised in the beginning of  neoliberalism was related to the creation of  
                                                          
689 UNCTAE b, 1948:123 
690 Steinberg, 1995 




differences among states, the labelling of  countries according to the level of  
industrialisation. 
 Therefore, it seems clear that the need for industrialisation and the idea of  
development are more a political form than an economic one. Governmental efforts to 
increase competition through the reinforcement of  development were linked to 
international neoliberal interests in ensuring the availability of  natural resources without 
direct interference. The interests of  Latin American countries in the promotion of  
development of  non-industrialised countries made countries compete, and consequently, 
keep raw materials available in international markets.  
The international practices that reinforced the need for development also implied 
domestic practices were required to support the international need for the expansion of  
markets. The practice of  coalescence promoted the need for development at the first 
UNCTAD, but at the same time produced the need for improvement of  internal capacities 
to increase export of  raw materials and to achieve industrialisation. The exploitation and 
export of  natural resources was the political basis of  the Latin American participation in 
the G77.  
 The Latin American decision to take part in the G77 was related to the neoliberal 
requirement of  expansion of  markets and the interaction of  Latin American government 
with it. Their participation in the G77 was intended to promote competition through the 
reinforcement of  differences. In fact, despite the adoption of  neoliberalism in Latin 
America at domestic level coming after the establishment of  the G77, that 
neoliberalisation started with its need to fulfil the requirements of  international intuitions 
and its own need to be part of  the mutual enrichment. This need is linked to the liberal 
history of  Latin America. 
Historically, different ideologies have tried to conquer the world since the Second 
World War. Latin America had a liberal past, however, andideas of  mutual enrichment 
were very important for Latin American territories. Liberal ideals promoted Latin 
American aspirations to take part freely in international trade and accordingly triggered 
 
 
its independence. Liberal rationality was also the basis of  Latin American support for the 
inception of  multilateral institutions.692 
 However, at the end of  the nineteenth century liberalism started to die due to the 
decline of  the European Concert that had enabled continuous international trade through 
Europe without large-scale wars. Economic conflicts related to the increase of  
protectionist barriers and the consequent end of  laissez faire promoted disagreement 
among states that culminated in the Great War. According to Polanyi693 the outbreak of  
the Great War reflected the crisis of  the liberal rationality that would generate a re-
evaluation of  liberalism and lead eventually to embedded liberalism (neoliberalism). 
According to Ruggie:  
The task of  postwar institutional reconstruction, as Nurkse sensed, was to maneuver 
between these two extremes and to devise a framework which would safeguard and even 
aid the quest for domestic stability without at the same time, triggering the mutually 
destructive external consequences that had plagued the interwar period. This was the 
essence of  the embedded liberalism compromise: unlike the economic nationalism of  the 
thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of  the gold standard 
and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic interventionism.694 
 Latin America during the world wars and, in accordance with its liberal principles, 
had the impression that increasing its participation in international trade was enough to 
improve its economic conditions. In fact, during the world wars Latin American countries, 
like other natural resource producers, had a period of  economic prosperity due to 
increased imports/exports to the US.695 However, at the end of  the war these increases did 
not become an increase in economic growth, but rather economic conditions in many 
states declined significantly.696 
This difficulty Latin American governments faced in achieving economic growth, 
despite the increase in raw material exports, led them to seek explanations for their failure. 
The primary responsibility for the backwardness was found to be the liberal international 
structure of  trade based on the theory of  comparative advantages. In the first document 
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of  the ECLA in which an evaluation of  the economic situation in Latin America was 
made, Prebisch stated that the international division of  labour limits the regional 
economic growth of  states producer of  natural resources.697 
The discourse of  Latin American governments was that prices of  commodities in 
international markets do not act in the same way as industrialised products.698 Hence, 
Latin America was not taking part in the mutual enrichment that liberalism offered, it was 
condemned by the international system to be the “periphery” of  the industrial world. 
Latin American governments realised that the only way to improve their economic 
conditions to achieve industrialisation was through a change in the international structure 
settled in the rules about trade, but these rules could not be interfered with. Commodity 
prices could not be the guide of  international trade because their terms were not beneficial 
for the region.   
With the outbreak of  the Cold War the US became the leader in the establishment 
of  a new kind of  political rationality in international trade, the capitalist one. Latin 
American governments found themselves in the middle of  two political camps that forcing 
them to align liberal rationality with that proposed by the US. 
The contingence in which embedded neoliberalism was being integrated into 
multilateral institutions and given the capability of  these institutions to influence national 
economies meant that the balance between domestic and international political 
technologies of  government and its compensation mechanism was affected and became 
the opposite of  liberalism. Indeed, internal political technologies in liberalism were 
grouped in the “police of  state” and the international ones in the “mutual enrichment”.699 
In neoliberalism, the group of  internal political technologies was called by Foucault the 
‘Society regulated’;700 and the group of  external political technologies was called “global 
development”. Global development was the aim of  a world with different kinds of  states, 
developed and underdeveloped ones, and the only way for Latin American countries to 
address improvement of  their condition was through multilateral negotiations at the UN 
conferences. 
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Thus, government was limited at international level by international institutions, 
while at domestic level, the power of  the state became unlimited. Particularly, in the 
Raison d’État the natural law, represented by the theory of  law and legal institutions, was 
the compensation mechanism of  the “state police”.701 The ‘law provides the basis for 
anyone who wants to limit in one way or another this indefinite extension of  Raison 
d’État that is becoming embodied in a police state. Legal theory and judicial institutions 
no longer serve as the multiplier, but rather as the subtraction of  royal power’.702 The 
natural law that is outside government promoted the birth of  fundamental rights that 
opposed the governmental rationality. Thus, in the Raison d’État state power was limited 
by ‘juridical reason’.703  
 Polanyi704 also identified this orientation to the market with the emergence of  
liberalism. He stated that in the last centuries, most concretely in the nineteenth century, 
a new civilisation appeared, based on a self-regulating market that he called liberalism. In 
this civilisation the state played a fundamental role because it deployed regulation over 
the market. Polanyi suggested that the liberal civilisation was formed by four main 
institutions: two at national level and two at international level. The two institutions at 
national level were the self-regulating market, which produced material welfare of  state; 
and the liberal government, which was a creation of  the self-regulating market. The two 
institutions at international level were the balance-of-power system, aimed at preventing 
long and devastating wars between the Great Powers that would interrupt trade; and the 
international gold standard, which symbolised a unique organisation of  the world 
economy. Taking up the Foucauldian idea of  political technologies, it is possible to say 
that Foucault understood the two institutions proposed by Polanyi at national level in a 
similar way: for Foucault, the liberal state (created, according to Polanyi, by the self-
regulated market) depends on a political rationality of  state dominated by a political 
economy characterised by the defence of  self-regulating markets (laisses faire) to promote 
mutual enrichment of  states. 
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 The state power at international level started to be limited by the neoliberal 
rationality. With the creation of  the UN and the Breton Wood system, the international 
legal structure subtracted the power exercised by states and promoted the birth of  
fundamental rights of  the population of  the world, promoting the need of  development 
as the way to improve economic conditions of  the human kind.  
  In neoliberalism international legal theory has been oriented to subtract the power 
exercised by powerful states over multilateral institutions. Likewise, this natural law 
promoted the birth of  fundamental rights of  the population of  the world, promoting the 
need of  development as the way to improve economic conditions of  all humankind. The 
change of  the international legal-economic framework due to the emergence of  
neoliberalism would be decisive for Latin American government in international affairs.  
 The trade condition implied that governments in Latin America should change 
internal policies in order to retain economic growth. The international economic system 
pushed Latin American states to adopt practices aligned with neoliberalism.  
Regarding embedded international liberalism in Latin America, the ECLA and 
the knowledge it produced played an important role. Foucault705 explains that in 
neoliberalism the economic process must not be understood as a natural mechanical 
process, but rather an economic process should be conceived as a “system” that involves 
economic processes and a history which gives them sense. This economic system cannot 
be analysed by economic theory because there is no pure economic theory in the history.706 
The Latin American government, sustained in the knowledge provided by the 
ECLA, acquired its own economic strategy, one for non-industrialised states. This 
strategy, adapting itself  to the multilateral structure, formed a neoliberalism based on the 
local need of  industrialisation. Indeed, Latin America through the ECLA researched its 
own economic history, and this history enabled it to build a system to protect raw 
materials markets and to achieve industrialisation.  
Neoliberalism, as a liberal regime, is able to settle new capitalisms using a specific 
historical and institutional framework. To do this, neoliberalism does not change the legal 
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structure of  markets, but instead, seeks to change the institutions that regulate the society. 
Each of  these capitalisms is composed of  a particular institutional-economical set. 
Foucault affirms: 
The task of  postwar institutional reconstruction, as Nurkse sensed, was to maneuver 
between these two extremes and to devise a framework which would safeguard and even 
aid the quest for domestic stability without at the same time, triggering the mutually 
destructive external consequences that had plagued the interwar period. This was the 
essence of  the embedded liberalism compromise: unlike the economic nationalism of  the 
thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of  the gold standard 
and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic interventionism.707 
The ECLA was essential in the development of  neoliberal rationality because it 
defined Latin American economic history, verifying the non-industrial state. The model 
of  industrialisation by import substitution (ISI) was the transitional process from 
liberalism to neoliberalism in Latin America708 and it allowed the emergence of  the 
possibility of  taking part in the G77.   
From Foucault it is particularly possible to conclude that at national level a 
capitalist system can be created to promote and protect competition. In German 
liberalism709 (ordoliberalism), Foucault710 states that capitalism is a process influenced by 
history; capitalism is a construct. Hence, capitalism is historically singular, meaning that 
price mechanism is not a natural mechanism and capitalism is not a pure economic 
process. The history of  capitalism is an economic-institutional history and, consequently, 
the history and its reality are crucial in the creation of  neoliberalism.711 Through the 
history it is possible to create a specific economic theory that could be recreated over and 
over again. This historical reality will transform capitalism into a historical institutional 
capitalism.  
The historical context established by Prebisch in the ECLA, evident in the The 
Economic Development of  Latin America and its principal problems, explains historically why 
Latin America is “different”, and why it cannot achieve development in the established 
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multilateral system. In this text, it is possible to find foundations of  industrialisation as 
the basis of  Latin American state legitimacy in the neoliberal rationality. Concretely, the 
introduction states: 
In Latin America, reality is undermining the out-dated schema of  the international 
division of  labour, which achieved great importance in the nineteenth century and, as a 
theoretical concept, continued to exert considerable influence until very recently. Under 
that schema, the specific task that fell to Latin America, as part of  the periphery of  the 
world economic system, was that of  producing food and raw materials for the great 
industrial centres. There was no place within it for the industrialization of  the new 
countries. It is nevertheless being forced upon them by events. Two world wars in a single 
generation and a great economic crisis between them have shown the Latin-American 
countries their opportunities, clearly pointing the way to industrial activity.712 
 To understand how historical studies could be used to support capitalism for 
non-industrialised countries, it is necessary to understand Latin American interest in 
knowledge of  underdevelopment and their subsequent participation in coalitions. Latin 
American governmental history has a different economic history from European 
government. The neoliberal government of  a non-industrialised state must therefore be 
different from the neoliberal industrialised state. This knowledge is the basis of  the 
discourses of  Latin America through coalitions, and it deepens the differences among 
states. 
        Thus neoliberal precepts, such as market competition, supported the differentiation 
of  states while the desire of  the neoliberal Latin American governments to achieve 
development through industrialisation led them to make available raw materials in 
international trade, this being perceived as the solution to the problematisation of  global 
natural resource availability. Latin American governments reacted to international 
neoliberalism by establishing a new political practice to interact with other states. This 
included taking part in the G77. 
The conscious economic system of  neoliberalism created an institutional 
framework inside and outside of  government to promote competition and to give life to 
the truth of  markets. The participation of  Latin America in the G77 was no more than a 
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technology of  neoliberal governments that promoted global development to limit the 
international power of  states at international level, and accordingly to ensure the 
competition of  states that allow mutual enrichment.  
The multilateral institution created by neoliberalism shall have among its roles the 
homogenisation of  different kinds of  neoliberal rationality around the world, based on 
the idea of  global development. The development was the objective of  external political 
technologies of  government under the neoliberal rationality. The idea of  development was 
the aim that guided the foreign practices of  Latin American states, so coalitions responded 
to this idea, reinforced this idea, and maintained this idea as an ideal to be achieved. 
 Political calculation around development is relevant to understanding the 
relationship between industrialised states and Latin American non-industrialised states in 
the neoliberal period, and consequently, their participation in coalitions. This is because 
the multilateral structure understood the Latin American state as a different kind of  state, 
a state that had the role of  raw materials producer and consequently that was not able to 
achieve mutual enrichment. The Latin American state was conceived as merely a provider 
in the international structure.  
 Therefore, the discourse of  coalition around opposition to the multilateral 
structure came linked to this role of  raw material producer, because Latin American 
governments did not have the same opportunities to trade in international markets, and 
consequently their capacity to achieve their governmental rationality, the development, 
was limited.  
 However, this development through industrialisation promoted through the 
coalition could not be achieved, because the achievement of  industrialisation decreased 
the availability of  raw materials in international markets, a critical factor of  neoliberalism. 
Therefore, the Latin American government taking part in coalitions of  developing 
countries in the UN conferences, such as the G77, is a practice that supports neoliberalism 
 In this context, global development as the political technology of  neoliberalism at 
international level was assured by the availability of  raw materials. Latin America was 
available to offer these natural resources because its exports of  natural resources implied 




police of  development, which was supported and promoted by coalitions and accordingly 
utilised by Latin American states, was the way in which the multilateral structure 
influenced international trade, avoiding price control. The police of  development, 
promoted by Latin American states, affected their exports of  raw materials around the 
world. 
    Participation in coalitions such as the G77 emerged in a contingence in which 
there is a shortage of  raw materials, and international concern regarding capacities of  
low-industrialised states to achieve their purpose, producing raw materials. At the 
international level, both kind of  countries, industrialised and non-industrialised, need 
options to ensure the availability of  raw materials to trade, and this was done by protecting 
development in international negotiations through coalitions. 
 The first UNCTAD was the chosen place. Here, Latin America searched for 
development through its participation in coalitions of  developing countries and at the 
same time, it sought the stability of  the whole neoliberal system. Latin America accepted 
the role of  raw material producer, and became available to support global enrichment, but 
also through coalition pursued the opportunity to partake of  this enrichment; 
industrialisation was of  course the key to this. The Latin American role in the first 
UNCTAD and participation in the establishment of  the G77 were the expression of  this 
interest. The discourse of  Latin America through the G77 about to transform GATT was 
not against the multilateral structure and neoliberalism, but rather seeking better 
conditions in the production of  raw materials to avoid the collapse of  the underdeveloped 
state. If  this new state “in development” should fail, all the liberal system would fail. 
Given the power of  industrialised states over multilateral institutions, these states 
had the option to avoid the establishment of  coalitions, but on the contrary, the 
organisation of  the UN promoted this association through its structure. The participation 
of  Latin American countries in a coalition was effective for the international structure 
anyway because this coalition promoted the eternal promise of  a great future through 
development and cooperation among states. 
In the present, the neoliberal purpose of  the Latin American practice of  taking 
part in coalitions plays the same role as in the past. These objectives are the promotion of  
categorical differences among states and the protection of  raw material availability for 
 
 
international markets. For example, an important issue stated in declarations of  the G77 
is the explicit re-affirmation of  the key Principle of  Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities, which reinforces differentiation among types of  states. Likewise, the 
need to defend aid for development is commonly reaffirmed, allowing influence on 
international markets without directly intervening in them. 
However, it is possible to observe some changes at international level that should 
be evaluated in current negotiations to explore participation in coalitions more deeply. 
Firstly, development sought by states has become “sustainable development”, which 
probably responds to a neoliberal reorganisation at international level in the 1990s, linked 
to the end of  the Cold War. Likewise, some Latin American countries have changed 
category in the international differentiation of  states; Brazil for instance is now an 
“emergent economy”, a status linked to its size and natural resources. It is not the scope 
of  this research to explain these changes, but it is clear that shifting to sustainability is a 
modification of  capitalism to sustain neoliberalism, and Brazil’s new category is related 
to a better price of  raw materials at international level. These changes are in turn linked 
to international inconveniences in achieving agreement in some international 
negotiations. 
Finally, in climate negotiations, Latin America is still part of  the G77, seeking 
concessions for development, and the structure of  states is organised according to their 
level of  industrialisation. Natural resources must be protected to sustain continuous 
international trade, that then allows mutual enrichment. In this new context, Brazil 
performs a different role from other Latin American countries; it is an enormous country 
in comparison with others. Because of  its immense capacities Brazil is a state that can 
enrich itself  in global development. Nowadays it has the ability of  enrichment in the 
neoliberal system, like other BRICS countries. Therefore, when these states oppose global 
agreement about emissions they are not against use of  their resources, but rather are 
against the restriction of  the exploitation of  resources from countries of  lower 
industrialisation than them. An illustration of  this is “support” and “concern” for African 
































1. 5. CONCLUSIONS 
The understanding of Latin American countries’ participation in the G77 has 
remained unchanged over time, and has been related to regional desires to reform the 
international economic system that is understood to be unfair.713 Thus, in the literature it 
has commonly been said that the Latin American countries coalescence in the G77 is the 
result of particular experiences related to the failure of the ITO and the imposition of 
GATT,714 as well as volatility in commodity markets, the legacy of colonialism, and the 
lessons provided by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on trade policy.715 Latin 
American involvement in coalitions of developing countries has been explained by the 
need to promote the development of developing countries, which has been undermined 
by neoliberal trends in the hands of the developed countries that lead the world. 
This study, through the use of Foucauldian methods, has proposed an alternative 
understanding of the Latin American participation in the G77. Thus, it has shown that 
Latin America in the G77 at UN conferences is part of a neoliberal dispositif that reinforces 
“developing country” as a category of country different to the “developed country” at 
international level. This differentiation of countries, due to the needs of an international 
structure triggered by the idea of comparatives advantage, also sought to respond to the 
international problematisation about access to natural resources after the world wars.  
This neoliberal dispositif, the result of a primordial neoliberalism that sought the 
intensification of economic regulation through the construction of new institutions to 
keep the economic stability and peace,716 also sought the expansion of markets to ensure 
the mutual enrichment of states. In this context, it is important to clarify that this research 
does not claim that neoliberalism is behind the decision of Latin America to join the G77; 
here the point made is that the neoliberal need for expansion of international markets uses 
the G77 as a good vector to promote the idea of the developing country, an idea that arose 
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with the knowledge produced in Latin America itself. This knowledge helped to build the 
structural framework that defines underdevelopment.   
Thus, it was explained that the differentiation of countries that appears in 
liberalism, turns into a duality of industrialised and non-industrialised countries in 
international discourse after the independence of Latin American countries and the 
beginning if neoliberalism. Actually, the Latin American territory that emerges as new 
countries in the liberal period produces only raw materials due to their Spanish and 
Portuguese colonial pasts. This region, that as colonies had the task of ensuring 
continuous commodities provision to international markets, acquired the role of non-
industrial producer. The division of countries according to their industrialisation is a first 
stage in the subsequent North-South division at UN negotiations  
The differences among states, promoted by the G77 and reinforced by the 
knowledge produced by the ECLA in Latin America, helped to configure the 
international structure under the neoliberal rationality of government, which defines 
development as a way of international surveillance. In this neoliberal structure, the 
developed country is the leader of the international system and the developing country is 
the eternal follower of development that produces raw materials for export. Hence, the 
definition of the developing country as a different state provides at the same time the 
definition of what it means to be a “developed state”. The developing country produces 
natural resources while the developed state is the producer of capital.  
In this context, there is a clear interaction between the international system and 
the G77 that allows its continuity. On the one hand, the Latin American practice of taking 
part in the G77 at the UN reinforces the idea that the non-industrialised country needs 
support from the international system to achieve development as well as the need of a 
restructuration of the international economic system. While on the other hand, the 
division that triggers the G77 as a representative of developing countries promotes the 
need for development in order to maintain a continuous system to export natural 
resources, which allows economic growth at national level and sustains the commodity 
trade at international level. 
 
 
Supporting the differentiation of countries, the G77 is interested in the continuity 
of the system. This explains why Latin American in the G77 was not deployed in the 
negotiations of GATT. The G77 is backed by the international community because it 
supports the international system structured around the idea of development, and 
nowadays around the idea of sustainable development. International organisation needs 
the stratification of countries as a form of global structure.  
The history of the beginning of Latin America in the G77 shows that this practice 
is not part of a phenomenon that only responds to international events, but is rather the 
result of a line of thinking that sought to solve the global problem related to the availability 
of raw materials. This need for knowledge about natural resources is connected with the 
beginning of neoliberalism, the period also known as embedded liberalism.  
This study argues that the differentiation of countries is part of a 
power/knowledge structure that is closely related to the arising economy of development 
and the emergence of the neoliberal rationality of government within the multilateral 
structure. The knowledge built to solve the Latin American need to improve their terms 
of trade in an international system ruled by GATT is what supports a structure of power 
that organises countries worldwide, and categorises states to protect the continuous 
production of raw materials. This knowledge came from the political economy of 
development produced in Latin America by the ECLA, with theories about dependence. 
This knowledge has been supported by several theories produced in the region, such as 
the development theory addressed by this study. 
Likewise, this research claims that the Latin American participation in the G77 
implied the deployment of a starting seed of neoliberalism in Latin America. In the study 
it is claimed that the emergence of neoliberalism at international level, represented by the 
establishment of international institutions to restore and protect markets, fostered the 
emergence of a Latin American neoliberalism. Indeed, given that Latin American 
countries had early participation in multilateral institutions, they were the first developing 
countries to be exposed to neoliberal requirements and the need of a change in their 




This proto-neoliberalism adopted by non-industrialised countries in their contact 
with international trade responds to international differences in labour productivity 
between industrialised and non-industrialised countries. Through the G77, Latin America 
captures this Ricardian theoretical system and pushes to institutionalise the differentiation 
of states according to their natural resources production. The distinction of productive 
roles stated by Ricardian precepts of the labour theory of value, and implemented in the 
liberal rationality, reinforces this competition of countries at the global level. Competition 
is the objective of neoliberal practices at international level. The international competition 
between developing countries for raw materials markets is an important part of the 
mechanism that ensures the possibility of global economic growth, and the Latin 
American government in its international objective tries to sustain the competition among 
states using the need of development.  
Consequently, this research shows that despite Latin America discourses through 
the G77 seeming to oppose the international economic structure, the region has been an 
important part of the process of the neoliberal establishment at international level, helping 
its deployment. The developing country, like a category adopted by Latin America that 
seeks a better condition of trade for commodities at the UN negotiations through 
coalitions, has been fundamental to sustain the neoliberal rationality. Every institution is 
produced by discourses,717 so, the first structure gives the meaning of each country and 
this marks the beginning of exclusion. Discourse has the capacity to naturalise,718 so the 
discourse about development creates the underdeveloped state. The discourse that creates 
differentiation of countries is taken as a truth and is not called into question. 
The establishment of the G77 with Latin American involvement responded to the 
beginning of multilateral institutions. The categorisation of countries reinforced by the 
Latin American coalescence is related to the inception of multilateral institutions that 
have promoted the segregation of states since their very beginning. In fact, despite the UN 
defining all states as equal, it enacts the first specific differentiation of countries in the 
creation of the Security Council and an inexplicit categorisation in the organisation of 
groups in the UN General Assembly.  
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 This appreciation is according to William719 who claims that ‘if the structural 
differences in the international political economy identified the possibility of a coalition, 
international organisations provided the process whereby coalition formation became a 
distinct possibility’. This perspective allows understanding of the multilateral institution 
as a structure that deploys neoliberalism. This perspective accords with ideas established 
by several authors720 who claim that multilateral institutions has been a form to deploy 
neoliberalism. 
Likewise, an important point is the fact that the differentiation was made from the 
very beginning of neoliberalism. According to Vrasti,721 ‘the subject is always that which 
is already born of its origins’. The institutional idea of the developing country was born 
with the new structure, hence, it is defined within a hierarchy of countries and this 
structure is not easy to change.  
Given the need for developing countries as a category in the international system 
and the need for discourses about them, why is there a discourse that opposes developed 
and developing states? Is this categorisation useful to solve the problems of development? 
Does the strategy of defining differences and opposition adequately describe the current 
international system? It seems that the distinction and awareness of differences among 
states do not allow a real dialogue to solve the development; on the contrary, this 
differentiation intensifies and reaffirms the need for a structure that should monitor 
development, a police of development. This police is the means by which the international 
community executes power (surveillance) over raw materials producing countries, 
through the idea of development.  
The result of this research about the limitations on trade and control of natural 
resources exploitation invites new research to follow about the factors that trigger the need 
of non-industrialised governments to increase their control over populations in order to 
achieve economic growth. This means to look deeply at the balance between international 
neoliberal practices and domestic ones. Indeed, given the limitation of government power 
at the international level and the fact that governments have to take care of their 
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populations because of the limited movement of people, this balance, or imbalance, could 
be causing a reinforcement of differences that promotes competition, the basis of 
neoliberal rationality. In this context, Foucault states that the powerful countries in 
neoliberalism could take better care of their populations, allowing for better competition, 
while others must compete on unequal terms. 
The formation of governmental rationality in developing countries, and its 
relation to the multilateral structure, provides an interesting point of analysis for the 
future. For example, exploration of the relationship between the development of 
international neoliberalism and the beginning of governmentality at domestic level could 
yield important results. Indeed, unlimited governmental power over their populations is 
linked to the fact that the international power of states has been limited due to their 
involvement in multilateral institutions.  
The results of this research can also be useful to deepen the understanding of 
current Latin American coalescence with developing countries. For example, in Brazilian 
participation in the BASIC group to address climate change negotiations it is possible to 
appreciate a most explicit differentiation of countries. In the UNFCCC, countries are 
placed into categories to address climate change responsibilities, and accordingly these 
negotiations have introduced more labels for states. The process of categorisation of 
countries in present times has become increasingly efficient. Nowadays, the international 
community has categorisations regarding the size of populations such as the emergent 
economy, or of industrial backwardness such as Central American countries. These kinds 
of state take a particular status in international negotiations and become part of a specific 
coalition. Knowledge about climate change has had the greatest impact on deepening the 
differentiation among countries. 
For example, it is possible to think that climate change as a bargain arena does 
not seek to create a relationship among equal states. But, rather, it would seek to 
strengthen the differences of countries. Indeed, in the UNFCCC countries are organised 
into Annex I and No-annex I. Climate change negotiations institutionalise categories of 
states. Climate negotiation stabilises the differentiation and reinforces it as a form of 
analysis. In fact, the new interdependence that can be glimpsed in climate change with 
the debate about “common but differentiated responsibilities”, reinforces rather than 
 
 
reduces the gap between the powers of states involved. The North and the South 
differentiation in climate change negotiations claims that there will be no equality 
between countries, and these will be considered as different in their roles worldwide. The 
United Nations has encouraged and promoted the stratification of states since its 
establishment. The UNFCCC has institutionalised the differences, defining countries, 
different contexts. 
Regarding methodological aspects, this study presented new approaches to the 
use of Foucauldian methods in international relations. For example, this research is in 
opposition to studies in which the Foucauldian notion of governmentality is extended to 
the international sphere. For instance: 
Foucault’s conception differs from both IR realism and the variants of this view noted 
above, primarily in that he does not see governance as being either the actions of 
government, transnational regimes or the behaviour of firms, but rather as a series of 
practices emanating from diverse actors in society. Governmentality, when applied to the 
‘economic’ and the ‘global social’, situates itself within a sociological tradition of enquiry 
when applied to the field of IR. And as we shall see, a more sociological investigation into 
the realm of governance can do much to overcome some of the conceptual shortcomings 
found in the governance literature, with its focus on macrolevel institutions, statist 
centrality and its inability to account completely for the inherent dynamism of global 
social processes and practices.722 
In opposition to this idea, the current research suggests that there is not a “global 
political rationality” and therefore, there is no one thing that can be called “global 
governmentality” because international space is structured by the interaction of national 
political rationales. While the “older” states and those more powerful impose their own 
rationality to meet its internal mechanisms veridiction, global space is also complemented 
by the perspective delivered by less powerful states, such as the Latin American ones. The 
neoliberal rationality does not apply in developed and developing countries alike.723 The 
best approach is to say that there is an outward practice of governments that creates new 
institutions at international level and that reinforce domestic neoliberalism.  
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This research has also shown that neoliberalism in Latin America has not always 
been imposed all the way down. This study is an example of how governmentality at 
global level is building since the domestic subjectivity of Latin America and the idea of 
development, and how this is reinforced by the “mentality” of international trade guided 
by an embedded liberalism. This is a vision contrary to the top-down vision of the 
governmentality.724 In the example of Latin America and its participation in the G77, it is 
possible to observe that the Latin American country is self-regulated at domestic level in 
order to fulfil the requirement of the international trade and in the final aim to achieve its 
neoliberal rationality.   
Foucault works with practices instead concepts. In other words, the Foucauldian 
methods were appropriated to connect concepts that do not have a “unique” 
understanding, such as neoliberalism or development.725 Given that Foucauldian methods 
are centred on the questioning of  historical truths that support the veracity of  concepts, 
the examination of  these historical truths allows researchers to identify the “origin” of  
ideas, and consequently it brings the opportunity to trace the relationship between Latin 
American participation in the G77 and neoliberalism. 
In a general perspective, the methodological framework used in this research has 
been a suitable way to respond to the research question. Through the Foucauldian 
analysis it has been possible to establish the genealogy of the Latin American coalescence 
and to determine its relationship with neoliberalism. Likewise, this study of Latin 
America in the G77 has allowed the establishment of new concepts regarding 
development in Latin American states and its relationship with the deployment of 
neoliberalism. The Foucauldian approach used in this research has been a resourceful 
method to address understanding of developing countries’ practices in international 
politics. Likewise, the use of discourses made this thesis more oriented to practical 
foundations of neoliberalism than only to its theoretical foundations. 
Moreover, this methodological approach has allowed work with discourses from 
coalitions that represent a category of countries involved, such as developing countries. 
Since the thesis presents a view from Latin America, it contributes to the discussion on 
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the creation of non-Eurocentric international relations. This is important mainly because 
mainstream IR scholarship has, for the most part, been focused on Europe726 and the US.   
 The main strength of this method is the use of discourses as antecedents to explain 
political situations, which is a suitable form to introduce archive sources into the analysis. 
According to this research, the methodological approach used to understand coalitions 
and the use of discourses from the United Nations is a suitable alternative to address other 
problems in international politics. Hence, the use of archives arises as a good opportunity 
to make practical research in diplomacy. This methodology could be useful to understand 
more fully the concepts that promote an analysis of the international system and the 
relationship between state actors and particularly the United Nations.  
Moreover, this perspective, in contrast with others used in international relations 
studies is an interesting way to merge perspectives in political analysis. For example, the 
results of this study are associated with claims established by historical sociology because 
it generates a representation of the international space in which participation is part of 
coalitions of the Latin American states. Using the words of Mill,727 this research attempts 
to capture the “sociological imagination” that includes structures, history and the 
“biography” of states in its analysis. Thus, this research suggests that there is an 
international social structure that is formed by the vision of national social structures, 
which includes the historical perspective. The “biographical” perspective then becomes 
the discourse of state, as a way to emulate the individual. 
The Foucauldian analysis is attractive to enrich other methodologies used in 
politics and international relations. For example, these methods can complement the 
analysis produced by mathematical models, game theory, the “rational choice” public 
choice, or optimisation, among others. It can give them a theorist’s sense about what is 
important to evaluate, and enable progress towards concrete ideas for the best parameters 
selection to be analysed. However, although the way the methodology was applied is 
useful to generate results regarding global structures in which governmental practice is 
located, it would be necessary to define a more accurate method to propose results at the 
national level, such as perspectives about the internal structures of governmental 
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collaboration between countries. Likewise, this methodology will allow understanding of 
the international structure that creates international development and global growth. This 
critical approach would allow more thorough analysis of devices on which current 
governments take decisions internationally, beyond their isolated actors or international 
events. Since this study sheds light on the global structure within which the different 
countries are formed, an extensive use of this methodological approach will allow a better 
understanding of the distribution of global power. 
The Foucauldian analysis using coalitions of developing countries as a practice of 
analysis could be useful to deepen understanding of the category of developing country, 
the North-South division and its relation to the distribution of global power, a matter on 
which authors have shown alternately for or against.728 Indeed, Najam729 argues that the 
South should not be a real concept for analysis, while Williams730 poses the South as an 
area of research in itself, grouping countries within an analysable category as a whole. 
The use of Foucauldian methods is recommended to address South-North matters 
because it is focused on practices, and hence avoids the problem of the differences and 
similarities between countries, which leads to finding points of integration and 
consistency in the investigation. Also, these methods allow the integration of other ideas 
into the research, such as the international neoliberal rationality. In fact, from the 
perspective of the involvement of a government in a coalition of developing countries and 
their similarities with developed countries, it is possible to identify elements that build the 
neoliberal rationality of states, such as the need for global enrichment through of a 
perpetual trade.  
Finally, the use of the coalition as an area of research can help understanding of 
the modern state as an international construct that appeared in the globalisation era. 
Indeed, the relevance of categorisation by types of countries in the international economic 
structure and its relation to the production of natural resources raises new questions about 
how the multilateral structure is maintained and the role of this in the neoliberal 
rationality that comprises it. It also raises questions about how the rationality of the state 
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is being built in the interaction with other states and how this interaction affects the global 
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1. 7. ACRONYMS 
ALCA   Area de Libre Comercio de Las Americas 
BASIC   Group of Brazil, South Africa, India, China 
BRIC(S)  Group of Brazil, Russia, India, China 
ECLA (CEPAL) United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
ECOSOC  United Nations Economic and Social Council 
FAO   Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
GATT   General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 
G7   Group of Seven 
G77   Group of 77 
G20   Group of Twenty 
IBRD   International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
IBSA   Group of Brazil, South Africa and India 
IIRSA Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of 
South America 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
ITO   International Trade Organization 
MERCOSUR   Mercado comun del sur 
NAM   Non-aligned Movement 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NIEO   New International Economic Order 
OCDE   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
 
 
OAS   Organization of American States 
OPEC   Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
TIAR   Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 
UK   United Kingdom 
UN   United Nations 
UNCCURR  Scientific Conference on Conservation and Utilization of  
   Resources 
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework 
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly 
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
US   United States 
WB    World Bank 
WTO   World Trade Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
